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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Democracy in Iran has since 1979 been a major preoccupation 
for the West. Most commentators have failed to see the Iranian 
revolution as a step towards the establishment of a modern 
democratic state. This illustrates a profound misunderstanding of 
different steps in this direction. In three phases contemporary 
Iranian history reads as a tale of state formation. In the sense 
that a state needs to be strong enough to democratize, the Iranian 
twentieth century reads as a long journey towards democracy. In 
a first phase the State prevailed over concentrations of private, 
non-statal power like the tribes, the clergy and the bazaar. In a 
second phase within the State new actors, like civil society or the 
Islamic armed forces, emerged on new foundations of power. In 
an ongoing third phase these new actors now battle for 
domination of the state. The nuclear issue could determine the 
outcome. The West might have an ace to play, by accepting Iran’s 
nuclear destiny and a future of both deterrence and further 
democratization in the country and region. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The June 2009 events in Iran were shocking for most of those observers 
following the country. After an intense and competitive campaign 
Ahmadinejad was reelected. If such was not per se incredibile, the high 
number of votes he gathered was. Officially the incumbent got a bit 
over 24 million votes, more than the hugely popular Khatami had 
gotten in 1997. Sure Ahmadinejad has his partisans, yet such a crushing 
defeat for Mir Hussein Mousavi, who got a little over half 
Ahmadinejad’s votes was hardly credibile. The images of young 
supporters of Mousavi hitting the streets only to get beaten by a mix of 
riot police and Basij, a section of the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 
the Islamic Guardians Guard Corps. Mousavi’s partisans spoke of the 
beginning of a velvet colored revolution, while Ahmadinejad compared 
their riots to little more than the violence of unhappy soccer fans whose 
team had just lost a game. 
 
So what is happening? Is the Iranian revolution collapsing? 
Unsurprising maybe, since it “was virtually destined for a big fall from the 
outset”.1 At least, such has been the sentiment (or the hope?) of many 
observers since 1989. Until now it has proven illusory. Even today there 
seem to be more questions than answers. If Iran is an Islamic Republic 
ruled by the ayatollahs, where were the ayatollahs during the 
upheaval? And during the presidential contest? Why did Mousavi’s 
supporters have such a clearly determined social profile, in essence 
young, educated and generally middle-class, without him being able to 
gather national support? 
 
                                                 
1 R. WRIGHT, “Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes”, Foreign Policy, No.103, Summer 
1996, pp.161-174 (172) 
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To answer these questions the basic interrogation of this study turns 
upside down the question of democracy and democratization in Iran. 
Why did the so-called Third Wave of  democratization not affect Iran? 
Why did or do the regime not move? Is it “stronger” or “more 
ferocious” than other regimes ? Can traditional models of analysis 
answer this question? Does it suffice to say it is a non-democratic 
system “in transition”? I wonder where transitology went wrong. Why 
has it proven unable to present a general theory of democratic 
transitions? And, more importantly, why have its statements on Iran 
been so very much at odds with reality? Is it time to accept that a 
certain model of “authoritarianism” can be sustainable? If so, what are 
the institutional characteristics of such regimes. Rather than looking for 
paths towards democracy in Iran, this study would thus try to 
understand the durability of dictatorship in a country that has known 
undemocratic rule in different forms throughout the twentieth century.  
 
Only such an analysis will permit me to consider the internal dynamics 
of the system and help to understand how these dynamics brought 
about the situation of today, where civil society and a section of the 
military dispute power, without allowing religious leaders to plays a 
significant role. 
 
Although with every new book on Iran, the author feels obliged to 
underline “how unknown this complex country still is”, the amount of 
articles, studies and books on the country clearly outdoes scholarship 
on many countries of the region. Yet, and perhaps surprisingly, there 
do not seem to be many scientific reasons explaining why Iran should 
get more attention than for one Saudi-Arabia. The only major reality 
that makes Iran truly and considerably differ from other countries is 
the revolution. Iran is the only country in the region and one of the 
very few countries worldwide to have experienced a large-scale 
popular revolution amounting to an apparent total transformation of its 
social and political order. Predictably and justifiably many social 
scientists have focused on this event, its causes and consequences.  
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Simplistically one could subdivide approaches of the revolution in two 
very different macro-visions. A first approach underlines the rupture 
between the pre-revolutionary revolution of Iran and the post-
revolutionary period. In such a sense Pahlavi modernization might be 
opposed to religious obscurantism. Or pro-Western tendencies to anti-
Western radicalism. A second approach underlines continuities 
between both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran. This line of thought has 
focused both on religion as on the economy, both on foreign policy and 
on internal developments.  
 
In order to explain the revolution social scientists have gotten up, close 
and personal with Iran. This has especially been the case for many 
scholars of Iranian origin, who are often and understandably, very 
embedded in and familiar with the realities of their native country. To 
these have been added all those non-Iranian scholars, that have taken a 
particular interest in some specific reality of the country. All this has 
especially, but not only, since the revolution offered a substantial 
quantity of rather detailed accounts on different Iranian realities.  
 
The reasons for the attention given to Iran are undoubtedly multiple. 
Scholars focusing on religion, culture, and revolution, just as much as 
anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and a whole series of 
other –ists find in Iran “a particular interest”  because of a very 
“specific context”. For a variety of reasons, most of them linked to 
national pride, Iranians themselves eagerly underline the specificity of 
their country.  This “specificity” has now and again brought about 
some unpleasant side effects. 
 
Until 1979 many analyses of Iran used what one could call a paradigm 
of similarity. In essence Iran was considered a country well underway 
to “join” or “copy” the Western socio-political reality. The basic 
presumption was: Iran is different but similar. In essence scholars used 
a bias analogous to the one that is still today used for Israel. Israel is 
obviously not a traditional Western liberal-democratic regime, as such 
it is different. Yet it is also considered the regime most similar to the 
West. As such many of the analyses and paradigms commonly used to 
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analyze Western liberal democratic societies were applied to these 
“similar” polities. Reviewing pre-revolutionary scholarship on Iran 
something analogous can be said. 
 
This changed with the revolution. The change is a very subtle one, yet 
quite remarkable. From a paradigm of similarity one shifts to a 
paradigm of dissimilarity. In essence what will be stressed now will be 
the differences between the “dissimilar” country and the Western 
liberal democratic countries. The most apparent changes are often the 
incorporation of new concepts or terms, something especially obvious 
in the analysis of Latin-American dictatorships. Those new “concepts”, 
generally considered “impossible to translate”, are then to reinforce the 
“specificity” of the country under consideration. In the Iranian case the 
best example is offered by the concept of velayat-e faqih. This so-called 
“guardianship of the jurist” is based on Shi’i jurisprudence and 
transformed in a  political concept by Khomeini. Since scholars have 
been engaged to understand to “true” character of this “new” concept. 
The question increasingly became what Khomeini truly meant and if 
his interpretation was or was not in line with traditional Shi’i 
jurisprudence. For some it has become impossible to understand Iran 
without profoundly understanding the religious jurisprudence on and 
genesis of velayat-e faqih. Quite a bit like Latin-American studies now 
“require” the use of words as “caudillo”. The incorporation of new 
concepts is always an extremely delicate undertaking, since it might 
constitute an excuse to go around the established concepts of the social 
sciences.  
 
Is such a shift in focus detrimental? It clearly does not have to be. One 
can perform an in-depth scan of a polity and subsequently conclude 
that the polity is more or less dissimilar to the polity of reference. These 
are the very basic tenets of comparative politics. It becomes detrimental 
however when dissimilarity is no longer a conclusion but a point of 
departure. The latter has become the case more often than not. What 
could be called a bias of dissimilarity has started to permeate the 
analysis of the Iranian political system. Hardly any study of 
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contemporary Iran omits a reference on just how specific and unique 
the Iranian situation is.  
 
The detail of some punctual sociological analyses have started to 
obscure the bigger picture. Micro-analyses offer an infinitively complex 
image of any policy. And micro-analyses have come to colonize the 
bigger picture. Unsurprisingly most scholars underline that the 
complexity of decision-making in the Iranian polity makes a total 
understanding seems near to impossible. All of them underline the 
importance of informal power structures in the Islamic Republic. Such 
claims are not necessarily false, but somewhat short-sighted and naive. 
The claims are not false in the sense that the Iran polity is indeed 
characterized by informal power structures. They are naive when they 
pretend to capture some kind of “specificity” of the Iranian system. 
From China to the world’s oldest democracy informal links among the 
power elite are numerous. This is no different in European 
parliamentarian democracies.  
 
It is remarkable how such bias of dissimilarity inextricably leads to 
some kind of “our” system versus “their” system paradigm. The 
Marxist paradigm has considered fascist authoritarian systems as a 
special form of liberal democracy (dictatorship of the bourgeoisie).2 
This line of argumentation was somewhat altered in 1935 when the 
Komintern’s leading figure, Bulgarian communist leader Dimitrov, 
stated that fascism had to be considered not just “another” form of 
capitalism3 but the expression of the most chauvinist, imperialist and 
reactionary fractions of the bourgeoisie. The fundamental link between 
                                                 
2 The “class against class” policy, abandoned temporarily, but not forgotten, between 
1934 and 1939, of the Comintern which inspired among others the KPD to consider the 
German Socialist Party as “social-fascist” are well known. For an overview consider: M. 
DREYFUS (ed.), Le siècle des communismes, Paris, Les Editions de l’Atelier/Editions 
ouvrières, 2000, especially pp.208-215 and pp.503-506 
3 G. DIMITROV, « Pour l’unité de la classe ouvrière contre le fascisme : Discours de 
clôture, prononcé au VIIe Congrès Mondial de l’Internationale Communiste, le 2 août, 
1935 », in G. DIMITROV, Oeuvres Choisies en trois volumes, Vol.II, Sofia, Presse, 1972, 
pp.95-132 (101) 
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both types of regimes was however never really questioned.4 Both 
systems were (and are) from a Marxist point of view an expression of 
the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. More recently the authoritative 
Marxist scholar Poulantzas underlined the close family bond between 
fascism and other forms of “the Capitalist State”.5  
 
Most non-Marxist scholars, on the other hand, have been 
straightforward in their effort to separate liberal democracy on the one 
hand from fascism, communism and other authoritarianisms on the 
other. In a way however, the result of their analyses is formally similar 
to the Marxist one. Indeed, both “liberal democratic” scholars and 
Marxists start by considering the system they prefer as 
“fundamentally” different from other systems. These “other ones” can 
be either Communism and Fascism for a liberal democratic scholar or 
Fascism and Liberal Democracy for a Marxist. In this way, the 
classification seems to say at least as much about the scholar using it, as 
it does about the object it is supposed to define.6 
 
Other than ideological predispositions, cultural and regional studies 
have clearly contributed to this process. Understandably both cultural 
and regional studies tend to stress differences rather than similarities of 
a specific “culture” or a particular “region”. Although theories of 
democratization have been looking to develop a general theory of 
democratization, often minimizing  the role of cultural factors, they 
have played an equally detrimental role in the process. It is arguably 
literature on transitions towards democracy that has suffered most 
clearly from the dissimilarity bias. Notwithstanding all the nuances and 
refinements different scholars have tried to develop, transitological 
literature has remained very much on the track of a binary distinction 
                                                 
4 G. DIMITROV, “L’offensive du fascisme et les tâches de l’Internationale communiste 
dans la lutte pour l’unité de la classe ouvrière contre le fascisme : Rapport au VIIe 
Congrès Mondial de l’Internationale Communiste, présenté le 2 août, 1935», in G. 
DIMITROV, Oeuvres Choisies en trois volumes, Vol.II, Sofia, Presse, 1972, pp.5-94 (11) 
5 N. POULANTZAS, Fascisme et dictature, Paris, Seuil-Maspéro, 1974, p.348 
6 G. HERMET, “Prologue”, in G. HERMET (ed.), Totalitarismes, Paris, Economica, 1984, 
p.5 
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between “democracy” on the one hand, and “non-democracy” on the 
other. 
 
Once such a fundamental binary distinction had been established, the 
“science of transitology” could develop. Transitology and 
democratization have, since Huntington’s Third Wave,7  come to 
constitute a “new branch” of social sciences. Transitology covers the 
study of political transitions from authoritarianism in any form to 
(liberal) democracy. In doing so it requires a clear distinction between 
both regime types. Not surprisingly contemporary analyses of political 
systems within the framework of transitology have something in 
common: a basic distinction separates democracy from 
authoritarianism. Societies and polities are divided on the basis of their 
“open” or “closed” nature. One cannot go without noticing the 
classificatory logic of such an approach. Transitology relies heavily on a 
binary classification, democracy versus dictatorship. The opposition of 
dictatorial, authoritarian or other non-democracies to democracies 
becomes even harmful when used to put aside normal analytical 
instruments. Such notably happened with certain theories of 
totalitarianism defending the impossibility of an internal collapse.8 The 
same temptation of methodological exceptionalism can be found in 
some works of scholars in transitology who pretend implicitly that 
during a transition “normal social science methods” are to be 
suspended.9  
 
                                                 
7 S. HUNTINGTON, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 
8 See M. DOBRY, “Introduction :  Les Processus de Transition à la Démocratie”, Cultures 
et Conflits, no.17, 1995, pp.3-8 and the work of J. J. KIRKPATRICK, Dictatorship and Double 
Standards, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982 
9 See: G. DI PALMA, To Craft Democracies. An Essay on Democratic Transitions, Berkeley 
University of California Press, 1990, p.34 but, as M. DOBRY, “Introduction :  Les 
Processus de transition à la démocratie”, Cultures et Conflits, no.17, 1995, pp.3-8 notes 
quite correctly such a reasoning is present as well in writings of G. O’DONNELL & P.C. 
SCHMITTER, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
democracies, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1986 
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Considering the failures of Iraqi and Afghan campaigns for democracy, 
it might be an idea to question such a simplistic bias. Yet there are 
theoretical scientific reasons to do so as well. Transitology relies heavily 
on the idea that transitions are initiated or accomplished by elites. If 
elites should transform dictatorship in democracy, how to identify 
ruling elites? Who rules Iran? Who is really in charge? These are not 
questions that are easily answered.  
 
Be it for cultural reasons, for its type of government, or for regional 
particularities, the paradigm of dissimilarity tries to convince us that 
Iran is different. It does so by turning certain undeniable realities into 
absolute, coherent entities supposed to characterize the polity. At the 
same time it downplays the role similar realities play in other polities. 
Why would informal power structures be quantitatively or 
qualitatively more important in Iran than in any other polity? Why 
would ideology have a more important role in Islamic Iran than in the 
liberal-democratic United States? Are there objective scientific 
measures that permit us to state such beyond reasonable doubt? 
 
Whatever the answer to these questions might be, it is undeniable that 
from such a perspective Iran is not a democracy. Iran is a dictatorship. 
The self-evidence of both statements is matched only by their 
straightforwardness. So-doing things become remarkably simple. The 
only question remaining would then be: how to ma make a democracy 
out of the Islamic Republic. Some analysts, taken such an evolution for 
granted, put it even more bluntly “It would, of course, be ideal for this 
transformation to take place with a minimum of damage and with a high level 
of freedom and democracy.”10 In essence, does the West have to go to war 
for democracy ?  
 
Until here the story reads as the revenge of essentialism, with all the 
problems this implies. But the kind of essentialism applied to Iran has 
two characteristics that make it especially harmful. Firstly, it is an 
                                                 
10 M. SAZEGARA, “The Point of  No Return : Iran’s Path to Democracy”, Policy Focus #54, 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2006, p.17 
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orientalist essentialism. Secondly, it appears to be based on common 
sense.  
 
Edward Said’s work has often been reduced to its political critique of 
Orientalism.11 In reality, one of the fundamentals of Edward Said’s 
famous criticism of Orientalism concerned essentialist visions of the 
Orient. Said famously argues that the gap between the Orient and the 
West is willingly constructed. One of the ways this is done is by 
essentializing those realities that differ most visibly from the West. 
Such essentialism formed and arguably still forms the most basic 
foundation of Orientalism, be it in fine arts or literature. The question is 
why such essentialism is still permeating social science. 
 
The latter question becomes all the more relevant when considering 
how essentialism constructs its entities. Pierre Bourdieu wrote: “Social 
science must break with the preconstructions of common sense, that is, with 
‘reality’ as it presents itself, in order to construct its proper objects, even at the 
risk of appearing to do violence to that reality”.12 Unfortunately essentialism 
as used today towards Iran departs exactly from observed reality, from 
the most visible aspects of the political system. The best illustration of 
this point is that still today a huge majority of scholars consider the 
Islamic Republic as the Republic of the mollahs. Velayat-e faqih offers 
another illustration. A number of social scientists indeed takes the 
pseudo-concept at face-value, turns it into an object of study and then 
uses it as a criterion of distinction between Iran and other countries. 
 
Charles Tilly described the process eloquently as follows: “The 
separation of sociology from history operated, curiously enough, through both 
abstraction and concretization: abstracting social processes from the 
constraints of time and space, concretizing social research by aiming it at 
reliable observation of currently visible behavior.”13 This study considers 
                                                 
11 E. SAID, Orientalism, New York, Penguin Books, 2003 
12 P. BOURDIEU, “Vive le crise! For heterodoxy in social science”, Theory and Society, 
Vol.17, No.5, September 1988, pp.773-787 (777) 
13 C. TILLY, “Historical Sociology”, Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Vol.1, 1980, 
pp.55-59 (55) 
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Iran can be both similar and different. It can even be judged unique. 
But none of these qualifications should be transformed in absolute 
signs of distinction, permitting to construct some kind of social reality, 
opposing it to another construction. Rather than qualifying a priori the 
Iranian political system this study turns back to the very basics of 
political sociology, bringing back in the historical dimension.  
 
I argue that labels as “democracy” or “dictatorship” tell us surprisingly 
little about the quantity and the quality of the rulers. Democracy, going 
back to ancient Greek tradition where it often had a negative 
connotation, would technically mean the “rule of the people”. 
Although it has come to mean the government of the people, by the 
people and for the people, Schumpeter gave a more realistic definition 
of modern liberal democracy by describing the democratic method of 
rule as “the institutional system, resulting in political decisions, in which 
individuals acquire power to rule (legislate) as a result of a competitive 
struggle for the votes of the people.”14 Dictatorship on the other hand goes 
back to an institution of the Roman Republic where one person was for 
a limited time assigned “full” authority by the Senate. The opposition 
between democracy and dictatorship with regard to the quantity of the 
rulers seems hence rather straightforward. In dictatorship the one rules, 
in democracy, directly or indirectly, the people. On the quality of the 
ruler, in essence their nature, the difference seems similar. Democracy 
is based on the selection of rulers by competitive elections and alternate 
rulers; while in contemporary literature dictatorship now includes the 
lack of “truly free” elections.  
 
If this might seem a clear-cut distinction to some, the Iranian case poses 
a challenge to the essentialist distinction between democracy and 
dictatorship. It presents both a democratic structure, as an authoritarian 
structure. 
 
                                                 
14 J. SCHUMPETER, Capitalisme, Socialisme et Démocratie, Paris, Payot, 1990, p.355 as 
quoted in P. RIUTORT, Précis de sociologie, Paris, PUF, 2004, p.508 
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Some scholars, by either simplifying Iranian reality15 or by adapting the 
concept of totalitarianism16, have classified Iran as a “totalitarian state”. 
Such a qualification makes little sense. If what opposes democracy to 
dictatorship are both qualitative aspects, Iran is probably both. It 
combines an indirectly elected official, the Supreme Jurisprudent, 
ruling not unlike a Roman Republic-style dictator, with a system of 
relatively democratic institutions and competitive elections. Yet even 
the Supreme Jurisprudent is elected, albeit indirectly through an 
Assembly of Experts, elected through relatively competitive elections as 
well.  
 
Quantitatively, it might be a different story. Iran might be ruled by one 
coherent mullah-junta and therefore be labelled a dictatorship. It seems 
indeed easy enough to criticize classificatory logic, the question 
remains: is there really no sense to it at all? Maybe common sense and 
political science do match. Returning to the very basics of political 
science, I will attempt to separate authoritarianism from democracy by 
looking at these Aristotelian interrogations.17 
 
I distinguish between those scholars asserting that the one rules, 
monists, and those claiming that multiple actors rule, pluralists.  This is 
basically the quantitative criterion separating democracy from 
dictatorship. In the former the many rule, in the latter the one.  
 
Although some strong points of elitist analyses are discovered, an 
overview will inevitably demonstrate some of their limits. Both 
pluralists and monists share with transitology a predominantly 
essentialist and elitist vision of the polity. First, regimes are categorized 
according to who rules, the one or the many. Subsequently transitology 
intervenes to see how elites can be incited to “choose” democracy. Or to 
put it even more reductively: how can a regime in which the one rules 
                                                 
15 R. KAMRANE & F. TELLIER, Iran: Les Coulisses d’un Totalitarisme, Paris, Flammarion, 
2007 
16 C. BENARD & Z. KHALILZAD, The Government of God: Iran’s Islamic Republic, New 
York, Columbia UP, 1984, pp.114-115 
17 ARISTOTE, Les Politiques, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1993, p.229-230 
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be converted into a regime with a plurality of rulers. What is then 
looked for is elite fragmentation and situations in which moderates side 
with the opposition. The latter is supposed to lead to democratization if 
not democracy. Once again Iran seems to defy this logic. The country’s 
harsh conflicts between elites are combined with a remarkable regime 
stability. This observation has led scholars to add still other concepts to 
the already extensive list of existing labels. To “limited democracies”, 
“tutelary democracies”, “illiberal democracies”, “competitive 
autocracies” have been added labels as  “factionalized authoritarianism”18 
or “fragmented authoritarianism”, the latter supposedly characterized by 
“a highly fragmented state that generates and nourishes elite factionalism and 
public contestation but all along allows hard-liners to monitor and manage 
political forces, ensuring that conflicts among elites persist without 
unravelling into an authoritarian breakdown”.19  Although Ibrahim 
Karawan’s “Mullastroika” offers some competition,20 the best illustration 
of classificatory logic’s failure has perhaps been offered by Houchang 
Chehabi when he described the Iranian Constitution as “doubly hybrid 
semipresidential and quasitheocratic”.21   
 
When classificatory logic does not hold even within the theories 
favouring it, the idea of stepping over from one regime to another loses 
much of its sense. But the mentioned paradigms present considerable 
limitations even in their answers on the basic question of who rules. 
Since the answer remains limited to either one elite or multiple elites, 
the identity of these elites is foregone. Another major flaw of these 
                                                 
18 H. CHEHABI, “The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative 
Perspective” , Government and Opposition, Vol. 36, No.1, Winter 2001, pp.48-70 (62) 
19 A. KESHAVARZIAN, “Contestation Without Democracy: Elite Fragmentation in Iran”, 
in M. PRIPSTEIN POSUSNEY & M. PENNER ANGRIST, Authoritarianism in the Middle 
East: Regimes and Resistance, London/Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp.63-88 
(65, 73) 
20 I.A. KARAWAN, “Monarchs, Mullas, and Marshals: Islamic Regimes?”, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.524, November 1992, pp.103-119 (110) 
21 H. CHEHABI, “How Theocratic is the Islamic Republic”, Daedalus, Vol. 120, No.3, 
Summer 1991, pp.69-91 (78) also quoted in A. KESHAVARZIAN, “Contestation Without 
Democracy: Elite Fragmentation in Iran”, in M. PRIPSTEIN POSUSNEY & M. PENNER 
ANGRIST, Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, London/Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp.63-88 (73) 
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elitist theories is indeed their mostly a-historical nature. By 
acknowledging that “many scientific mistakes would be avoided if every 
sociologist were to bear in mind that the social structures he or she studies at 
any given time are the products of historical development and historical 
struggles that must be analyzed if one is to avoid naturalizing these 
structures” this study tries to avoid the basic antinomies produced by 
essentialism. 22  
 
This study does not aim at classifying the Iranian system, nor does it 
hope to assert once and for all who rules Iran. Its objective is to 
understand the system. Understand where it comes from, the history of 
its institutions and the sociological background of its rulers. To do so I 
found useful inspiration in the work of both Norbert Elias and Charles 
Tilly. Both sociologists always paid special attention to the historical 
dynamics of state and elite formation. These and other scholars 
consider elites and political systems not as such, yet analyze and 
underline their formation, rise and downfall.  
 
State formation is often a process of competition for the monopoly on 
the means of organized violence. It would however be a mistake to 
think that once certain social units lose the competition, these disappear 
completely. Surely by the conquest of the monopoly of the means of 
coercion the State takes over their despotic power. Bluntly, only the 
State can shout “Off With His Head”. At the same time however many 
of the preexistent social units maintain a high degree of infrastructural 
power.23 Infrastructural power being the power to penetrate civil 
society and implement decisions, in essence this means that such units 
still dominate the state on certain matters not directly linked to 
coercion. Education forms an excellent example. Be it in Iran, be it in 
catholic Western European countries, even after state formation 
education remained for quite a while in the hands of the clergy. It 
sometimes proved an efficient way to oppose the State’s influence on 
                                                 
22 P. BOURDIEU, “Vive le crise! For heterodoxy in social science”, Theory and Society, 
Vol.17, No.5, September 1988, pp.773-787 (779) 
23 M. MANN, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and 
Results,” in J.A. HALL (ed.), States in History, Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1986, pp.109-36 (113) 
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society. After the consideration of state formation, the internal 
dynamics of the system will hence be examined.   
 
I claim that these internal dynamics are closely linked to the genesis of 
the state and the system. That much even that the nature of the system 
and its durability will depend in a high degree of the characteristics of 
the genetic process. The coming into being of a system determines its 
longevity and its further evolution. This evolution can, but does not 
have to, lead to liberal democracy. It can, but does not have to, lead to 
military dictatorship. And so on. Much, if not all, depends on pre-
established dynamics. Unfortunately, yet in the light of what was said 
above not unsurprisingly, this is often left out in discussions on Iran 
and the future of its political system.  
 
The first and fundamental question on the genesis of a system regards 
the forces animating it. Forces is here to be understood not as entities, 
but as forces of nature, as dynamics. Indeed, I will argue that 
depending on how the system was established and on what social units 
composed it in what manner, the internal forces and dynamics permit 
to predict in a rather reliable way the future of the system under 
consideration. The first chapter makes this very clear by opposing the 
genesis of the Nazi-system to the genesis of the Stalinist Soviet Union. 
Contemporary social science has the tendency of assimilating these two 
regimes, often under the label of “totalitarianism”. I argue that such 
assimilation proves extremely harmful for the understanding not only 
of both, but equally of other non-liberal democratic systems. I, briefly, 
indicate fundamentally different dynamics leading to respectively 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies within the Nazi and the Stalinist 
regimes. A case is then made to consider these two great dictatorships 
of the twentieth century as opposites on an axis. The former incarnating 
a self-destructive and disintegrative form of dictatorship, which 
ultimately destroyed the German state. The latter on the contrary is 
claimed, expanded the range of the Soviet state and hence reinforced it 
by integrating or destroying all competitors to its infrastructural power. 
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To place the Iranian revolution between these two opposites is no easy 
task. If it is done in an attempt to qualify the Iranian regime it would 
even be futile. I decided not to analyze the Islamic Revolution and 
Republic from a classical perspective used for dictatorships. Using 
parameters as ideology, one-party, repression or mobilization, this 
study would enter the dissimilarity bias denounced earlier. Nor did I 
chose to make the revolution the object of my investigation. The 
present Iranian regime was not created in 1979.  Scholars of revolution 
limit their analysis to three basic stages: the pre-revolutionary socio-
political and socio-economic situation of the country, the revolution 
and the post-revolutionary conditions. They explain the new regime by 
identifying pre-revolutionary actors and circumstances, revolutionary 
dynamics and power struggles and finally post-revolutionary state 
construction. State construction is something very different from state 
formation, since the former necessarily implies the possibility of 
voluntary action in a specific direction. For the analysis of 
contemporary Western European polities scholars have went back as 
far as 990, no reason hence to limit my study of the Islamic Republic to 
a study of the consequences of revolution. 
 
Rather I chose to identify the actors by considering the dynamics of 
Iranian state formation since the end of the 19th century. The second 
chapter is therefore mostly historical. It does not obviously not offer a 
complete and total history of pre-revolutionary Iran. The chapter 
reconsiders pre-revolutionary Iran from the point of view of state 
formation. Practically this implied that elements as territorial control 
and integrity; competition for the means of coercion and the expansion 
of the State’s infrastructural power lie at the very center of this chapter. 
The evaluation of both the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties will predictably 
be done from a similar perspective. In what way did these succeed or 
not in constructing an Iranian state.  
 
All this is not to say that those constructing the state were voluntarily 
and consciously doing such. It might well be that none of them was 
fully aware of the process he, because women were marginalized, was 
taking part in. Nor is Iranian state formation assumed to constitute a 
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historical necessity or a predetermined destiny of the Iranian people. It 
all might have turned out very differently. I acknowledge that. But in 
the end it did not turn out in any other way. It could have, but it did 
not. A process of state formation was initiated.  
 
Chapter three brings us to 1979 and what turned out to be the Islamic 
 27 
power might be civil society, the military, or… Once more it is 
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Revolution, it is the Trotsky-Stalin debate that perhaps illustrates best 
the dispute. While Trotsky advocated world revolution, Stalin 
preferred to insist on building so-called “socialism in one country”. 
This does not mean that Stalin was against Soviet socialist expansion, 
as history would show. Yet he, or at least his system, avoided a process 
of falling forward that would have endangered the survival of the 
Soviet system. Hitler’s foreign policy on the contrary seems the 
incarnation of a process of falling forward. These differences are no 
coincidence, nor do they depend on the will of either Hitler or Stalin. 
They are closely linked to the genetic process of both systems. 
Arguably Trotsky’s defeat in the dispute was too. The centripetal 
tendency of the Soviet system barred the way of advocates of a falling 
forward kind of foreign policy. So depending on the conclusions of the 
second to the fourth chapter, Iranian foreign policy should either be 
characterized by a process of falling forward and radicalization, or by a 
more circumscribed advancing of its national interest.  
 
Be it the institutional analysis, be it the analysis of foreign policy 
making and the internal dynamics of the system will subsequently lead 
to an assessment of future scenarios, based on a tentative model of the 
contemporary Iranian system. It will answer the simple question “Who 
Rules How?”. 
 
This study is based on a variety of oral and written documents, both 
first and second hand. An extensive bibliography gives an overview of 
many of them. Others, often valuable first-hand information, had to be 
omitted for different reasons.  
 
On a more technical note, I have not chosen a specific system of 
transliteration for Iranian concepts, names and terms. Especially for 
names such would have forced me to prefer sometimes unconventional 
transliterations over more frequently used ones for the sole sake of 
coherence with the chosen system. I have generally preferred the most 
common transliterations. Obviously, at times quotations or articles 
used have forced me to do otherwise. I ask the reader’s understanding 
for possible incoherencies.  
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2. The Iranian System: Dictatorship, 
Democracy and the State 
 
2.1. Understanding Elites 
 
What has come to constitute the field of “transitology”, in essence the 
study of transitions towards democracy, has given much attention to 
elites. Elites are supposed to play a preponderant role in the transition 
process and thus in the determination of the type of regime. In 
transition theories, and especially in its Game Theoretic form, the main 
actors of transition are the elites (reformers of the regime), considered 
responsible for transition by siding with the moderate opposition.24 
Competition between elites and collusion with a certain objective 
shows vital to such an approach. The “only” question remaining is 
then: why do these step over to the other side? Many have asked a 
similar question concerning Iran: “What to do to make elites choose 
“democratization”?25  What constitutes a “critical juncture” for the 
regime and so on.  
 
The answer of why elites “choose” democracy, has often been more or 
less related to the development of civil society or the opposition. 
Scholars defending this assumption indicated a certain confrontation 
between the totalitarian state on the one hand and mass mobilization or 
popular organizations on the other hand. Unfortunately, this has often 
not been the case. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania transition 
started not when popular mobilization was at an all-time high but 
                                                 
24 D. ACEMOGLU & J.A.ROBINSON,  Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2005, but see also J. COLOMER, “Transitions by agreement: 
Modeling the Spanish Way”, The American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.4, December 
1991, pp.1283-1302 & A. PRZEWORSKI, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic 
Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America, New York, Cambridge UP, 1991 
25 See for example : S. SIAVOSHI, “Authoritarian or Democratic: The Uncertain Future of 
Iran”, Iranian Studies, Vol.32, No.3, Summer 1999, pp.313-332 
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rather close to rock-bottom (and this contrary to 1956, 1968,…).26 
Albrecht has even demonstrated that in some cases the opposition can 
be a blessing for authoritarianism.27 
 
Moreover, even if popular mobilization would be the factor igniting 
change, would democracy have to be the “logical consequence” of such 
mobilization? Obviously not. Others have underlined the importance of 
a rise in income, but even these theories have been challenged, often 
leading to the introduction of new qualifications, as “partial” 
democracies or “semi-democracies”, that obscure as much as they 
reveal.28 
 
In reality and notwithstanding the excellent scholarship on the issue no 
general theory of democratization has emerged.  This is not a coincidence. 
Tökés underlines how transitology assumes, irrespective of the cultural 
context, that a global continuum (wave) exists in which “actors act and 
institutions perform in a modal fashion”; that all actors consciously pursue 
strategic objectives, “mainly the instauration of institutions of liberal 
democracy”; that ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities constitute 
“obstacles to progress toward liberal democracy” and “will, and ought to be, 
swept away by transnational forces of modernization, secularization and the 
ultimate triumph of a free enterprise-driven global economy” and finally that 
“institutions, values, and system-building precedents of the Western political 
community represent an inherently superior alternative model” to both 
authoritarian and communist systems.29  
 
                                                 
26 A. HORVAT & A. SZAKOLCZAI, “Du discours sur la société civile et de l’auto 
élimination du parti”, Cultures et Conflits, No.17, 1995, pp.47-80 (47) 
27 H. ALBRECHT, “How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from 
Egypt”, Democratization, Vol.12, No.3, June 2005, pp.378-397 
28 See the illustrative paper on democratic transitions D.L.EPSTEIN, R. BATES, J. 
GOLDSTONE, I. KRISTENSEN & S. O’HALLORAN, “Democratic Transitions”, American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol.50, No.3, 2006, pp.551-569 
29 R.L TŐKÉS, “Post-Communism: ‘Transitology’: Global Dreams and Post-Communist 
Realities”, Central Europe Review, Vol. 2, No 10, 13 March 2000, http://www.ce-
review.org/00/10/tokes10.html 
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Charles Tilly identifies four risks of teleological reasoning: firstly, the 
working back from an outcome to subsequently pick from the past 
those elements that are consider to have caused the desired outcome, 
“while ignoring crucial factors in political change that seem antithetical or 
irrelevant to democratization; secondly, system functionalism, a specific 
form of regime exists because the system needs equity or stability; 
thirdly ideal-case reasoning, that is an “idealized summary of all positive 
experiences, as the model” for transition; and, finally, the search for 
“sufficient conditions”, supposing that the “social world conforms to 
immutable general laws producing the same whole structures and sequences 
everywhere.”30 In France, Michel Dobry has repeatedly advanced similar 
criticism. 31 
 
Three of these criticisms have to be addressed briefly. The first one 
concerns the so-called teleological aspect of transitology and its 
inherent tendency towards historicism and historical determinism. The 
two other major criticisms have been centred on the voluntarist 
approach of transitology and its regressive nature.  
 
Teleology leads to an analysis in which no other outcome than liberal 
democracy is seriously considered. Such is best clarified by the 
conceptual difference between democratization and transition towards 
democracy. If the former is a process that democratizes at least a 
(possibly insignificant) part of a political system, it is not necessarily the 
first step in the direction of a full democratic system. The limitation of 
the powers of the Iranian Council of Guardians would without a doubt 
signify democratization, but it would at the same time probably be 
impossible to speak of a transition towards democracy. The preposition 
“towards” implies a movement “in the direction of”. The impression 
often arises that although (probably) no one expects a model of 
Western democracy to emerge in Iran or China, numerous scholars try 
                                                 
30 C. TILLY, Contention and Democracy in Europe 1650-2000, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 
2004, pp.38-39 
31 M. DOBRY, “ Les voies incertaines de la transitologie : choix stratégiques, séquences 
historiques, bifurcations et processus de path dependence ” , Revue Française de Science 
Politique, Vol.50, No.4-5, August-October 2000, pp.585-614  
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to determine a “path” that will eventually lead to “democracy” in some 
larger definition. A number of “characteristic” (not to say necessary) 
stages are then individuated and in each of these stages steps towards 
democracy imply certain measures (quite a bit like “problem-solving”). 
Creating the illusion of a certain homogeneity between transitions in 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and earlier in Southern Europe is a 
necessary prerequisite for the ultimate objective of transitology, namely 
the elaboration of a “theory of democratic transitions”. This 
homogenization contributes to the illusion of a “one best way” to 
democracy, in this way one explains the result (democracy with a 
market economy) by the path followed by the country (state, 
society,…). Nuances are then introduced, since no country follows 
exactly this “one best way” and the approach in the end consists in 
“explain[ing] the specificity of the result by the specificity of the trajectory”.32 
 
In a way the teleological danger was acknowledged by path 
dependence-theories in their preference to speak about 
“transformations” rather than “transitions”, but as the French 
sociologist Michel Dobry explains, this doesn’t necessarily change a 
whole lot.33 Although by recognizing the influence of the old system 
and its structure on the issue of the transformation process, path 
dependency-scholars do incorporate the possibility of different 
outcomes for a particular process (depending on the particular 
characteristics of the old system), many of them do not avoid a 
regressive method of analysis. While path-dependency scholars do not 
start with the preoccupation of explaining the establishment of 
democracy, they still seem to analyze the establishment of a certain 
type democracy or a certain type of market economy by the 
(determined) “extrication path” offered by a certain ancien régime. The 
result remains a result of a specific historically determined “march 
towards democracy”. 
 
                                                 
32 M. DOBRY, “ Les voies incertaines de la transitologie : choix stratégiques, séquences 
historiques, bifurcations et processus de path dependence ” , Revue Française de Science 
Politique, Vol.50, No.4-5, August-October 2000, pp.585-614 (590) 
33 Ibid., pp. 594-596 
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Criticism of the teleological nature of transitology is a logical 
consequence of the difficulties encountered in separating democracy 
from authoritarianism as seen above. Once it becomes clear that 
democracy is not a sortal but a scalar concept; the task of identifying 
transitions or transformations towards democracy becomes very 
difficult.  
 
Second criticism under consideration should be the regressive nature of 
the transitological analysis, which Tilly describes as “working back”, 
and is intimately linked to its teleological character. When starting from 
a particular outcome, the installation of a democratic system, the risk of 
omitting factors and of not grasping the entire societal dynamic is 
colossal. This is all the more the case since often the most basic feature 
of logic is forgotten: how many scholars of transitology effectively test 
their hypothesis and framework by attempted falsification? In the 
attempt of developing a general theory the downplaying of “negative 
examples” is extremely hazardous. Another way of approaching the 
elite-question in pacted transitions would be to ask why do elites stay 
loyal to the system? Why do the main institutions not break away more 
often and more quickly? Why did Khatami in the end despite massive 
popular support decide to stay within the framework of the Islamic 
Republic? What makes or breaks the loyalty of elites? Even when John 
Stuart Mill warned scholars not to apply his methods to social 
phenomena, he underlined that in social sciences “plurality of causes 
exists in almost boundless excess, and effects are, for the most part, 
inextricably interwoven with one another.”34 In the same sense Tilly avows 
that any scholar must avoid: “picking through the past selectively while 
ignoring crucial factors in political change that seem antithetical or irrelevant 
to democratization.”35 Something that has proven very difficult in 
scholarship on transitology. 
 
                                                 
34 J.S. MILL, A System of Logic, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1887, as quoted in C. TILLY, 
Contention and Democracy in Europe 1650-2000, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2004, p.37 
35 C. TILLY, Contention and Democracy in Europe 1650-2000, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 
2004, p.38 
 34 
Thirdly, we have to underline the unilateral voluntarist approach of 
many of these “transition-paradigms”. Truth be told, much depends on 
the delimitation of transitology. If one wishes to include state formation 
theories covering centuries of the development of states, it has to be 
acknowledged that some of these were probably overly structuralist.  
 
There are still remnants of this scientific tradition in voluntarist 
transitology. All transition theories, from the basic transitology studies 
to scholars studying the rise of fascism, seem to share the idea that a 
regime holds as long as its elites and thus the basic institutions hold or 
stand strong. “To hold” is to be understood as to maintain their loyalty 
to the existing regime. In transitology the break-up of incumbent elites 
or the rising of alternative elites is often considered decisive for the 
breakdown of dictatorship, in the criticisms on the thesis of a so-called 
French allergy to fascism one can read a similar story, the other way 
around. French democracy stood strong because the elites didn’t 
consider fascism a viable or necessary alternative to the existing 
republic.36 Other scholars underlined that France might have been 
defeated so quickly in the World War II because basic institutions had 
at that time already been undermined by pro-Nazi elites.37  
 
Notwithstanding these structuralist remnants, both in what have been 
called respectively the second post-1970’s and the third “integrative” 
generation of transitology, human agency has become prominent.38 It 
often reduces the questions of institutions that stand strong (or not) to a 
                                                 
36 Compare R. REMOND, Les droites en France, Paris, Aubier, 1954 ; M. WINOCK, La Fièvre 
hexagonale : Les grandes crises politiques de 1871 à 1968, Paris, Seuil, 2001 to M. DOBRY, « Le 
thèse immunitaire face aux fascismes. Pour une critique de la logique classificatoire », in 
M. DOBRY (ed.), Le mythe de l’allergie française au fascisme, Paris, Albin Michel, 2003. 
Contemporary repercussions of this debate can be found in the discussion on the Front 
National.  If the French society is “allergic” to fascism as some authors defended than the 
FN is either not fascist, or not dangerous. Against this logic of qualifying the FN as a 
mere “populist” party see A. COLLOVALD,  Le “Populisme du FN”, un dangereux 
contresens, Paris, Eds. Du Croquant, 2004 
37 A. LACROIX-RIZ, Le Choix de la Défaite, Paris, Armand Colin, 2007 
38 See M. MAHDAVI, “Rethinking Structure and Agency in Democratization: Iranian 
Lessons”, International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
December 2008, pp. 142-160 (143-144) 
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consequence of choice. Adam Przeworski, and Juan Linz, prominent 
representatives of respectively the second and the third generation, all 
underline the importance of elite “choice” . In economic literature 
different kind of approaches have been proposed, most of which based 
on either Game Theory (appropriate for so-called “pact-ed” transitions, 
in essence transitions that see elites “agree” on the establishment of 
democracy) or more basic Rational Choice Microeconomics (useful as 
well for mass mobilization transitions?). This voluntarist approach, as 
the work of Linz and Stepan39 proves, is however not limited to 
economically inspired theories of political change. Even in path-
dependence approaches such voluntarist approaches are not wholly 
absent, since with the introduction of critical junctures these theories 
undeniably give way to “big strategic decisions” by actors.40  
 
Voluntarism is problematic because it poses the risk of underestimating 
historically or sociologically determined structural factors beyond the 
power, control and even imagination of actors involved. Moreover, it 
supposes rational actors acting voluntarily in the direction of some 
kind of democracy. It is evident from the experiences in Eastern Europe 
that this has generally not been the case. Those taking over from the old 
regime were all but dedicated to democracy, to paraphrase Jeremy 
Brecher, movements starting democratization rarely start with liberal 
democracy as a scope per se.41 James Mahoney has underlined that this 
kind of voluntarist transitology has made knowledge accumulation in 
the social sciences extremely difficult because it has “led many analysts 
to characterize each transition as unique and unpredictable(..) little effort has 
                                                 
39 J. LINZ & A. STEPAN, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore, The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1978 
40 M. DOBRY, “ Les voies incertaines de la transitologie : choix stratégiques, séquences 
historiques, bifurcations et processus de path dependence ” , Revue Française de Science 
Politique, Vol.50, No. 4-5, August-October 2000, pp.585-614 (588) 
41 J. BRECHER, Strike !, San Francisco, Straight Arrow Books, 1972, p.240. BRECHER uses 
the sentence for social revolutions, while M. DOBRY applies this idea to democratization 
in M. DOBRY, “ Les voies incertaines de la transitologie : choix stratégiques, séquences 
historiques, bifurcations et processus de path dependence ” , Revue Française de Science 
Politique, Vol.50, No. 4-5, August-October 2000, pp.585-614 (588) 
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been devoted to offering generalizations that might stimulate processes of 
hypothesis testing.”42 
 
But transitology might be flawed by an even more fundamental 
assumption. That is the passage from one system to another, from 
dictatorship to democracy. Such transition implies and requires a clear 
definition of and distinction between both concepts. As mentioned in 
the introduction, there is a qualitative and a quantitative aspect to the 
distinction between democracy and dictatorship. 
 
Schumpeter’s definition of democracy already implied it, if the people 
rule, it is at best indirectly. Competitive elections and alternation are 
generally considered part of the qualitative difference between 
democracy and other systems. This seems straightforward enough. 
However the qualitative aspect is also a very problematic one. In Iran 
the elective process is quite democratic a part from the interventions of 
the Council of Guardians concerning the selection of candidates. 
Moreover, history illustrated how alternation at top-level is possible.  
 
The quantitative aspect  is related to the number of individuals that 
rule, at best, for the people and, at least, in their name. Contemporary 
analyses of elites and elitist views on politics are without exception 
tributary to early elite theorists as Michels, Mosca, Pareto and Gramsci. 
Notwithstanding the differences between them, what linked these 
scholars was their profound belief in the impossibility of truly pluralist 
democracy and the conviction that rule would always be in the hands 
of a single unit or elite. In his Quaderni del carcere, Gramsci fulminates 
against those that suppose that “number is the supreme law” in the 
elective system. What is measured during elections for Gramsci is “the 
                                                 
42 J. MAHONEY, “Knowledge Accumulation in Comparative Historical Research: The 
Case of Democracy and Authoritarianism”, in J. MAHONEY & D. RUESCHEMEYER, 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, New York, Cambridge UP, 2003, 
pp.131-174 (160) 
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effectiveness and the capacity of expansion and persuasion of the opinions of 
the few, of active minorities, of the elites, of the vanguards,…”43  
 
The genesis of modern political ways of governing is at the centre of 
Gaetano Mosca’s writings. Yet his conclusion on the identity of rulers is 
less than satisfying. Mosca supposes that the “best” rule and quite 
candidly limits his conception of these to some kind of Machiavellian 
outlook.44 The “best” are not “the most altruistic, the most inclined to 
sacrifice themselves for others” but rather those that are “best adapted to 
political life.”45 The adjective “best” can hence in normal times “always be 
applied to the ruling classes (classi dirigenti), because the fact that these are 
such proves that at a given time, and in a given country, these contain the 
elements most apt to govern.”46 When addressing the appearance of the 
particular Western European type of liberal democratic rule, Mosca 
underlines the legacy of ideas of political freedom and popular 
sovereignty from Greeks and Romans, adding that “it is useless to 
discuss if moral forces predominated on material ones or material ones on 
moral ones.”47 A statement that has to be reframed in his Mosca’s 
virulent opposition to Marxists who underlined the material and 
economic bases of political change. However Mosca’s approach has 
obvious limitations, since the “idea” of political freedom existed in 
many Western and some Eastern societies, yet these have all generated 
very different regimes and types of government. Impossible on the 
basis of “ideas” to explain the fundamental differences in result 
between the Chartist movement in Britain and their contemporary 
                                                 
43 A. GRAMSCI, “Noterelle sulla politica del Machiavelli”, Quaderno 13, in A. GRAMSCI. 
Quaderni del carcere, Vol. 3, Quaderni 12-19 (1932-1935), Torino, 2001, pp.1553-1652 (1624-
1625) 
44 See R. MEDICI, La Metafora Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Gramsci, Modena, Mucchi 
Ed., 1990, p.92 
45 G. MOSCA, Scritti Politici: Elementi di Scienza politica, Vol.2, Torino, Unione Tipografico-
Editrice Torinese, 1982, pp.1066-1067 
46 Ibid. 
47 G. MOSCA, o.c.,  pp.1059-1061 
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French social struggle, the explanation of which clearly sends us back 
to very determining material and structural conditions.48  
 
Robert Michels on the other hand was very explicit on why 
undemocratic rule appears. His Iron Law of Oligarchy pretends that no 
party structure, as democratic as it might claim to be, can ever escape 
an oligarchic power structure. One of the main reasons for this is in 
Michels’ view the specialization within the organization, which leads to 
an inevitable take-over of power by the “professionals” of politics.49 
Michels hence linked the appearance of undemocratic rule to very 
down-to-earth almost technical motives. Although Michels’ analysis of 
political parties was indisputably of great value, Galbraith’s 
Technostructure offered an indirect counter-argument by asserting that 
in any corporation, so why not in a political party, decision-making is 
in the hands of “all who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to 
group-decision making”. These include both the management as white 
and blue collar workers.50 The opposition between Michels and 
Galbraith illustrates a broader divide that characterizes contemporary 
elitist theories. They prefer to answer the question “How Many Rule” 
rather than “Who Rules”. Today analyses of elite-rule can grosso modo 
be divided in two groups: a monist side claiming that one elite 
dominates and a pluralist side asserting that at least two or more elites 
rule, alternate or intervene in policy-making. Logically from a 
quantitative perspective dictatorship should imply the rule of the one, 
and democracy the rule of the many. 
 
2.1.1. The One Dictator 
 
Undemocratic or dictatorial systems seem to lend themselves extremely 
well to a monist approach. Indeed, if liberal democracies pretend, 
                                                 
48 See for a comparative discussion of both movements : C. TILLY, Contention and 
Democracy in Europe 1650-2000, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2004 
49 R. MICHELS, Les Partis politiques, Paris, Champs Flammarion, 1971 
50 J.K. GALBRAITH, The New Industrial State, London, Hamish Hamilton/Pelican Books, 
1967, p.80 
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rightly or wrongly, to be pluralistic systems where the “many” or the 
“people” rule, authoritarian regimes often defend and justify power 
monopolies, be it for a particular party, the army or some charismatic 
leader.  
 
Some analyses of undemocratic policies have offered a clear monistic 
view of undemocratic politics. Max Weber’s “Sultanism” is an excellent 
example of such. Following Weber Linz and Stepan consider regimes 
like those of Trujillo, Duvalier, Marcos, Bakaso, Kim Il Sung or 
Mohammed Reza as “sultanist regimes”.51 Sultanism is characterized 
by a high fusion (in the person of the ruler) of private and public 
whereby the polity becomes the personal domain of the sultan. There’s 
no rule of law and low institutionalisation. Although social and 
economic pluralism can exist, political pluralism is absent. There is no 
sphere of activities for any opposition, for regime moderates or for civil 
society that is not subject to the will of the sultan. Sultanism is 
supposed to differ from totalitarianism because it is short of an 
elaborated ideology by which the policies of sultan can be measured 
(on the contrary Stalin’s policies had to be justified referring to 
Marxism-Leninism), nor does it mobilize the citizens. It is an 
unrestrained personal leadership, free of any ideological, 
organizational or social constraints. 
 
The best expression of liberal democratic scholarship that stresses the 
similarities between fascism and communism is offered by the 
totalitarian model. Who rules a totalitarian state? Different elements 
have been said to characterize a “totalitarian” regime and differentiate 
it from other regimes. Ideology, mobilization and a single party have 
generally been among these characteristics.52 Subsequently other 
                                                 
51 J.LINZ & A. STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996, p.51 See also the essay of J. LINZ, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian 
Regimes” in N. POLSBY & F. GREENSTEIN (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, vol.3, 
Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1975 
52 Consider for example H. ARENDT, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, Harvest, 
1976; R. ARON, Démocratie et Totalitarisme, Paris, Gallimard, 1965; C.J. FRIEDRICH & Z. 
BRZEZINSKI, Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autocracy, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1965; C.J. 
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scholars have cast doubts on each of these characteristics.53 It is 
therefore still not clear if calling a regime “totalitarian” clarifies more 
then it obscures.54 When looking at “who rules?” most scholars of 
totalitarianism offer a very simple answer. Power is (almost) always 
supposed to be exclusively held in the hands of one unit, be it the 
leader, the party or a bureaucracy. Arendt’s image of an atomised 
society of individuals facing an all-potent state (or system) illustrates 
such vision. This doesn’t mean that these scholars do not see 
differences within the totalitarian state; indeed most of them see at least 
a dual structure of power.55 This “dual” structure of power however in 
no way implies power sharing, since for totalitarians it is unthinkable 
to separate State from party or vice versa.56  
 
                                                                                                           
FRIEDRICH, M. CURTIS, B.R. BARBER, Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views, New 
York, Praeger Publishers, 1969; G. HERMET (ed.), Totalitarismes, Paris, Economica, 1984; J. 
J. KIRKPATRICK, Dictatorship and Double Standards, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1982; 
J. LINZ, “An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain” in E. ALLARDT & Y. LITTUNEN 
(eds.), Cleavages Ideologies and Party Systems, Helsinki, Transactions of the Westermarck 
Society, 1964; J. LINZ, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes” in N. POLSBY & F. 
GREENSTEIN (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, vol.3, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
1975 
53 Consider the German “Historikerstreit” as well as Structuralist scholars such as M. 
BROSZAT or H. MOMMSEN. Other examples are: J. KOCKA, “ ‘Totalitarismus’ und 
‘Faschismus’. Gegen einen falschen Begriffskrieg.”  in X., Totalitarismus und Faschismus. 
Eine wissenschaftliche und politische Begriffskontroverse, Kolloquium im Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, 24. November 1978, München 1980, pp. 39-44 or for a French translation: 
E. TRAVERSO, Le Totalitarisme. Le XXe siècle en débat, Paris, Le Seuil, 2001; I. KERSHAW 
& M. LEWIN, Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000; but see also R.C. TUCKER, “The Question of Totalitarianism”, 
Slavic Review, Vol.20, No.3, October 1961, pp.377-382; S. ZIZEK, Did Someone Say 
Totalitarianism?: Four Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion, London, Verso Books, 
2002 (Vous avez dit totalitarisme?, 2004). 
54 We’ll return to this point with practical examples. For an overview of the debate about 
totalitarianism an interesting anthology is offered by E. TRAVERSO, Le Totalitarisme. Le 
XXe siècle en débat, Paris, Le Seuil, 2001  
55 H. ARENDT, Le Système totalitaire, Paris, Le Seuil/Points, 2002, p.174-175  
56 S.H. ROBERTS, The House that Hitler built, 1939, p.72 quoted approvingly by H. 
ARENDT, Le Système totalitaire, Paris, Le Seuil/Points, 2002, p.175 
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One thing that all models of totalitarianism57 have in common is the 
institutional vision of a command-structured system. 58 Orders come 
from above (or from the “centre”) and the fear of those on lower 
echelons makes that these orders are, generally, respected and 
executed, no matter how illogical they might be. Many scholars of 
totalitarianism have implicitly (and some explicitly) considered 
totalitarian systems “immune” from society. Since political and civil 
liberties and freedom of organization are extremely limited or 
inexistent, the system doesn’t need (to care about) the people, it just 
needs to break their resistance. Although overly simplified here this 
thesis forms the essence of most scholarly work using the concept of 
“totalitarianism”. The essence of an undemocratic system, and 
especially of totalitarianism, should in this conceptual framework be 
the absence of democracy and the (near) absence of pluralism.59  
 
Research indicating at the very least some kind of pluralism in those so-
called totalitarian states flawed these theories in a rather important 
way. Scholars of totalitarianism have not been blind to its weaknesses. 
Two main reactions to the criticisms can be noted. First, limiting the 
concept of totalitarianism to Stalinism, Nazism and, sometimes, 
Maoism. Second, describing totalitarianism not so much as a static 
model that accurately describes a certain system, but rather as a regime 
or movement with  “a totalitarian temptation”.60  
 
Dobry states that categories used in political science are frequently 
mere adaptations of classifications used in political practice and 
                                                 
57 We’ll consider some exceptions under the heading Pluralism and Undemocratic Politics 
58 The oldest example of such a structure can probably be found in E. DE LA BOÉTIE, 
Discours sur la Servitude Volontaire, Publication complète en 1576 
59 J.J. LINZ, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2000, p.53-54 
60 The term has generally been used to characterize the positive attitude of Western 
intellectuals towards certain communist regimes, but contributes to undermine the static 
nature of the initial concept. See K.D. BRACHER, Schlüsselwörter in der Geschichte, 
Düsseldorf, Droste Vlg, 1978 and  J.-F. REVEL, La tentation totalitaire, Paris,  Laffont, 1976 
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struggle.61 This makes that often those categories can benefit from a 
certain vagueness in range and content. Used for decades as a political 
tool against the Soviet-bloc, the concept of totalitarianism never 
actually found a precise signification. 62 It is far from certain if the 
introduction of categories as post-totalitarianism will fundamentally 
change this fact. 
 
If totalitarianism never did find an unambiguous signification, the 
concept of authoritarianism seems at least to have benefited from a 
clearer definition. The definition offers a more disperse view of power 
and control structures in undemocratic systems. It is thus no 
coincidence that Linz’ definition63 of authoritarianism, considers it a 
political system “with limited, not responsible political pluralism: without 
[an] elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without 
intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in their 
development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises 
power within ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” in which 
“personal leadership is a frequent characteristic but not a necessary one”. This 
definition was developed in contrast to “totalitarianism”. If the 
characteristics of “totalitarian” regimes included total control, the 
complete absence of any form of pluralism or power-sharing and a 
guiding ideology, many undemocratic regimes did not qualify, so 
social science was in need of a new concept. In his definition Linz 
                                                 
61 M. DOBRY, « La thèse immunitaire face aux fascismes. Pour une critique de la logique 
classificatoire », in M. DOBRY (ed.), Le mythe de l’allergie française au fascisme, Paris, Albin 
Michel, 2003, pp.17-68 (32) 
62 It suffices here to refer to the debate concerning the nature of the Soviet regime after 
1956. The recent introduction of post-totalitarianism by Linz & Stepan is an explicit 
recognition of this vagueness that reigned for decades. J. LINZ & A. STEPAN, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996 
63Originally in J. LINZ, “An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain” in E. ALLARDT & 
Y. LITTUNEN (eds.), Cleavages Ideologies and Party Systems, Helsinki, Transactions of the 
Westermarck Society, 1964 but here quoted from J. LINZ “An Authoritarian Regime: 
Spain” in E. ALLARDT & S. ROKKAN, Mass Politics, New York, The Free Press, 1970, 
pp.251-283 (255) Applied as well in J.LINZ & A. STEPAN, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp.40-54 
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incorporates Matthews’ idea of a Franco who keeps “all parts of his 
regime weak” and who “as long as his position is not attacked” does 
not intervene in the nation’s affairs64 and Almond’s vision of “structural 
pluralism (…) so typical for authoritarian regimes”65 Yet, although he 
considers some degree of pluralism, in Linz’ definition power is still in 
the hands of the “one”, which not only qualifies it as a monist 
approach, but moreover brings it close to the monist analysis of 
democratic systems in which some “apparent pluralism” exists. 
 
2.1.2. A Plurality of Dictators 
 
Pluralists have generally excluded non-democracies from their 
purview. To put it bluntly: a dictatorship is no pluralist democracy. 
Pluralists seem to offer the exact opposite answer to the question “Who 
rules”?: the many, a plurality, be it different elites, different parties, 
different classes, different groups… Although monism seemed, at first 
sight, more adapted to undemocratic regimes, we’ve seen that it has 
also rather successfully approached liberal democratic systems. It 
appears more difficult to apply pluralism to autocratic systems. Yet, 
even though it was in the analysis of democracy that pluralism found 
its most fertile soil, it has not been limited to the sole domain of liberal 
democratic systems.  
 
Indeed, scholars as Medvedev, Ionescu, Deutsch or Almond, analysing 
Soviet politics, pretended to have detected what has been called the 
“Iron Law of Pluralism”.66 “Transitologists avant la lettre” these 
pluralists considered that the development of pluralism could not 
                                                 
64 H.L. MATTHEWS, The Yoke and the Arrows: A Report on Spain, New York, George 
Braziller Inc, 1957, p.100 
65 G.A. ALMOND, “Comparative Political Systems”, in H. EULAU et al. (ed.), Political 
Behavior, Glencoe (Ilinois), The Free Press, 1956, pp.35-42 (40) quoted by  J. LINZ, “An 
Authoritarian Regime: Spain” in E. ALLARDT & S. ROKKAN, Mass Politics, New York, 
The Free Press, 1970, pp.251-283 (252)  
66 For a critical analysis of this Iron Law see: S. WHITE, “Communist Systems and the 
‘Iron Law of Pluralism’”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.8, no.1, January 1978, 
pp.101-117 
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durably be blocked in any society. It is no coincidence that it was the 
author of the Third Wave that saw competing special interests appearing 
in Soviet society.67 Pluralization was or is considered a first step 
towards democracy.68  
 
If pluralists were right in limiting accomplished pluralism to liberal 
democracies69 and considering every step of pluralization a step 
towards systemic change, any attempt to extend pluralist models to 
undemocratic systems would be rather futile, if not in a perspective of 
democratic change. Yet some scholars pointed out that Dahl’s 
“Polyarchy” did actually fit quite well some undemocratic political 
systems.70 Moreover, Dahl’s pleading for “limited popular 
participation” in the system71 also fuels the temptation to attempt a 
pluralist interpretation of undemocratic politics. Could one not argue 
that Iran has a system with some liberalization (relatively competitive 
elections) and high participation rates in those elections (at least during 
the Khatami period)? Dahl acknowledged some of those criticisms in 
his 1989 book, Democracy and its critics,72 by further specifying 
characteristics of polyarchy to exclude “non-democratic” systems.  
One of Dahl’s most basic ideas, elite rule with infra-elite competition, 
did however remain quite stable and it’s exactly this aspect that reveals 
extremely interesting in our perspective. Dahl does indeed consider 
                                                 
67 See especially the theses developed in S. HUNTINGTON & C.H. MOORE, Authoritarian 
Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, New York, Basic 
Books, 1970 
68 K. W. DEUTSCH, “Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration 
in Totalitarian Systems”, in H.E. ECKSTEIN & D.E. APTER (eds.), Comparative Politics: A 
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69 Even though he considered they would not be able to resist pluralist trends. R.A. 
DAHL, Polyarchy.  Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale UP, 1971, pp.78-79 
Another study on “pluralist trends” in communist systems can be found in: A. 
KORBONSKI, “Comparing Liberalization Processes in Eastern Europe A Preliminary 
Analysis”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, January 1972, pp. 231-249 
70 Dahl took these criticisms in account. Already in 1971 he created the category of “quasi-
polyarchies” see also R.A. DAHL, Democracy and its critics, New Haven, Yale UP, 1989 
71 Limited in Dahl’s vision to electoral participation. R.A DAHL, Preface to Democratic 
Theory, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956, p.58 
72 Although already in 1971 he created the category of “quasi-polyarchies” see also R. 
DAHL, Democracy and its critics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989 
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that one of the main reasons a democracy is viable has to do with the 
alternation of elites and the limited participation of the population.73 
 
The breaking with the monocratic analytical model of undemocratic 
regimes is not new. In his book Behemoth, Franz Neumann preferred 
the idea of a clique-ruled system to the concept of “Nazi State”. His was 
probably the first attempt to nuance the idea of an all-powerful state 
structure.74 Others were to follow75, some of whom found source in 
Fraenkel’s Dual State76 and its distinction between “Normenstaat” and 
“Maßnahmenstaat“.  
 
This dual structure of the state was specifically elaborated by Martin 
Broszat,77 who considered the Nazi-state a structure of competing 
institutions. According to Broszat National Socialism not only nazified 
the normal republican institutions but also constructed a parallel 
structure of power of specific Nazi-institutions. He thus proposed 
“polycracy” as a new model, rather than the dominant theory of 
monocracy. Although Broszat probably underestimated the importance 
of Hitler’s role in the system, his research allowed to definitively 
debunk the myth of a unified Nazi-structure and replace it with a 
picture of intra-institutional competition, for example between rival 
bureaucracies like the NSDAP and traditional state institutions 
inherited from the Weimar Republic. Broszat’s idea is not far away 
                                                 
73 To oversimplify one could say limited to the participation to free and competitive 
elections. 
74 F. NEUMANN, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1942 
75 We do not agree with G.A. ALMOND, “Comparative Political Systems”, The Journal of 
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76 E. FRAENKEL, The Dual State: a contribution to the theory of dictatorship, New York, 
Oxford University Press. 1941 Consider also another classic structuralist text: F. 
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77 M. BROSZAT, Der Staat Hitlers, Wiesbaden, Marixverlag, 2007 
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from what is now a classical micro-economic theory of the political 
economy of dictatorship. 
 
Broszat’s underestimation of Hitler’s role was more or less corrected by 
the model of “working towards” proposed by the British historian Ian 
Kershaw.78 Although he accepted Broszat’s model of institutional 
rivalry, Kershaw attributed a bigger role to Hitler in the system. He did 
so mainly because his research on German foreign policy and Hitler’s 
frequent interventions in this domain, made him come to the 
conclusion that if Hitler did not intervene so often in domestic politics, 
this reflected not so much a lack of power as a lack of interest. The 
concept is based on a bi-directional interaction between Hitler and 
those proposing policies to him. Hitler left it up to them to fight out 
their conflicts concerning a certain policy and chose the policy option 
victorious in such a confrontation. In this way not only did he always 
seem right (“his” choice always prevailed which contributed to 
development of the “Hitler myth”)79, but moreover he avoided to get 
mixed up in “lower levels” of debate. In the end those proposing policy 
options started, although not for these motives alone, proposing 
options “in his direction”, that is to say anticipating what the Führer 
would be thinking.  Kershaw envisioned a close interaction between 
elites and the Hitler myth. Priority seems however to be given to the 
actions and impressions of elites, rather than to Hitler’s personal action.  
 
On the Soviet Union too authoritative authors, like Merle Fainsod, Walt 
Rostow and Barrington Moore, have contested the image of a 
                                                 
78 I. KERSHAW, The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 1985 We 
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monolithic polity, demonstrating that intra-systemic competition and 
fragmentation were very concrete in everyday political life.80  
 
In this context Almond’s concept of “structural pluralism”, mentioned 
earlier, is quite interesting and cannot but remind us of the main 
innovation of Jerry Hough namely the concept of “institutional 
pluralism”. Hough’s attempt consisted in extending the idea of 
institutional differentiation of elites to communist systems and more 
particularly to the USSR. Hough’s work was not without link with the 
studies done by Gordon Skilling, who had  developed a theory of 
interest groups in the USSR.81 The theory has been harshly attacked, but 
never really refuted on the basis of hard empirical evidence.82 
Shtromas, a Soviet scholar, later émigré, went even further by stating 
that even under Stalin a certain form of interest group activity had 
existed. The “totalitarian tendency” of the regime made independent 
organization impossible, but this did not mean that certain groups, 
especially when they were not considered a priority for the regime, as 
for example lawyers, could not form pressure groups.83 This is hardly a 
Soviet totalitarian particularity, even under Mao informal factions seem 
to have existed.84 
 
The existence of pressure or interest groups might have been Hough’s 
starting point, his model of “institutional pluralism” should not be 
confused with it. His model shows numerous weaknesses, starting with 
                                                 
80 M. FAINSOD, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1964; W.W. ROSTOW, The 
Dynamics of Soviet Society, New York, Norton, 1967 & B. MOORE, Terror and Progress 
USSR, New York, Harper & Row, 1954 
81 See for example: H. GORDON SKILLING & F. GRIFFITHS, Interest Groups in Soviet 
Politics, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1971 
82 As Gordon Skilling himself notes not without pleasure in H. GORDON SKILLING, 
“Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited”, World Politics, vol.36, no.1, October 
1983, pp.1-27 (2) 
83 A. SHTROMAS, Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet Union, 
Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang - Europaisches Forum, Vol.1, 1981 
84 See for example L. DITTMER & Y. WU, “The Modernization of Factionalism in Chinese 
Politics”, World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 4, July 1995, pp. 467-494 & T. TSOU & A.J. NATHAN, 
“Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics”, The China Quarterly, 
No. 65, March 1976, pp. 98-117 
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its name,85 and would gain from comparison with sometimes 
interesting alternatives as Schmitter’s “state corporatism”.86 At the same 
time however it is of some interest. Hough’s institutional pluralism 
remains far from classical pluralism.87 The differences, as he states, 
“centre on the framework in which the political process takes place”.88 While 
in classical pluralism citizens have the chance to choose freely between 
competing elites89 and to form new organizations, in a model of 
institutional pluralism those who wish to further their interests must 
work within the official institutional framework. Hough describes 
different bureaucracies and elites coming from them as acting in their 
own interest and furthering their own goals rather than those of the 
system, insofar as the latter could be defined.90 Matthew Evangelista 
goes a step further and notes how the transition from the Soviet Union 
to the new Russian state had “the paradoxical effect of making transnational 
actors simultaneously less constrained in promoting their favored policies and 
less effective in getting them implemented.”91 Evangelista underlines how 
once a special interest group got access to top leaders of the system, 
                                                 
85 In an essay written for the work S. GROSS SOLOMON, Pluralism in the Soviet Union: 
Essays in Honour of H. Gordon Skilling, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1982  Hough affirms 
that it was his editor who pushed him to use such a term (p.49). 
86 P.C. SCHMITTER “Still the Century of Corporatism”, Review of Politics, Vol. 36, No.1, 
January 1974, pp. 85-131 converging on the existence of different “corporations” still 
considers that all these are mere transmission organs. Schmitter hence rejoins a kind of 
monist approach. 
87 And this contrary to what asserts S. WHITE, “Communist Systems and the ‘Iron Law of 
Pluralism’”, British Journal of Political Science, vol.8, no.1, January 1978, pp.101-117 
88 J.F. HOUGH, “The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?”, Problems of Communism, 
Vol.21, No.2, March-April 1972, pp.25-45 (29) 
89 Let’s note here the similarity between Hough’s vision of classical pluralism and Dahl’s 
initial concept of polyarchy. 
90 J.F. HOUGH, “The Bureaucratic Model and the Nature of the Soviet System”, Journal of 
Comparative Administration, Vol.5, No.2, August 1973, p.134-167. In a way he’s not so far a 
part from Trotsky’s and Brzezinski’s idea that bureaucracy had taken over the system, 
with however the nuance that Hough considers of the essence the existence of different 
bureaucracies and not just or mainly state-bureaucracy. Compare however: Z. 
BRZEZINSKI, “Victory of the Clerks”, New Republic, No.151, November 14, pp.15-18 and 
L. TROTSKY, The Revolution Betrayed,  New York, Dover Publications Inc., 2004 
91 M. EVANGELISTA, “ The paradox of state strength: transnational relations, domestic 
structures, and security policy in Russia and the Soviet Union”, International Organization, 
Vol.49, No.1, Winter 1995, pp.1-38 
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their lobbying often gave them a decisive advantage over others in 
policy making. An argument made many times in pluralist analyses of 
non-liberal democratic policies. 
 
The above does not mean however that those institutional forces are 
irresponsive to societal forces. Quite on the contrary, either they are 
genuinely concerned with the interests of their popular base, or they 
can easily use popular mobilization to further their own goals. It would 
be unthinkable to have an entire organizational structure (or 
bureaucracy or institution) that is completely irresponsive to its clients. 
This is no matter of philanthropy for the bureaucracies, but primarily a 
matter of survival. Wouldn’t the Iranian Bonyads lose their legitimacy if 
they wouldn’t listen to their clients clamoring for redistribution? For 
the individual citizen the existence of different bureaucracies seems to 
open a pathway towards “social mobility”92 (climbing up the 
bureaucratic ladder) or at the very least to the formulation of some 
particular group interest (e.g. women’s rights).  
 
It is undeniable that existing institutions have to offer sufficient space 
for social mobility and popular participation if they want to preserve 
legitimacy. In his model of “Bureaucratic Authoritarianism”, which 
pays quite some attention to the role of bureaucracies in dictatorship, 
O’Donnell acknowledges this and states that the main characteristic of 
regime crisis is the fact that certain groups “seek to establish new channels 
of access to governmental roles and new criteria for political representation”.93  
 
The role of the dictator or, in a communist system, the party, in the 
model of institutional pluralism, is one of a coordinating broker or of 
an arbiter of these different interests.94 Not unlike the role of the state in 
a “democratic” system.  
                                                 
92 At least until no fixed nomenclature has been installed. 
93 G. O'DONNELL, Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina 1966-1973 in Comparative 
Perspective, Berkeley, University of California Press,  c1988. 
http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4v19n9n2/ , p.24 
94 J.F. HOUGH, “The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?”, Problems of Communism, 
Vol.21, No.2, March-April 1972, pp.25-45 (34) 
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2.1.3. Many Democrats 
 
If we failed to agree on how many rulers rule a dictatorship, can we at 
least agree on the fact that democracy means alternation between 
different elites, competing for power? Pluralists attempt just that. 
Contemporary pluralist theory can probably be said to have started 
with de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America95, but for our purpose 
more useful examples of pluralist theory are offered by D. Riesman, D. 
Truman, P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, N.W. Polsby, R. Aron and 
obviously R.A. Dahl. 
 
Based on a decisional analysis, Truman used a classical lobby-groups 
centred approach.96 Since there are different ways of access to the 
political arena, due as well to interpenetration between political and 
lobby-group personnel, lobby-groups have to be taken into 
consideration in the decisional process. They hence rule or at the very 
least influence the rulers in a decisive way. Riesman97, although 
acknowledging that some kind of “ruling class” has existed, considers 
it a phenomenon of the past and sees it replaced by a multitude of 
groups, called “veto-groups”. Rather than lobbying to obtain 
something, they attempt not to lose what they have previously won 
(often in lobby-group activities). In contrast to command-structured 
groups like lobbies these groups are internally divided. Riesman’s 
vision of power is thus a very fragmented one. Power is not only not in 
the hands of some kind of cohesive elite, interest differentiation within 
those veto-groups fragments power even more. In Power and Poverty98 
                                                 
95 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, De la Démocratie en Amérique, Paris, GF Flammarion, 1982 (2 
tomes) 
96 D. TRUMAN, The Governmental Process, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1993 (1951) 
influenced if not inspired by A. BENTLEY, The Process of Government: A Study of Social 
Pressures, New Brunswick (NJ), Transaction Publishers, 1995. Originally published as 
early as 1908! 
97 D. RIESMAN, The Lonely Crowd, Garden City, Anchor, 1953 
98 P. BACHRACH & M.S. BARATZ, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, 
London/Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1970 
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Bachrach and Baratz, while trying to develop a theory of social change 
by comparing reformers and conservatives, in reality analyze the 
inability to arrive at a decision. A decisional process consists of 
different stages (from the conception of an idea to its implementation) 
and at each of these stages reformers have to gain over the conservative 
forces. The latter only need a decisive victory at one of the stages to 
block any change. If the conservatives do thus seem to have some 
advantage, this does not entail that they alone have power. Especially 
since one can be a conservative in one decisional process and a 
reformer in another. 
 
In his classic work on the city of New Haven99, R.A. Dahl, who had at 
that time already offered some reflections on pluralist democracy,100 
starts from a decisional analysis too. Analysing decisions in three major 
fields (social, political and economic) he remarks that while elites in one 
field do intervene more or less frequently in decision making in other 
fields, this doesn’t mean that only one group, of more or less colluding 
or cohesive elites rules. Rather, the intervention of different elites and 
groups in different fields of decision proves the pluralist thesis, since 
they all are categorized by a certain degree of independence, 
heterogeneity and permeability. Dahl doesn’t see the generalized 
“common interest” monists see and links pluralism to liberal 
democracy.101 About a decade after Polyarchy Dahl further developed 
the concept of “organizational pluralism”, which allowed him to 
incorporate Rokkan’s “corporate pluralism”102 and Lijphart ‘s verzuiling 
or “consociational democracy”103 into his model of pluralism.104  
                                                 
99 R.A. DAHL, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven, 
Connecticut UP, 1961 
100 R.A. DAHL, Preface to a Democratic Theory, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956 
101 See R.A. DAHL, Polyarchy.  Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale UP, 1971 
102 S. ROKKAN,. “Norway: numerical democracy and corporate pluralism” in R.A. 
DAHL (ed.), Political oppositions in Western democracies, New Haven, Yale UP, 1966, pp.70-
115 
103 A. LIJPHART, “Typologies of democratic systems” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.1, 
No.1, April 1968, pp.3-44. 
104 See a.o. R.A. DAHL, “Pluralism Revisited”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2, January 
1978, pp. 191-203; R.A. DAHL, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control, New 
Haven, Yale UP, 1982 
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Dahl’s  vision of pluralism is not unilaterally positive. He admits that 
“It has altered th[e] concept [of political equality] by replacing equality among 
individuals with equality among organizations, as if the latter were a 
functional equivalent of the former in a fully developed capitalist economy.” 
“Consequently, whilst pluralism has prevented the tyranny of (diffused) 
majorities, it has at the same time facilitated domination by (concentrated) 
minorities.”105 
 
Polsby and Aron deserve to be treated separately from the authors 
discussed above. Polsby focuses on the, in his idea, almost infinite 
resources usable in the struggle for political power (economic, status, 
knowledge, rights or even the time at disposal) which pluralists have to 
consider.106 He pushes pluralism to the extreme and provokes a 
reaction of, among others, Schattschneider107 who contested the 
assertion that all resources are equally useful.108 Polsby thus 
unwillingly illustrates the huge methodological difficulties pluralists 
are confronted with: how to measure the importance of distortions in 
the democratic political arena? How to account for inequalities in 
resource distribution or in the relative weight of certain resources? 
 
Aron109 deserves a special mention because although joining the 
pluralist thesis in acknowledging the existence of different and 
sometimes conflicting ruling “categories” and underlining, anticipating 
Dahl, the importance of their permeability, he’s not blind to shared 
interests at the top levels of society. For this reason he doesn’t so much 
                                                 
105 S. FABBRINI, “A European Looks at Dahl’s Democracy”, Public Affairs Report, Vol.42, 
No.2, Summer 2001, pp.4-5 
106 See especially the article N.W. POLSBY, “How to study community power: the 
pluralist alternative”, Journal of Politics, Vol.22, No.3, August 1960, pp.474-484 
107 E.E. SCHATTSSCHNEIDER, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in 
America, New York, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1960.  
108 For a rapid overview of the debate consult: A.J. HICKS & F.J. LECHNER, 
“Neopluralism and Neofunctionalism”, in T. JANOSKI e.a., The Handbook of Political 
Sociology, New York, Cambridge UP, 2005, pp.54-71 (56-57) 
109 R. ARON , “Catégories des classes dirigeantes”, Revue française de Science politique, No. 
1, February 1965, pp.7-27 
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refute monist theses, as he “regrets” the fact that they have, in his 
vision, never been proven.   
 
2.1.4. Democracy’s Sole Ruler  
 
Even when what is under discussion is liberal democracy,  the monist 
paradigm’s answer to Who Rules? is generally: a single unit, be it one 
person, one class, one elite, one part or one family. The best known 
examples of this approach are found in the writings of the Lynds, C. 
Wright Mills’, Floyd Hunter and G. William Domhoff. 
 
Helen and Robert Lynd, while researching the typical American city of 
“Middletown”,110 found that, although there seemed to be an open and 
democratic political system, one family actually controlled everything 
thanks to a single industry  (fruit-canning) on which depended in one 
way or another local banks, farmers, shopkeepers and so on. Yet 
although this family virtually controlled Middletown, it did not try to 
transform its economic dominance into an exclusive political 
monopoly. On the contrary, the inattentive observer could conclude 
that this family had no interest in politics whatsoever. The Lynds do 
however show how the family applied just the necessary resources in 
political life to avoid unpleasant surprises. It controlled but did not 
directly exercise power.   
 
One of the most interesting monist approaches was of the hand of C. 
Wright Mills. In an attempt to rebut Riesman’s pluralistic thesis of veto-
groups, Mills analysed what happens in the top echelons of society.111 
He considered three institutional orders: the military, the political and the 
economic and stressed both the possible and the actual alliances between 
them. Not only did these three orders, according to Mills, share 
common interests, which allowed them to form a kind of cartel and 
                                                 
110 R.S. LYND & H.M. LYND, Middletown: a Study in Modern American Culture, San Diego, 
Harvest/HBJ Book, 1959 (1929) and R.S. LYND & H.M. LYND, Middletown in Transition: a 
Study in Cultural Conflicts, New York, Harcourt,  1982 (1937) 
111 C. WRIGHT MILLS, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford UP, 1956 
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limit the influence of “undesirable pressure groups”, they would also 
grow closer everyday for structural reasons. They shared common 
social origins, played golf on the same courses, formed marriage 
alliances, met at family reunions and so forth. Such togetherness 
predisposed them to exchange high ranking jobs or to grant each other 
favours. Although Mills offered little empirical evidence for his thesis 
the person of Robert McNamara who moved from the Pentagon 
(military elite) to the State Department (political elite), while also 
becoming President of Ford (economic elite), offers a nice illustration of 
what Mills meant. Another example is offered by former US President 
Bush Sr. once a CIA-director. The elite-cartel or closed elite112 controls 
and rules the system while permitting only a facade of democratic 
power-sharing. 
 
A third monist approach is offered by the reputation-based inquiry of 
F. Hunter.113 The results of Hunter’s research clearly rebut Mills’ idea of 
three converging elites. For Hunter dominance belongs to big business 
(e.g. Coca Cola in Atlanta City). One (economic) elite, presenting some 
similarities with Mills’ power elite, is supposed to hold power over 
Atlanta and, by extension, the US.  
 
In numerous works the harshly criticised Domhoff114 insisted that, 
notwithstanding appearances, the US is actually ruled almost 
                                                 
112 It seems to be neither an aristocracy because it’s not a hereditary blood-based elite (but 
this is questionable), nor a class since they do not share common class interests. 
113 F. HUNTER, Community Power Structure, Chapel Hill, University of North-Carolina 
Press, 1953 & F. HUNTER, Top Leadership U.S.A., Chapel Hill, University of North-
Carolina Press, 1959.  
114 Among others: G. W. DOMHOFF, Who Rules America?, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice 
Hall, 1967; The Higher Circles, New York, Random House, 1970; Fat Cats and Democrats, 
Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice Hall, 1972; The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats: A Study 
in Ruling Class Cohesiveness, New York, Harper & Row, 1974; Who Really Rules? New 
Haven and Community Power Re-Examined, New Brunswick (NJ), Transaction Books, 1978; 
The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling Class Domination in America, New York, Random 
House, 1979, Who Rules America Now: A view for the ‘80’s, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice 
Hall, 1983; The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in America, Hawthorne (NY), 
Aldine de Gruyter, 1990 
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exclusively by one cohesive elite.115 Domhoff recognizes that groups 
which are not part of the ruling elite seem to have some influence but 
adds that in practice they lose in the field of political competition. 
Pluralism is only apparent since the “ruling class” controls society 
through four special processes.116 First there are “special interest-
processes”, lobbying sensu largo or interventions in a Lynd-like manner 
via networks organized or used for the obtaining of especially short-
run advantages. Second, Domhoff identifies their involvement and 
dominance in expertise-bodies. These activities are summarized by the 
author as “policy-formation processes”. The third process concerns the 
extremely small role of American political parties in elections which he 
confronts with the fundamental role of private financing of candidates. 
Domhoff asserts that American political parties are hardly responsive 
to their electorate after elections, nor are election campaigns focused on 
the needs or concerns of the general public. The fourth and final 
process concerns the diffusing of ideology to the entire system, in the 
American case centred especially around “laissez-faire liberalism” and 
“individualism” and often understood as “Good Americanism”.117 The 
particularity of liberal ideology is the strong accent put on individual 
responsibility. By constantly downplaying the role of social forces and 
of the system in one’s failures, the elite obtains a “resigned 
acquiescence” of the people which allows the elite to perpetuate its 
dominance.118  
 
                                                 
115 Although the causal factors he identifies for this cohesiveness differ little from those of 
C. Wright Mills, Domhoff came to recognize the possibility of conflicts within the ruling 
class. Such conflicts do however not prove any form of pluralism, since they remain 
within the ruling class. 
116 See G. W. DOMHOFF, The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling Class Domination in 
America, New York, Random House, 1979 and for a favourable summary of some of 
Domhoff’s thinking: H. BLOKLAND, “De corrumpering van de Amerikaanse 
democratie”, Socialisme en Democratie, Vol.61, No.3, pp.8-24  
117 G. W. DOMHOFF, The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling Class Domination in America, 
New York, Random House, 1979, pp.170-172 
118 Ibid., p.191-200 
 56 
2.1.5. A Qualitative Distinction 
 
For an essentialist, the above is confusing. Some scholars find that those 
systems traditionally qualified as dictatorships have many rulers. Is it 
still a dictatorship then? Others have argued that those systems 
traditionally qualified as democracies have in reality only one ruling 
elite. How to speak of democracy then? 
 
If one analyzes the methodologies of the two paradigms, an important 
difference is noted. Although some, like Broszat also consider the 
structural side of the system, the pluralist paradigm generally uses a 
decisional methodology. That is it focuses on how a decision is reached, 
or not reached, and which individuals and groups intervene in the 
decision- or policy-making process. The monist paradigm on the other 
hand is characterized by a method of institutional analysis (Who’s Who? 
and Who’s Where?). More practically it analyzes who occupies the 
highest positions within the system, it traces the presence of party-
members in different state organs or on the lack of institutional 
constraints for policy-makers. Although both approaches are of 
obvious relevance, considering their very different outcomes, the 
question of the influence of the technique on the result has to be 
posed.119  
 
The discussion on the number of rulers illustrates how complex a clear-
cut separation between democracy and non-democracy can be. It is 
however possible that I have focused too unilaterally on the 
quantitative aspect of the distinction. Let us therefore consider the 
differences on four qualitative key dimensions as found in Linz’ 
                                                 
119 Outside the Anglo-American debate this link between technique of analysis and result 
seems to persist. The French sociologist P. BIRNBAUM in his La Classe dirigeante française, 
Paris, PUF, 1978 starting from the Who’s Who (and thus an institutional technique of 
analysis) arrives again at a rather monist conclusion. (see as well P. BIRNBAUM, Les 
Sommets de l’Etat, Paris, Le Seuil, 1977 on legal collusion among elites) 
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classical definition of authoritarian regimes: pluralism, leadership, 
ideology, mobilization. 120 
 
Monism seems to undermine theories that put forth a difference of 
“nature” between undemocratic or democratic systems. If one stays 
within a monist framework the answers to the question “Who rules?” 
or even “How Many rule?” are very similar for both types of regimes. 
There are clear differences in the degree of freedom, repression and 
ideology, but if these are differences in degree, they do not indicate 
differences in nature, democracy  becomes a “scalar” rather than a 
“sortal” concept.121  
 
In monist theory the difference in political pluralism between 
democracy and non-democracy lies in the fact that while liberal 
democracy keeps up appearances, totalitarian regimes as Stalinist 
Russia officially rule out pluralism. Yet in the end both liberal 
democracies as undemocratic regimes have a small, more or less 
cohesive, elite deciding. The distinction blurs even more when Linz and 
others admit a “certain degree” of pluralism in authoritarian systems, 
to distinguish them from totalitarian regimes. If “one” elite rules both 
in democracy and non-democracy, the size of the elite (ranging from 
one person under sultanism to some percentage of the population 
under liberal democracy) brings us back to a mere difference in degree. 
 
Can mobilization be considered fundamental? In monist analyses 
liberal democracy counts especially on “resigned acquiescence”, while 
most models of totalitarian politics consider mobilization a 
fundamental aspect of it. Nevertheless even here some ambiguities 
appear. As Linz and Stepan show, in the transition from totalitarianism 
to post-totalitarianism, mobilization can diminish without bringing 
about democracy. More important yet, under sultanism mobilization is 
considered generally absent!122 Moreover, Almond writes that in 
                                                 
120 J. LINZ, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain” in E. ALLARDT & S. ROKKAN, Mass 
Politics, New York, The Free Press, 1970, pp.251-283 (255) 
121 A. WEALE, Democracy, New York, St.-Martin’s Press, 1999, p.18 
122 J.LINZ & A. STEPAN 1996, supra  
 58 
totalitarianism acquiescence is, over time, based on “conformity and 
apathy”.123 Could then responsiveness be a decisive criterion? Monists 
consider non-democracy obviously rather unresponsive, but at the 
same time cast doubt on how “responsive” the ruling elite in 
democracy really is.  
 
Domhoff and many others underline the existence of a liberal ideology 
which permeates liberal society as a communist ideology could 
permeate a certain class or society. The difference between liberal 
democracies and illiberal regimes could however lie in the nature of the 
ideology. Indeed, a totalitarian ideology is, in theory, a politically 
guiding and mobilizing ideology; while the liberal one is based more 
on acquiescence and is guiding “only” insofar as it indicates a personal 
way of life. Sultanism however lacks such guiding ideology. Is the 
nature of totalitarian ideology such that it allows to separate 
totalitarianism from all other regimes, liberal democratic or not? To 
distinguish between totalitarianism and non-totalitarianism on the 
(sole?) basis of the nature of the ideology (politically guiding or not) 
there has to be absolute clarity on the nature and function of ideology. 
Unfortunately we lack such insight.  There is no actual proof that 
ideology actually always guided politics even in totalitarian regimes. 
Many scholars on Nazism consider Nazi ideology did not guide 
Hitler’s regime. Rather they claim it evolved and radicalized because of 
the structural mechanics of the Nazi-system. The arguments stating 
that Nazi-ideology guided the majority of the German population are 
not especially convincing either.124 As we will see one of the main 
differences between Nazism and Stalinism might just have been the 
nature of their respective ideologies. The former’s ideology being less 
elaborate and based on a “Hitler-myth”, while the latter’s was an 
elaborate theory for all parts of society, on which a Stalin-myth was 
merely superposed. 
 
                                                 
123 G.A. ALMOND, “Comparative Political Systems”, The Journal of Politics, Vol.18, No.3, 
August1956, pp.391-409 (403) 
124 Consider for example: G. ALY, Hitler’s Beneficiaries, New York, Metropolitan Books/ 
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The influence and role of liberal ideology is equally at the centre of 
contradictory debates: does it guide ruling elites and/or people in 
liberal systems? Should it? Should illiberal parties then be excluded 
from elections and power-sharing? The matter seems especially 
interesting in post-communist countries: some of the Baltic countries 
have forbidden communist parties and the Czech Republic recently 
outlawed the Communist Youth Movement (KSM). But the question is 
even relevant for contemporary Western democracies. It was relevant 
when West-Germany banned the German Communist Party about a 
decade after the end of World War II and it is even more so today while 
these democracies are confronted with other illiberal parties, 
movements or policies.125 
 
A further criterion that could help us separate democratic and 
undemocratic systems, might be the presence or absence of free and 
competitive elections. Unfortunately, in a monist view of liberal 
democracy those elections are not much more than a formality. It is 
hence unclear whether their mere existence could determine the nature 
of the regime. And, in the end, aren’t social scientists often measuring 
the degree of freedom and competition in a particular election? 
 
Let us return to the pluralist paradigm. Does the pluralist paradigm 
offer us a decisive qualitative difference between democracy and 
dictatorship?  
 
Pluralism seems to present a clear vision of how decision-making and 
especially public-policy-making happens. By considering politics as an 
arena in which actors freely compete and the state as a referee to 
guarantee the free competition. between private interests, it espouses a 
traditional liberal view. Pluralist or quasi-pluralist approaches of 
systems where the state has a clearly more important function do have 
a propensity to stress the competition between different actors in the 
making of policy. 
 
                                                 
125 One thinks of far-right parties and Islamist movements 
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Pluralism has not been immune from criticism. The problematic 
teleological nature, implicit in the so-called  “Iron Law of Pluralism”, 
has been one point of criticism. Another, mainly monist, criticism 
concerned the fact that most pluralists, although rightly emphasizing 
the intervention of different groups in a decisional process neglect to 
“measure” these. In essence, pluralists suppose that all interventions 
and actors are of equal value and have equal influence. As Hicks and 
Lechner rightly remark pluralists have reacted to these criticisms by, on 
the one hand, extending the rage of agency of their model, 
incorporating state-based or class-based interest groups, which led to 
organizational pluralism or corporate pluralism, and, on the other 
hand, acknowledging possible constraints or empowerments coming 
from a particular context that might favour some particular actor.126  
 
Pluralist analyses focus on interest groups and lobbies and the 
fundamental difference between democracy and non-democracy, from 
a systemic point of view, appears to be the absence or presence of 
freedom of association. Interest groups under non-democracy are 
generally not spontaneous or free associations in defence of certain 
groups. This distinction is on the other hand not that absolute if we 
adhere to Shtromas’ thesis of independent informal interest groups 
under Stalinism.127 
 
Where monism underlined consensus, collusion and cooperation, 
pluralism accentuates competition between actors, be it elites or 
institutions. The competition can be more or less free and autonomous 
or on the contrary organized by state-bureaucracy and hence top-down 
in nature. Pluralist writings seem to confirm that the degree to which a 
state or society are “open” is more  of a scalar difference, illustrated by 
two ends of an axis. On one end we find a system dominated by freely 
constituted competing actors, on the other a system dominated by 
                                                 
126 A.J. HICKS AND F.J. LECHNER, “Neopluralism and Neofunctionalism”, in T. 
JANOSKI e.a., The Handbook of Political Sociology, New York, Cambridge UP, 2005, pp.54-
71 (58-62) 
127 Supra. 
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actors established or controlled by the regime. All the existent polities 
could then be placed on such an axis.   
 
Concluding one can not go without noticing that, neither monism, nor 
pluralism or corporatism, have been able to offer a clear distinction 
between democracy and dictatorship. This is well illustrated by the 
Dahl’s 2001 “How Democratic is the American Constitution” in which he 
challenges the democratic nature of the US Constitution.128 The first 
problem is obviously a methodological one, the answer to the question 
“How Many Rule?” depends almost entirely on the selected approach. 
The second issue concerns the very different answers offered to the 
“Who Rules?” question. For some the very abstract “Technostructure” 
rules, for others rule is in the hands of a coagulated power elite, for 
others still one party, lobby-groups, veto-groups,  bureaucracy, state 
institutions, corporations, and so on. The actors present on the 
competition-collusion axis are hence all but clear. Arguably these actors 
vary over time and space, yet the variety of conclusions regarding one 
single regime, the United States, over one single period of time, 
indicates that such variation is not the main reason of the paradigms’ 
inability to clearly determine the actors.  
 
Such an inability proves the limits of the classificatory logic inherent to 
many of transitological approaches. The mentioned paradigms actually 
reveal quite useful to undermine basic “our” system versus “their” 
system analyses of regimes, by introducing a scalar difference between 
different regimes based on elite behaviour. Monists, as C.W. Mills or 
Taylor, often acknowledge the existence of different elites and either 
stress the collusion between these (the power elite) or the absolute 
dominance of one of these elites. Pluralists on the other hand 
accentuate the different actors competing for power, but some, like 
Aron, do acknowledge a common interest of the ruling elite. Moreover, 
if one compares C.W. Mills’ account with Broszat’s or Hough’s 
competing institutions, what differs is above all the degree of collision 
among elites. In Kershaw’s pluralist approach of Nazi Germany 
                                                 
128 R.A. DAHL, How Democratic is the American Constitution?, Yale, Yale UP, 2001 
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consensus building was undeniably essential for the Führer’s policy. 
The so-called bargaining to reach a consensus also shows that collusion 
in pluralist theses is all but absent. What most seems to separate these 
scholars reveals in the end not much more than a scalar difference of 
complicity.  
 
Pierre Bourdieu might have offered the clearest characterization of the 
limits of the above paradigm. The French sociologist avows that the 
matter is totally irrelevant. In his vision elites are always at the same 
time divided and united. They are united because they are part of the 
ruling elite, which requires close interaction and mutual acceptance. 
They are divided because each and every part of the corps attempts to 
dominate it.129 Although reframing the question, Bourdieu as well 
acknowledges the dialectics of collusion and competition. If the 
combination of both paradigms thus offers us some useful analytical 
tools, like the competition-collusion spectrum to characterize elite-rule, 
both paradigms also present numerous problems. 
2.2. So… Who Rules? 
 
The limits of essentialism are now clear. Constructing a naturalized 
concept of dictatorship and pretending a transition to a naturalized 
kind of liberal democracy would necessitate a correct and deep analysis 
justifying such a classification. None of the above mentioned 
approaches has been able to do so. This is hardly a surprise. Debating 
on if a state or a system is ruled by one or more elites, by a coherent 
ruling class or different lobby- or veto-groups, occasionally permits 
some tentative conclusions on the degree of pluralism and perhaps 
democracy in a given state or system, yet it does not constitute a 
sociological analysis of the functioning and origins of the regime as 
such. 
                                                 
129 See his analysis in P. BOURDIEU, La Noblesse d’Etat, Paris, Minuit, 1989 & P. 
BOURDIEU,  “Rethinking the State : genesis and structure of the Bureaucratic Field”, 
Sociological Theory, Vol.12, No.1, March 1994, pp.1-19 and the Bourdieu-inspired synthesis 
of monist and pluralist paradigms in P. RIUTORT, Précis de sociologie, Paris, PUF, 2004, 
pp.506-510 
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The action of the ruling elite is often described in a vacuum, sometimes 
a time vacuum, sometimes space vacuum, often both. In essence one 
labels the elite, private or state, moderate or radical, yet at the same 
time rigorously ignores their history and the background of their 
power. By answering the question “Who Rules?” in such a reductive 
way, one obscures an essential part of the calculus. By answering “The 
Elite Rule”, the question “Who are the Elite?” is forgotten. 
 
The time vacuum is best exemplified by the lack of historical analysis of 
the emergence of elites that characterizes many of the above mentioned 
approaches. In short the description of the elites in place and their 
action is given more importance than their emergence. This seems a 
step back in comparison to what could perhaps be called the founding 
fathers of respectively historical sociology and elite analysis, namely 
Montesquieu and Gaetano Mosca. Neither of them would have thought 
of starting an analysis of elites without considering the socio-economic 
and socio-political evolution and situation that led the elites to be the 
elites. Yet today, even those scholars preoccupied with the 
interpretation of  institutional functioning, like Kershaw130, Hough131 
and Broszat132, or scholars describing the “origins of totalitarianism”133, 
often downplay, if not totally ignore, the influence of history on the 
formation of the functioning and very nature of the regimes they are 
studying. The space vacuum is related to the relative absence of 
description of the environment elites compete in, for those who 
consider the state an arena, or, for those cherishing an instrumentalist 
vision of the state, of the tool used by the elite. Most Marxists and 
classical Liberals would probably consider the State rather passive, 
while others, like for example Poulantzas or Pahl and Winkler, see a 
                                                 
130 I. KERSHAW, Qu’est-ce que le Nazisme, Paris, Gallimard (Folio), 1997   
131 See for example J.F. HOUGH & M. FAINSOD, How The Soviet Union is Governed, 
Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1982 which treats the question of historical development in less 
than 7 (!) pages. 
132 M. BROSZAT, Der Staat Hitlers, Wiesbaden, Marixverlag, 2007 
133 H. ARENDT, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, Harvest, 1976 
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more significant role for the State.134 The corporatism described by 
Schmitter and Manoïlesco135 allows to bring the State back in, although 
still only partially and prudently.136 Seeing the State merely as an 
“arena” for competition or an “instrument” of power and domination is 
less harmful than hardly considering it at all. This is no twist of fate. 
The fact that many, if not all, of the above mentioned refrain from 
analyzing the formation of the state is inextricably linked to the lack of 
situation in time.  
 
To be sure, there is more to it. For many of the authors the lack of 
situating in space and time of elite struggle is an almost natural 
consequence of the fact that their “general theory” of power and 
government is a mere extrapolation of what they empirically found on 
a local level, in a small town (New Haven, Middletown), a corporation 
(Technocracy) or part of the system (Shtromas). Concluding that 
pluralism exists nationally since it does in New Haven or since lawyers 
form interest groups or that technocracy commands since this seems 
the case in entrepreneurial structures, is making a big leap from small 
empirical evidence to grand theoretical conclusions. 
                                                 
134 N. POULANTZAS timidly defends the idea of a “relative autonomy” for the State and 
accused other Marxists and especially R. MILIBAND of fostering an “instrumentalist” 
vision of the State (something MILIBAND always denied). See N. POULANTZAS, ‘The 
Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau’, New Left Review, No. 95, 1976, pp.63-83; 
N. POULANTZAS. Political power and social classes. London, New Left, 1973; N. 
POULANTZAS State, power, socialism. London, Verso, 2001(1978) and R. MILIBAND, 
“The Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas”, New Left Review, Vol.1, No.59, January-
February 1970, pp. 53-60;  R. MILIBAND, “Poulantzas and the Capitalist State”, New Left 
Review, Vol.1, No.82, November-December 1973, pp. 83-92; R. MILIBAND, Capitalist 
Democracy in Britain, Oxford, Oxford UP, 1982; R. MILIBAND, Class Power and State 
Power, London, Verso, 1983; R.E. PAHL AND J.T. WINKLER, “The Coming 
Corporatism”, Challenge, No.18, pp.18-35 as quoted in  L.G. GERBER, “Corporatism and 
State Theory”, Social Science History, Vol.19, No.3, Autumn 1995, pp.313-332 (322-323) 
135 P.C. SCHMITTER, “Still the Century of Corporatism”, Review of Politics, Vol. 36, No.1, 
January 1974, pp. 85-131 
136 About the return of the State in Social Science P. EVANS, D. RUESCHEMEYER and T. 
SKOCPOL (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, New York, Cambridge UP, 1985 
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2.3. State Formation 
 
Such ills are not easily overcome. A look at state formation theories, to 
which transitology is inextricably linked and indebted, and their 
evolution offers some relief. Where transitology and modern elitist 
theories underline how elites make the system, theories of state 
formation underline how the system makes elites. It would be 
reductive to reduce difference between both to a simple voluntarist-
structuralist debate, yet there are undeniable parallels. 
 
At first sight, theories of state formation are flawed by similar ills that 
undermine transitology. Tilly’s four-folded characterization of state-
formation theories offers four broad approaches of how states were 
formed: one, the Statist approach, accentuating the importance of the 
State as an arena for political infighting and factionalism and hence 
focuses on political rather than on economic factors. “Among historians, 
sociologists, and students of comparative politics, statist accounts of states’ 
formation are by far the most popular (..) searching for clues as to the 
conditions producing strong, effective stable states, and assuming only one 
such set of conditions exists. (..) they often posit a single, central path of 
European state formation and a set of deviations from the path explained by 
inefficiency, weakness, bad luck, geopolitical position, or the timing of 
economic growth and its concomitants.(..) Bertrand Badie and Pierre 
Birnbaum, for example, treat France as the most fully realized European state: 
‘Prussia, Spain, and Italy followed related paths, but the process of 
differentiation and institutionalization never went so far [as in France].” A 
second theory is based on mode of production and its contradictions of 
which the most famous example is offered by Perry Anderson’s Marxist 
analysis137; a third named the geopolitical approach, incarnated by 
James Rosenau,138 which links state formation to international relations 
and their own logic, claiming that the latter heavily influences the kind 
of state formation; and a fourth approach, linked especially to 
                                                 
137 P. ANDERSON, Lineages of the Absolutist State, London, Verso, 1974 
138 J.N. ROSENAU, The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Behavior 
and Transformation, New York, McCaleb-Seiler, 1970 
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Immanuel Wallerstein139, of world system analysis, “regarding the 
structures of individual states as consequences of their positions within the 
world economy.”140  
 
Arguably much of transitological literature would today be situated in 
the Tilly’s “statist approach to state formation”. The essence of much of 
it is indeed elite choice and behavior and the underlying calculations 
inspired by the struggle for power. This struggle for power among 
elites would then influence the form of government and the state, when 
these elites deem such a change useful for the advancement of their 
cause, in essence their collective power. Unsurprisingly hence, some of 
the criticism of these state formation paradigms by Tilly has bases not 
too different from those founding our criticism of transitology.141 
Indeed, Tilly mentions how many theories fail because “they assume 
implicitly a deliberate effort to construct the sorts of substantial, centralized 
states that came to dominate European life during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries” (statist theories) or “fail to capture the impact of war 
and preparation for war on the whole process of state formation” (geopolitical 
and world system theories).142 Tilly also acknowledges that the 
propositions made in a book edited by him on the formation of national 
states in Europe143 were flawed by an ill similar to the one 
characterizing the four theories above: “in fact, we implicitly substituted a 
new unilinear story – one running from war to extraction and repression to 
state formation – for the old one.” 144  
 
                                                 
139 I. WALLERSTEIN, The Modern World- System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of 
the European World System in the Sixteenth Century, New York, Academic Press, 1974 
140 C. TILLY, Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1990, pp.5-11  
141 For a more methodological criticism of state formation theories see P. ABRAMS, 
Historical Sociology, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1982, pp.147-189 
142 C. TILLY, Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
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143 C.TILLY(ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton, Princeton 
UP, 1975 
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A part from common ills, there are obviously other points on which 
theories of state formation on the one hand and transitology on the 
other meet.145 One is the interest for the type of regime, classification so 
to say. The opposition between “democracy” and “dictatorship” in 
Barrington Moore’s work and between “Staatsverfassung” and 
“Heeresverfassung” in Hintze seem to parallel the distinction between 
“authoritarianism” versus “democracy” in Juan Linz or between 
“democracy” and “totalitarianism” by Aron. However, it is hardly a 
coincidence that state-formation scholars, with often a background in 
historical sociology, have been more successful than their 
transitological colleagues in overcoming these ills. Avoiding such a trap 
of simplistic dual classification requires an attempt “to explain neither 
uniformity nor yes-no differences, but variety and change.” 146 Attempting to 
systemize and understand the contemporary Iranian regime is a 
fruitless undertaking if one forgets the fundamental contributions not 
only of elitist theorizations, but also of the underlying structures and 
dynamics, both clearly situated in time and space. Concerning ruling 
elites state-formation theories harbor the obvious advantage of 
describing the emergence of elites, their incorporation in the system 
and their influence on the structure of the system. By identifying 
historically driven forces, elites and their action, a paradigm based on 
historical sociology can hence succeed where both transitology and 
monist-pluralist paradigms fell short.  
 
Many state-formation theories do exactly what contemporary elitist 
analyses neglected: situating in space and time the emergence of elites.  
In doing so state formation theories replace Aristotle with 
Montesquieu. Notwithstanding Auguste Comte’s critique of 
Montesquieu’s classification of political regimes, which Comte 
considered a return to “the primitive type of Aristotle’s Treaty”,147 French 
                                                 
145 There is arguably no better incarnation of this fact than C. TILLY, Contention and 
Democracy in Europe 1650-2000, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2004  
146 C. TILLY, Contention and Democracy in Europe 1650-2000, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 
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sociologist Emile Durkheim seems to have understood Montesquieu 
somewhat better than Comte did. 148  The former underlines that 
Montesquieu’s classification, although formally similar to Aristotle’s, 
draws from a different register in that it does not consider the number 
of governors as a decisive criterion. For Montequieu, democracy, 
government of the people, the many, and aristocracy, government of 
the few, the elite, are part of one category of society: the Republic. 
Montesquieu opposes the Republic to Monarchy and Despotism. In the 
Republic all are inspired by the collective good, the virtue of putting 
the interests of the collective before the personal interests, what 
Montesquieu calls “political virtue”. A situation possible only because 
all are if not equal at least similar and personal wealth is kept within 
limits. There is no, what Durkheim would later describe, “division of 
social labor”.149 According to the author, such a Republic has only 
existed in small polities as ancient Greece and Sparta or Rome in its 
Republican period.  
 
Monarchy seems the exact opposite of the Republic. Under Monarchy 
wealth, social tasks and labor are extremely divided among different 
classes (e.g. peasants, fishermen, hunters, workers,…) of the polity. 
This specialization does not allow Montesquieu to define Monarchy as 
the rule of the one, because different classes, groups or “organs”,150 
each with their specialization limit the range of action of the others. It is 
this careful balance between different societal forces in competition in 
the defence of their own domain that Montesquieu will consider the 
basis of the separation of power and the limitation of power. Durkheim 
describes the internal dynamics of Montesquieu in an admirably clear 
way: “The members of society thus divert everything from the general interest 
to the personal interest [honor] (..) But the cohesion of the elements is born 
out of their diversity. This ambition that moves orders and individuals, indeed 
                                                 
148 We base our considerations on Montesquieu here heavily on the excellent synthesis 
made of them in E. DURKHEIM, Montesquieu et Rousseau: Précurseurs de la Sociologie, 
Paris, Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie., 1966, pp.55-68 
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Sociologie, Paris, Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie., 1966, p.64 
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at the same time stimulates every single one of them to fulfil in the best 
possible way is function. They also unconsciously further the common good, 
believing to focus solely on personal advantages.”151  
 
Despotism, the government of the Persians in Montesquieu’s view, 
holds the middle between both Republic and Monarchy. Not knowing 
any division of labor, nor hence “organs” or “classes”, it nonetheless 
has one ruler, that drew centralized all forces in his person. People are 
not motivated by political virtue, since they are far from public affairs, 
nor by honor or ambition since all are “equal in servitude”. 
Montesquieu thus offered an infinitely more sociological vision of state 
and government than Aristotle had done. In his analysis of polities, he 
immediately and inextricably links the question “Who Rules?” to the 
interrogation “How Do These Rule?” and to a given society’s social 
infrastructure. For Montesquieu discussing the former question is 
useless if one has not first found a sufficient answer to the latter. Little 
imagination is needed to see her the precursor of more nineteenth and 
twentieth century analyses of feudalism, absolute monarchy and other 
topics now covered by historical sociology.152  
 
If simplifying, we would consider the Republic to be an ideal-type of 
fusional society, not unlike ideals of a classless society or a Rousseau-
inspired social contract, the regime of Monarchy could represent most 
of the regimes today, at least at the level of their social bases. Indeed, 
division of labor is widespread and the description of competition 
instigated by “ambition” and individuals competing furthering the 
common good while believing to focus on mere personal benefits 
sounds similar to the tenets of both economic capitalism and political 
liberalism. Montesquieu’s vision is clearly more complex, more 
developed and arguably more precise than Aristotle’s. Montequieu 
answers questions considering historical development, resource 
attribution, competition between elites, socio-economic structures and 
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152 See P. ABRAMS, Historical Sociology, Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1982 who identifies Anomie, 
Class Formation, Rationalization as some of these topics. 
 70 
so on. Montesquieu’s classification is also more specific on the nature of 
specific regimes, because the French author analyzes their roots and 
practical functioning. Elites and rulers are no longer operating in a 
relative vacuum.  
 
Contemporary state formation theories bear some resemblance to 
Montesquieu’s approach, which has allowed them to solve, at least 
partially, the ills flawing still today much of transitological literature. 
On the other hand many scholars of revolution have in the past fallen 
in a similar voluntarist trap. While some of them acknowledge possible 
structural constraints, most of them assume that revolutionaries have 
some kind of plan for the construction of a new order. Such plan can be 
explicit, expressed by some kind of revolutionary ideology, or implicit, 
expressed in actions. Without a priori refuting such perspective, I prefer 
the more nuanced approach of human agency found in state formation 
theories. The importance of voluntarist teleological action in the 
direction of state formation has rarified and teleology in general been 
minimized. Indeed, while Tilly still regretted voluntarism in statist 
approaches of state formation which in his vision assumed an 
intentional effort to construct modern states, Norbert Elias had already 
underlined how state formation theories can avoid assumptions of 
voluntarism in state construction. Elias mentioned how the interaction 
of uncountable ambitions and individual interests can create a 
phenomenon no one explicitly wanted or planned for, but remains 
nonetheless the result of the actions and aspirations of a great number 
of actors.153  
 
At the same time, by considering countries where state formation did 
not develop as in, for example, Western Europe, contemporary state 
formation theory also limits the risk of “analytical regressiveness”.154 
                                                 
153 N. ELIAS, Über den Progress der Zivilisation, tonne II, 1969 in its French translation N. 
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theories in the colonial world  C. TILLY, “War Making and State Making as Organized 
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Barrington Moore’s “Terror and Progress USSR” and “Social Origins of  
Dictatorship and Democracy” offer much earlier illustrations of such.155 
Tilly somewhat ungenerously summarizes Moore’s argument as 
follows: “To the extent that great, exploitative landlords survived the 
transition to intensive cash-crop farming (..) authoritarian government 
persisted into the contemporary era. To the extent that the bourgeoisie 
predominated, some form of democracy existed.” 156 This synthesis illustrates 
two aspects of Moore’s work. Firstly, a more structural (as opposed to 
voluntarist) analysis, secondly, the “open end” (as opposed to 
teleological types of analyses) side of it. Tilly’s own approach as offered 
in Coercion, Capital and European States also avoids relating state 
formation to “strategic decisions”, leaves space for some falsification 
and explicitly refutes teleology.  
 
Undeniably, Tilly’s merit in the domain of state formation domain has 
been extremely valuable and probably decisive, yet his main argument 
was probably less original than is generally assumed. Tilly’s central 
argument is that “state structure appeared chiefly as a by-product of rulers’ 
efforts to acquire means of war” and “relations among states, especially 
through war and preparation for war, strongly affected the entire process of 
state formation.”157 This explanation combines much of the other theories 
of state formation by reframing them. Although Tilly quotes Norbert 
Elias only once in his chapter on “how war made states, and vice 
versa”, preferring to stress the influence of Barrington Moore, Stein 
Rokkan and Lews Mumford on his theory, Elias’ influence seems 
major. Elias underlines that throughout history arms have been the best 
way to obtain means of production just as threat has been an 
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indispensable auxiliary to production, especially in the struggle for the 
monopolization of power. Every “social unit” faces a choice, claims 
Elias, either to be defeated which implies the loss of its independent 
autonomous existence, or to be victorious and extend its influence and 
power.158 Inexorably this competition between social units leads to an 
order of monopolization where competition without monopolies is 
substituted by competition organized by monopolies. During the same 
process private monopolies evolve to public monopolies, notably on 
the fiscal and the military level.159 
 
The originality of Elias’ approach lay not in his underlining of the 
importance of war and armies in state formation. Since, 
notwithstanding the fact that more recently some have tried to put 
emphasis on the co-evolution of states and economic network 
developments,160 the importance of war and military centralization on 
state-making forms an almost transversal characteristic of classic state-
building theories from Hintze over Wallerstein and Perry Anderson to 
Giddens, Tilly and Finer.161 Some of these scholars, like Otto Hintze, 
Charles Tilly and Michael Barnett, have underlined that the threat of 
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war might be enough to ignite the process of centralization.162 Hintze 
spoke about “compelling political imperatives” (zwingende politische 
Notwendigkeiten)163 and in his view one of these “continuous state of war 
dominating the continent” (beständigen Kriegszustand der auf dem Kontinent 
herrschte)164 Hintze went as far to state that every political system 
(Staatsverfassung) is originally a military system (Heeresverfassung).165 
Elias’ approach was innovative because it systemized the link between 
war making, taxation and state making. A theme that would become 
central in Tilly’s state formation theory. 
 
But Elias is also to be credited for another major innovation. When he 
considers the competition and struggle between different social units, 
he adds to his analysis how private monopolies develop into public 
monopolies. One of the fundamental questions of state formation will 
indeed be the passage of concentrations of private power to state 
institutions sensu largo. In other words, how are concentrations of 
private power transformed in state institutions. How are groups that 
were until then competitors to the state become competitors in the state.  
2.4. The Corporatist Complex 
 
This idea of competitors within the state brings us back to the pluralist 
paradigm. Pluralist scholars have reacted in different ways to criticism 
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Allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, 3rd ed., Goettingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913, 
pp.52-83 
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regarding the pluralist paradigm. An interesting development of 
classical pluralist theory can be found in “stretched organizational 
pluralism”. As Pollard notes the concept usually refers to the degree “to 
which the foreign policy making power is shared, willingly or unwillingly, 
with other individuals and institutions”. Unlike polyarchy it “does not 
necessarily imply a high degree of representation or contestation in the larger 
polity. […] whereas Robert Dahl's polyarchy refers to the widest possible 
contestation and representation, stretched organizational pluralism includes 
both democratic and authoritarian social movements and constitutional 
systems.”166  
 
Therborn once stated that “Corporatism has become a bit like God. Many 
people believe it is an important phenomenon (…) But nobody really knows 
what it looks like.”167 As many social scientific concepts, corporatism has 
been subjected to cross-examination, but one clear definition has yet to 
emanate. To avoid losing too much time in conceptual hair splitting, I 
will adopt Schmitter’s definition. Schmitter puts the essence of 
corporatism in the institutional aspect of it, rather then in the 
ideological or philosophical aspect. For Schmitter corporatism is a 
“system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized 
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically 
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for obtaining certain controls on 
their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.”168 
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 75 
 
By including state-organizations neo-pluralism draws closer to 
corporatism.  Borrowing from Romanian scholar Manoïlesco, Schmitter 
distinguishes between democratic and undemocratic pluralism, or 
societal and state corporatism respectively.169 While in the latter model 
state-instituted corporate bodies are mere transmission belts for state 
policies and ideology, the former seems compatible with democracy 
since it presupposes social groups organized on a voluntary basis and 
hence freedom of association. The problem is that because of the 
monopoly these “corporations” enjoy, freedom of association is, even in 
cases of “societal corporatism”, at least de facto limited. Obviously, the 
distinction can be founded on the difference between autonomous and 
penetrative corporations versus dependent and penetrated 
corporations, yet this distinction is never very clear cut. Manoïlesco 
already noted a mixed form, so-called “mixed corporatism”.170 The full-
fledged societal corporatist system then greatly resembles, without 
identifying entirely with it, the state corporatist regime. 
 
Two fundamental differences still seem to separate corporatism from 
pluralism: on the hand competitiveness forms the essence of pluralism 
and seems absent from corporatism, on the other hand pluralism is a 
system in which freely organized, not-compulsory groups are the 
actors, while in corporatism Schmitter underlines the compulsory 
nature of such entities.  
 
A first difference seems to lie in the concept of “competition”. Pluralism 
accentuates the free competition between freely-constituted groups, 
while Schmitter’s definition of corporatism underlines the non-
competitive nature of “corporations”. Corporatism is a system based on 
looking for consensus and overcoming societal cleavages, something 
that at an elite-level does effectively bridge the gap with some monist 
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analyses. If we wish to adhere to a radical interpretation of non-
competitiveness, even the slightest presence of competition could 
exclude a polity from being corporatist.  
 
Reality however rarely offers such clear-cut differences. Citing Van den 
Brande171 Schmitter qualifies post-1945 Belgium as a more “pluralist” 
system since pillars, based mainly on confessional differences, that is 
socialist versus catholic, are neither monopolistic (both offer among 
other things trade unions, medical insurance system and political 
parties), nor non-competitive.172 With the augmentation of tripartite 
consultation, consensus seeking organs and depillarization, Belgium 
has today probably moved closer to corporatism.  
 
Not unexpectedly, some authors have argued that the difference 
between corporatism and pluralism is indeed not as insurmountable as 
it might seem. Consensus building and competition are not mutually 
exclusive; neither are authoritarianism and “many rulers”. By 
considering the process, the searching for consensus, by which multiple 
actors, corporations, elites or other institutions come to decisions, 
corporatism also considers decision making. Martin for one asserts that 
the bargaining in pluralism and the consensus building in corporatism 
show remarkable parallels. The revival of corporatist theory was 
partially due to the unsatisfactory results obtained by the then 
dominant pluralist paradigm. Moreover, some authors have argued 
that there’s little or no conceptual difference between so-called “liberal 
corporatism” and “pluralism”.173 The idea of multiple interest 
representation is present in both, and so is the vision of the state as a 
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necessary actor, be it to license certain institutions, be it as an 
indispensable referee. 
 
An interesting proposal made by Colin Crouch is to consider pluralism 
and corporatism (liberal or authoritarian) different stages on a 
continuum.174 By using two variables, respectively representation of 
private interest and discipline of members in favour of the general 
interest, the function interest organizations fulfil determine if the 
system is a corporatist or a pluralist one. At the left hand of the scale, 
closest to the disciplining pole, we observe a system in which the 
interest representing (or intermediating) organizations having no 
representative function and are mere transmission belts for the 
government, state or authoritarian corporatism. At the other extreme 
we perceive a system in which interest organizations have a strictly 
representative function, pluralism or, more radically, “contestation” in 
Crouch’s approach.175 In between those extremes other forms, 
liberal/societal corporatism or corporate liberalism can be placed. 
Competition is in this scheme not completely impossible in a 
corporatist system, but becomes more pronounced the more a system 
develops pluralist tendencies. 
 
State Corporatism        Societal Corporatism Corporate Liberalism Pluralism
Disciplining Representative
 
  
Even though corporations are in theory non-competitive, since all 
actors or their peak organizations are in the same “corporation” and co-
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decide about policy, this does not in our view per se mean that 
competition between corporations for the allocation of means or 
resources has to be excluded. Soliciting the state to invest more in a 
particular sector or category is not irreconcilable with corporatism. 
Given that corporatist entities are subdivided in categories (e.g. a 
military corporation vs. a steel corporation) it seems in no manner 
incompatible with corporatism to suppose competition on a macro-
level between representatives of categories.   
 
The continuum brings us to another important distinction between 
corporatism and pluralism. Corporatists do generally not use a 
decisional analysis. Yet while looking at institutional arrangements, 
they do not automatically conclude that power is in the hands of a 
single unit. It seems reasonable to choose a more complicated and 
nuanced vision of the polity which seems less dependent on the 
applied methodology. 
 
The continuum illustrated earlier thus allows us to account for quite 
some aspects of monism and pluralism together. Nonetheless, it does 
say little on the degree of responsiveness. In state corporatism the 
many can rule and corporations can hypothetically be quite responsive. 
On the other hand pluralism can witness an absolute dominance of one 
interest group.  The proposed approach via a continuum and the 
refutation to treat undemocratic and democratic polities fundamentally 
differently should allow us above all to refute methodological 
exceptionalism so very present in transition studies.176  
 
Yet when taking a closer look at the continuum it is obvious that the 
continuum does not escape classificatory logic. When trying to place 
classical fascist and communist regimes, admitted they both have 
corporatist features in the above sense, we would probably end up at 
the left of our continuum. At the same time, when trying to locate the 
US’ political system we would probably end up towards the right. Our 
continuum does thus something very similar to the concept of 
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totalitarianism. It opposes liberal democracy to what it is not, but it 
doesn’t allow to differentiate between different kinds of authoritarian 
regimes. Although it offers some interesting perspectives, corporatism 
does thus not avoid the risk of developing categories that do nothing 
more than distinguish “us” from “the others”.  
 
An attempt to overcome to this dilemma is offered by Rommetvedt 
(Figure 1) in the following scheme.177 It allows us to separate fascism 
from communism. Even though both would be placed in opposition to 
liberal democracy, the strong concentration of private power under 
fascism, absent in communist systems, offers us a first seemingly 
objective criterion to differentiate not only liberal democracy from 
other systems, but also to distinguish between those “other” systems. 
 
 
Concentration of
private power
Monolithic Private government Corporatism
Segmented Segmented State
Dispersed Pluralism State-directed
Dispersed Segmented Monolithic
Concentration of government power
Figure 1. Concentration of power and government systems
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Understood in this way corporatism wields some clear advantages in 
respect to pluralism. The reintegration of the state and its institutions in 
the model is obviously one of them. Corporatism also permits to 
underline the institutional background of elites and the use of the 
respective corporatist units in their struggle for power. When state 
formation is considered the incorporation of social units in the state, 
subsequently the state is composed of corporation-like entities. This 
evolution explains the emergence of the corporatist-complex. 
Corporatism offers some tools to understand it. One could even 
imagine state formation, in a first phase, as the passage of societal 
corporatism to state corporatism. 
 
Nonetheless even a corporatist approach, appears not totally free of the 
ills of the pluralist paradigm. It still seems to require a quantification of 
the degree of concentration or segmentation of private and state power. 
In reality, to the question on the respective weight of the social units in 
the process of state formation, theories of state formation offer a 
tentative answer.  A balanced view, which links corporatism and state 
formation, could permit us to identify the relevant social units and 
consider their degree of incorporation in the state. Hough’s model of 
institutional pluralism and O’Donnell’s bureaucratic authoritarianism 
permit us to bear in mind state institutions. 
2.5. State-Formation and Competition 
 
When one considers a “competition” for power by “actors” which are 
the actors that should be taken into consideration? Situating elites, their 
rise, their emergence and eventual downfall in space and time does not 
solve all questions. Social units that are at first competing and then lose 
the competition to what subsequently becomes the state are in the end 
“swallowed” by the state. Most scholars have in one way or another 
seen the basic quest of the State as one for social homogenous 
foundations, to which often social classes are considered the main 
obstacle.178 Marxism found one answer by offering a paradigm of 
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dictatorship of one class over another, or, in more complex situations, 
of class coalitions over other class coalitions. Another answer was 
offered by so-called “corporatist” theories in which class collaboration 
or at the very least meaningful consultation was proposed. Yet this 
does not mean in our vision that such swallowed social units do always 
and immediately disappear. Rather on the contrary, they now compete 
within the state for the control of the institutions. The state, by 
developing different kinds of institutions also enables them to do so.  
 
If state-formation is to be successful however the foundations of power 
have to shift. In a first phase one might go from societal corporatism to 
state corporatism. This means the incorporation of social units in new, 
state initiated bureaucracies, institutions or corporations. However, the 
autonomization of the state vis-à-vis social units that composed it, is 
one of the indicators of successful state formation. In a second phase an 
evolution from corporatism to pluralism or liberal democracy could be 
observed.  In essence, when the social definition of subjects is no longer 
considered in terms of “estates of the realm”179 but in terms of citizens, 
state and the connections between both through  political parties and 
the interest groups.180 Or in other words, when civil society 
emancipates from the “corporatist complex” and progressively acquires 
a role as a political subject. Habermas underlined how through its 
articulation in political parties and interest groups conditioning the so-
called volonté générale, civil society becomes the material constitution of 
the public sphere.181 To be sure, we are not offering either one of these 
as definitive starting points or objectives. Yet both extremes are useful 
to illustrate a certain type of evolution that sees the citizen and his 
intermediaries replace the social units now incorporated in the state. 
The destruction of these, or at least the undermining of their basis 
solidifies the state, insofar as the state can recuperate their clientele. The 
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state is dominated no longer by corporatist-like social units, with a 
power base outside the state, yet by new groups with their power base 
within the state. 
 
Autonomous foundations of power can be defined in different kind of 
ways, yet they are all concentrations of private power. They can have 
different grounds, different bases and different foundations, yet it is 
always non-statal. On the other hand we find those actors either 
dominated or initiated by the state. The clear analogy of such a vision 
with corporatist theories need not underlined. For obvious reasons 
autonomous concentrations of power do not need much theoretical 
elaboration. Their heterogeneous nature imposes a very case-to-case 
and ad hoc analysis. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to think 
“state institutions” are always that easily identified. And when duly 
identified, the question then rises: are state institutions actors in their 
own right or rather organs of power that are competed for. In essence, 
do state institutions have an autonomous role or not? 
 
2.6. Social Units and Institutions 
 
Considering competitors, it is tempting to look at individuals. This 
would be a mistake. To understand political exchange on what he calls 
the “political marketplace”, Wintrobe replaces political parties by 
individuals as the central institutional actor.182 Although in some cases 
empiric verification might not be impossible183, on a state level this is 
clearly not much more than a useful fiction taken from economic 
literature. The same observation has to be made when considering the 
dictator’s interaction with his subordinates. Out of the domain of 
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economics and philosophy it seems difficult to put the dictator’s 
dilemma as one between him and individual subordinates that could 
possibly work together and form (a fraction of) the people. The main 
problem with such an approach is that the dictator does not fear his 
people directly: Caesar was not assassinated by the people but by a 
bunch of Senators, Stalin didn’t fear the people as much as he did the 
members of high ranking in some institutions (Politbureau, Army,…), 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution was in its basic scope and despite its results 
not directed against the people but against the CP threatening his 
power. As de La Boétie noticed almost 5 centuries ago, the dictator is 
surrounded by 5 or 6 men who submit the country to his will. Under 
these 6 you will find 600 others, corrupted by the inner circle of power. 
These 600 others will then control 6000 others giving them some kind if 
dignity by allowing them to raise from their miserable position to 
control some larger fraction of the population and so forth. This huge 
pyramidal structure has two interesting consequences. The first one 
concerns the people’s perception of the tyrant. Since they are not 
oppressed directly by him, they often do not consider him responsible 
for their suffering. Hence the well known exclamation “if only the King 
knew!”. The second consequence is that the ruler is in direct and 
constant contact with a very small fraction of the population, which he 
fears and is feared by. It is therefore not much of a surprise that most 
dictators have been assassinated or betrayed by what where once their 
most loyal supporters.184 The dictator fears and interacts thus mostly 
with those in “power positions”. The elite.  
 
A part from those social units that are integrated in the state during the 
process of state formation, and whose incorporation sometimes causes 
the emergence of new institutions or bureaucracies, it can be said that 
every modern state has two basic and separate components that offer 
such power positions: a civil and a military component. Generally, but 
not necessarily, characterized by a dominance of the civil component 
over the military. Tilly ‘s argument that the military has had a 
dominant role in the process of modern state formation even in 
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countries that are today characterized by a predominance of civil 
power over the military component (as for example Russia, Sweden or 
Prussia) illustrates how essential the military is in any state structure.185  
 
On the military component, little extra explanation is needed, a part 
from the degree of political penetration of the traditional military and a 
possible parallel armed force, there is no relevant difference between 
armies of liberal-democratic and non-liberal-democratic states. 
 
On the side of the civil component one has to distinguish between 
“democratic state institutions” and “parallel institutions.” Although 
some dictatorships, especially so-called totalitarian ones, tend to 
multiply parallel institutions, these are not absent from democracies 
either. If one does not accept the argument that the US today has 
several parallel security structures, with not always clearly 
differentiated tasks; it is undeniable that for a long time (and still 
today) quite some European countries possessed such competing 
structures. The Gendarmerie was one institution used in France and 
Belgium to control the Army, yet at the same time it was not that 
different from a regular police force. No wonder Belgium decided to 
abolish it just a couple of years after its demilitarization. Moreover 
most European democracies have competing intelligence services. Most 
of them have at least two: one, military, depending on the Ministry of 
Defense and another one, civilian, depending on the Ministry of the 
Interior. 
 
A big difference could possibly be found in accountability, yet most of 
these services are accountable only to their superiors in dictatorships as 
much as in democracies. The only basic difference would be the origin 
of these superiors. Are they democratically elected?  Unfortunately  this 
brings us back to the problem of the degree to which elections are free 
and competitive. Moreover, even in democracies military intelligence 
services can all too often be considered unaccountable for their 
activities. Nonetheless the systematic development of parallel 
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structures on state level and on the level of policy-setting appears to 
constitute somewhat of a difference between liberal democratic regimes 
on the one hand and non-liberal democratic regimes on the other. 
 
On the one hand, one of the most remarkable features of non-liberal 
democratic countries lies not so much in the existence of classical state-
democratic structures, since often non-democracies use democratic 
institutions to cover up their true structure of command, but in their 
relative democratic functioning at certain levels. Can be considered 
“democratic state institutions”,  those political institutions 
constitutionally determined and used for the normal functioning of a 
democratic state order.186 These state institutions have a double 
function in the system, on the one hand they allow social promotion 
(getting from mayor to MP for example), on the other hand they can 
offer a resource in political struggle (“I represent the will of the people”). 
The example of Parliament brings some clarity. On the one hand 
Parliament  is by nature an institution which competes for power with 
other institutions, as for example the executive. On the other hand it is 
also an objective of competition in the eyes of other institutions. The 
military trying to get into parliament is only one of the many possible 
examples. Some institutions are at the same time actor and object of 
competition. This should not come as a surprise. It should on the 
contrary be considered completely normal, since all of them are both. 
There exists competition within the social units, within bureaucracies 
and also for a place within these. A brief and not totally accurate 
comparison with a football team might clarify the case. In a particular 
village children from different groups, let us say neighbourhoods will 
compete for membership of the team. Those (s)elected by the team will 
subsequently compete within the team to make it to the A-team. The A-
team will then compete with other teams in the A-League. If the team 
grows hugely popular it will also become object of competition by 
other actors on the market, like sponsors or even other teams. This team 
is hence both actor and objective of competition.  
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On the other hand a non-liberal democratic system contains so-called 
parallel institutions. These are generally understood as those 
institutions that are characteristic of a double system. It is above all 
important to underline here that we are not speaking about a parallel 
state as for example a party-state. The party-state is only the ultimate 
form of development of parallel institutions. A state can possess 
parallel institutions that can be more or less important but lack the 
necessary degree of development to extend to a complete parallel state. 
Secondly, it is essential to understand the possibly double function of 
these institutions. On the one hand they are parallel institutions and 
hence can have at every level of the organ they are parallel to (army or 
democratic state institutions), a parallel equivalent. On the other hand 
it can be or be part of a bureaucracy which can form the basis of social 
promotion and hence a resource to be mobilized in case of political 
conflict. In this sense the Central Committee of the CPSU, a parallel 
institution in respect to democratic state decision-making institutions, 
would be part of bigger a parallel institution/bureaucracy; while the 
CPSU itself would be a parallel bureaucracy in itself. 
 
The essence of a parallel system is that next to the normal state 
institutions, where traditional elites and non-party-members maintain 
some power, parallel ones are erected in which the “party” or regime 
loyalists dominate.187  In this sense in Iran as well parallel institutions 
do exist, as they do in Communist regimes as Cuba or Stalinist Russia. 
But in that case, would Parliament become a “parallel institution” 
when dominated by “regime loyalists”?  
 
The definition has to be specified. One of the clearest and most 
workable definitions of a parallel state comes from Lenin. According to 
Lenin parallelism is best characterized by the existence a “government 
of control” formed by the Soviets that do not possess any organ of state 
power, in our model we would rephrase this as “no organ of 
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democratic state power”, but is supported “directly by the majority of 
the people”, which one would have to rephrase as “possessing 
revolutionary legitimacy”.188 Considering this definition the Iranian 
Guardian Council, in no way comparable to the classic parallel 
institutions as there is for example the CPSU, could be considered a 
“parallel institution”, while, on the other hand, it can also be seen as 
one of the legislative chambers of Iran or as an institution acting as a 
constitutional court. The Sepah-e Pasdaran could be considered a parallel 
institution to the army, also because it is today a full-fledged armed 
force with internal fractions and tendencies.  
 
Such a definition offers us a characterization that is at once clear, 
limited and flexible enough to be workable. Social units defeated by the 
state are incorporated in state institutions, some in democratic state 
institutions, others, occasionally, in parallel institutions. Within the 
state these social units start competing for influence and power. A 
similar competition then sees the light between the both pillars of the 
new state structure. 
 
However within the framework of state formation both the democratic 
state institutions and the parallel institutions have to be seen in their 
respective histories of coming into existence.  From such a perspective, 
Elias work on what he calls the “progress of civilization” is of great 
interest.189 Although the concept of “social unit”  as used by Elias is 
admittedly vaguer than other concepts, it can be very adequate if used 
in the sense of Elias’ historical perspective of monopolization of power. 
Elias speaks of the monopolization of private power which then 
evolves into a public monopoly of power. The historical evolution of 
Iran will show more than some similarities with this vision. 
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2.7. Integration and Disintegration 
 
The concept of totalitarianism puts the accent on similarities between 
Stalinism and Nazism, but hides a major difference: after Stalin the 
Soviet system persisted, the Nazi-system died and had to die with 
Hitler.190 Can institutional competition explain this difference? If it can, 
institutional competition, its nature and the framework in which it 
operates can be considered a key variable for regime sustainability. 
 
Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union had some formal 
similarities. In this framework the most interesting ones are the 
coexistence on the one hand of both civilian as military parallel 
structures and, on the other hand, the essential weight of a leading 
figure in the system. Rent-seeking both in and by institutions was an 
essential part of their being. Such an observation should however not 
obscure essential differences.  
 
Three differences seem particularly important. First, Hitler and Stalin’s 
systems and their respective parallel institutions went through a very 
different process of formation. Ontologically they were very different 
systems and institutions. Secondly, the position and behavior of Stalin 
and Hitler in their respective systems was entirely different. Thirdly, 
the relationship between different institutions, both parallel and state 
democratic was very different in both regimes.  
 
Ontologically the parallel institutions were different, because their 
origins were different. Hitler’s Germany created parallel institutions 
without incorporating new elites in the system, nor did Nazism 
eliminate elites. Stalin on the other hand incorporated or destroyed 
possible competitors.191 The best known example being the local 
                                                 
190 This is obviously  no matter of “what would have happened if Nazi Germany would 
not have gone to war”, but rather on the contrary  implies that the Nazi-system was 
animated by a propulsion to go to war until utter defeat. 
191 See also T. SKOCPOL, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
France, Russia and China, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1979 on the dictatorship of the 
Party-State 
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landlords which opposed collectivization. These were offered the 
explicit choice, either to incorporate the new state order, or, in case of 
resistance to the new order, to disappear, often physically.  
 
The picture for Nazi Germany was very different. Inspired by 
Neumann’s rebuttal of the concept of “Nazi State”,192 Mommsen shows 
how Nazism was characterized by an inherent tendency towards self-
destruction, mostly due to a process of internal dissolution by 
fragmentation of the administrative apparatus through the creation of 
ad hoc institutions and the undermining of public institutions by 
arbitrary decisions and expansionist policies.193  
 
Hitler’s parallel institutions decentralized the state, while Stalin 
actually brought under state control sections of the country, the 
economy and society that had never been controlled by the state until 
then. The parallel institutions of Soviet Russia hence actually increased 
the state’s power and reach, while the establishment of similar 
institutions in Nazi Germany undermined and decentralized the 
existing state structure.194 Although Michael Mann, still doubting the 
usefulness of the concept of totalitarianism, affirms that a similar 
movement towards self-destruction animated the USSR, such a 
statement seems rather awkward considering that the USSR and its 
political system that Stalin helped to shape survived him for decades.  
 
Secondly, the relative position and behavior of both leaders was 
fundamentally different. What Kershaw calls the “Hitler myth”, 
illustrates how Hitler was above the state and the system.195 Closely 
                                                 
192 F. NEUMANN, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1942 
193 H. MOMMSEN, “Cumulative radicalization and progressive self-destruction as 
structural determinants of the Nazi dictatorship”, in I. KERSHAW & M. LEWIN, 
Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p.74 (74-87) 
194 Contrary to what claims S.A. ARJOMAND, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution in Comparative 
Perspective”, World Politics, Vol.38, No.3, April 1986, pp.383-414 (397) 
195 I. KERSHAW, The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford, Oxford UP, 
2001 
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linked to this position was Hitler’s behavior. Kershaw’s Hitler is no 
interventionist; he allowed free elite competition.196 
 
Stalin never reached a position anywhere close to Hitler’s. He was an 
exponent of the PCUS. His policies could, at least theoretically be 
challenged, and often were so. The fact that Trotsky could challenge 
Stalin’s legitimacy illustrates a process that would have been 
unthinkable in Nazi Germany. As different as his position was Stalin’s 
behavior. The Soviet leader was an interventionist who by his frequent 
and radical interventions limited competition. The elimination by Stalin 
(and the Revolution) of possibly competing traditional elites and the 
fact that Stalin, unlike Hitler, was not above but in the system made 
moreover that cumulative radicalization by competition to please Stalin 
never could have attained Nazi-Germany one.  
 
In the framework, the concept of cumulative radicalization197 is an 
extremely useful one. Cumulative radicalization is an immediate 
consequence of the Hitler myth and the competing towards the Führer. 
It illustrates the hierarchical vertical nature of Hitler’s influence on 
society. Hitler’s myth gave the (autonomous) elites and state 
institutions a scope. They worked towards the mythical figure of the 
Führer. Hitler’s parallel institutions which actually unmade the state, 
caused the absence of control on this sort of competition. A structural 
approach focusing on the incapacity of Nazism to create a “coherent 
institutional framework” constraining power indeed explains, in 
combination with the “working towards”-concept,  the cumulative 
radicalization by the absence of institutions able to limit the 
catastrophic course. The pushing of different groups and institutions 
that offered ever more radical propositions to the Führer combined with 
                                                 
196 Idea proposed by I. KERSHAW, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, London, Penguin Books, 
2001 & I. KERSHAW, Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis, London, Penguin Books, 2001  but 
mentioned as well in et. al.. R.O. PAXTON, The Anatomy of Fascism, London, Penguin 
Books, 2004 
197 H. MOMMSEN, “Cumulative radicalization and progressive self-destruction as 
structural determinants of the Nazi dictatorship”, in I. KERSHAW & M. LEWIN, 
Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p.74 (74-87) 
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an emergence of ad hoc institutions disintegrating and dissolving the 
administrative apparatus, resulted in a falling forward of the regime.  
 
In Stalin’s Soviet Union, all institutions were invaded by the parallel 
structure of the Party (in which Stalin leaded the way), organs of 
popular sovereignty as the Supreme Soviet or the Congress of People's 
Deputies existed and functioned, at national and local levels. The 
parallel institutions, which served to either incorporate or destroy 
possible competitors to the state, on the one hand extended the state’s 
grip, but on the other were also closely intertwined with the existent 
democratic state institutions. The CPUS recruited from Parliament, or 
rather, Parliament was infiltrated and controlled by the CPUS. Such a 
close interconnection was absent in Nazi Germany. A good example of 
this is the Army. The German Army maintained, at least in its 
functioning, a certain autonomy from the Nazi-State for quite some 
time. Although the degree and at the end even the existence of this 
autonomy has been debated and discussed at length,198 such a debate 
was quite unnecessary for the Red Army which was formed by the 
Revolution, infiltrated at all levels by Soviet Commissars and even lost 
its major officers under Stalin.199 There is no comparison possible 
between the USSR and Nazi-Germany on the level of ad hoc 
institutions. While in Germany they seemed to appear and disappear 
whenever useful, the USSR had rather stable parallel institutions. Not 
surprisingly, with Stalin’s disappearance, bureaucracy, of which he was 
an exponent, could take over.200 Thanks to the excessive use of it by 
Stalin, bureaucracy developed quite well, still possessed a useful 
                                                 
198 O. BARTOV, “Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich”, The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol.63, No.1, March 1991, pp.44-60 
199 This is admittedly a bit of a shortcut, which will be put in perspective later on. 
200 A legitimate question would be:  if one institution took over, was there no dictatorship 
to limit it anymore? The answer is necessarily double. First of all we underline that 
cumulative radicalization would however have been impossible since there was no leader 
nor a myth towards which to work; moreover institutional interpenetration has without a 
doubt reached a level that could limit such competition. Secondly however, since there 
was one bureaucracy that clearly dominated this competition, the institutional 
competition, so necessary for the functioning of  dictatorship and led to an excessive non-
competitive bureaucratization, which in the end caused the system’s breakdown. 
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ideology (Marxism-Leninism could be used without Stalin, Nazism not 
without Hitler)201, wasn’t stuck with irrational objectives and most 
importantly didn’t have to worry about purges no more.  
 
A third major distinction between the Stalinist system and the Nazi one 
regards the interlinkage between different bureaucracies and 
institutions. Competition is not without risks. Three of them are 
particularly obvious. The first one concerns the bases of the 
competition. For competition to exist, one needs parallel structures, but 
these parallel structures should be limited in number, otherwise the 
centralization of the state202, basic condition for state-genesis, is 
endangered. The second point concerns the objective of these parallel 
structures. The objectives as well should be limited and well-described, 
to avoid cumulative radicalization. The third point concerns the 
autonomy-interdependency of competing institutions. The higher the 
degree of autonomy of an institutions, or the elite leading it, the less 
control or influence the system can exert on it and hence the higher the 
risk of cumulative radicalization, destructive competition and even 
disloyalty.  
 
The elimination by the 1917 Revolution and especially by Stalin of 
possibly competing elites made that Stalin was in the end ruling a 
simplified form of civil society in which, and this contrary to Nazi-
Germany and to Fascist Italy, the CPUS had to worry less and less 
about “concentrations of inherited socio-economic power.”203 
Moreover, the existent institutions, limited in number as they were, 
were also highly interdependent and integrated. Victor Zaslavky 
correctly underlines: “Stalin reinforces all these fundamental structures of 
                                                 
201 M. LEWIN, “Stalin in the mirror of the other”, in I. KERSHAW & M. LEWIN, Stalinism 
and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 
p.116 (107-134) 
202 Centralization is here to be understood as including the state incorporation of social 
actors like in R. COLLIER & D. COLLIER, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, 
Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1991 
203 R.O.PAXTON, “The Five Stages of Fascism”, The Journal of Modern History, Vol.70, 
No.1, March 1998, pp.1-23 (19) 
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power, and they have remained unchanged after his death.”204 The increasing 
integration and interdependency in essence strengthened stateness. The 
main tendency of Stalinism was centripetal not centrifugal.  
 
It is time to offer some operational definitions of the concepts used. The 
autonomy of an institution or an incorporated social unit means its 
capacity to further its own interests within (or outside) the system. 
Intra-systemic competition between different social units can be useful. 
Such becomes a problem when their rent-seeking becomes excessive 
and unbalances the system. Bureaucratic interdependence, or 
interlinkage, is the opposite of autonomy. The interlinkage of 
incorporated social units and institutions means their capacity to 
autonomously defend their corporatist interests will be undermined. 
Political commissars, interventions of the Leader, purges and checks 
and balances are typical examples of interlinkage. Cumulative 
radicalization consists, certainly in foreign policy, in the process of 
“falling forward”. Cumulative radicalization, as the Nazi-state 
demonstrates, is the result of an excessive degree of autonomy of the 
competing social units and institutions. In essence, cumulative 
radicalization occurs when intra-systemic competition transforms from 
a positive characteristic of a dynamic system, into a destructive rent-
seeking process. The dynamics of the disintegrating Nazi-state 
illustrated how in such a process, excessive institutional autonomy is 
paralleled by a lack of institutional control and interlinkage. 
 
From such a perspective the Stalinist situation contrasted sharply with 
Nazi Germany. The uncontrolled competing of different elites in Nazi-
Germany contributed importantly to the regime’s radicalization. This 
uncontrolled competition even animated the so-called parallel 
institutions. In essence those institutions that should have formed the 
government of control enjoyed such an autonomy that they incited the 
process of falling forward that animated the Nazi regime. The Gestapo 
was born out of a law enforcement institution: the Prussian political 
police, but there was an important difference between the two 
                                                 
204 V. ZASLAVSKY, The Neo-Stalinist State, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p.9 
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institutions. “In mid-April 1933, immediately after Goring's appointment as 
Prussian Minister of the Interior, the entire Prussian political police force, 
comprised of the old Abteilung I and the new Sonderabteilung, was physically 
and organizationally separated from the Berlin Police Presidium. The 'Law for 
the Establishment of a Secret State Police Office' (Gesetz über die Errichtung 
eines geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes) of 26 April 1933 put the Prussian political 
police on a new legal footing, making it an independent agency”205 The SS 
notably had a relatively high degree of autonomy attempting to 
become the new political elite, replacing any other elites.206 Arguably 
the man responsible for their development, Josef Dietrich, was not even 
a committed Nazi.207 Although contrasting views dominate the debate, 
many authors have also argued that the Waffen SS was not just a 
subsection of the SS.208 The internal loyalty of all these organizations 
was very vertical, directed to for example Himmler and then Hitler, 
rather than guaranteed by political commissars. 
 
Schematically and clearly oversimplified (the most important missing 
features being probably ideological top-down influence and the chaos 
and competition at institutional level) one could reflect the differences 
in institutional structure between both systems in the following 
schemes. These provisional schemes succinctly reproduce the 
differences between both systems partially explaining the non-self-
destructiveness of Stalinism. If, Stalin and the CPSU, infiltrated and 
penetrated all levels of society, which (could have) led to a “physical” 
                                                 
205 C. GRAF, “The Genesis of the Gestapo”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 3, 
July 1987, pp. 419-435 (423) 
206  M. WOLFSON, “Constraint and Choice in the SS Leadership”, The Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1965, pp. 551-568 (553) & E. KOGON, Der SS-Staat, 
Das System Der Deutschen Konzentrationslager, Frankfurt am Main, Verlag Der Frankfurter 
Hefte, 1946 and for a discussion of the “true” nature of the SS see R. KOEHL, “The 
Character of the Nazi SS”, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 34, No. 3, September 1962, 
pp. 275-283 
207 J.J. WEINGARTNER, “Sepp Dietrich, Heinrich Himmler, and the Leibstandarte SS 
Adolf Hitler, 1933-1938“, Central European History, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 1968, pp. 264-
284 (265-266) 
208 See for a discussion of the debate C.W. SYDNOR, “The History of the SS 
Totenkopfdivision and the Postwar Mythology of the Waffen SS”, Central European 
History, Vol. 6, No. 4,  December 1973, pp. 339-362 
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total control of society, the situation under Hitler was quite different. 
But, as mentioned before, it was different on at least three levels. The 
difference in degree of penetration of the main “institutions” of the 
USSR was coupled to a limitation of the number of parallel institutions 
and their stability in the USSR and the absence of great private 
concentrations of power, able to disturb the system of state-controlled 
competition. To which a different position of Stalin in respect to Hitler’s 
has to be added. 
 
The Nazi-scheme shows the working in towards or in a “same” 
direction (often towards the Hitler myth), moreover the parallel lines 
indicate the relative autonomy of institutional functioning. The scheme 
in this way reflects Broszat’s thesis of the ability the Army, the Church 
or even bureaucracy to function according to their traditional values, 
rather than suffering from totalitarian interventions. Both schemes 
indicate the different position of both leaders in their respective 
systems: Stalin as an integral part of it, a primus inter pares, clearly 
belonging to the parallel structure and Hitler above it. Stalin 
intervening directly, in a triple way: with the party, within the party 
and by the party, while Hitler is shown more aloof and only in close 
contact with a small circle of trusted lieutenants. In this way, it also 
illustrates that no one could have menaced Hitler’s position, again a 
different story than Stalin’s one.209 
 
The schemes also show Nazi cumulative radicalization, a consequence 
as said from institutional competition, lack of institutional limits and 
“working towards a myth”, by the unending arrows, possibly absent 
for a part of traditional elites that refused to get too involved in the 
system and institutions as the Church or the Army. Such process of 
radicalization is notably absent from Stalin’s model, in which rather 
                                                 
209 The assassination plot against Hitler does not debunk this argument since the plotters 
could not threaten Hitler’s position nor hope to replace him, they could merely try to 
assassinate him. Even if they had succeeded for themselves their act would have been 
institutionally useless. If Trotsky or some other “plotter” would have succeeded in 
overthrowing Stalin’s power (or ideological legitimacy) on the contrary, he could 
legitimately have aspired to the thrown of Party Secretary.  
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than institutional competition, we see high interweaving and control of 
one column with the other ones. The limitation of competition in the 
Stalinist system is also as can be deducted from the schemes linked to 
the absence of an objective for competition. 
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2.8. Iranian State Formation 
 
State-formation theories have enriched social sciences in a significant 
way, and as we argued before, they are an excellent tool for the analysis 
of political regimes. Yet Rolf Schwarz and Georg Sørensen put forward 
an important question: why do they fail to explain Third World state-
making?210 For some developing countries the answer to this question 
could be rather straightforward: “The quasi-states in, for example, Africa, 
however, were born through unilateral decolonisation. Sovereignty was 
exogenously “granted”, partitioned by artificial boundaries drawn by former 
imperialists.”211 Yet the same can not be said for all developing countries 
and this kind of analysis is certainly not applicable to the Iranian case.  
                                                 
210 R. SCHWARZ, “State Formation Processes in Rentier States: The Middle Eastern 
Case”, Draft Paper to be presented at the Fifth Pan-European Conference on International 
Relations, ECPR Standing Group on International Relations, Section 34, The Hague, 
September 9-11, 2004, p.5 
211 C. NG, “How does the process of state formation in most developing countries differ 
from the process experienced in Europe and with what consequences for their 
 98 
 
War-making and state-formation, asserts Schwarz, have not been self-
reinforcing in the Middle East, since the decisive difference between 
Europe and the Middle East is the rentier state dimension of Middle 
Eastern states. Since these states depend on external (oil) rents, they do 
not need to develop a well-equipped fiscal bureaucracy to fiscal gains 
that would allow to maintain standing armies.212 Consequently, the 
demands of political participation “no taxation without representation” 
would hinder or prevent European-like state-formation leading to a 
strong state representing its citizens.213  Consequently, the link Tilly 
makes between state formation, war-making and fiscal centralization 
would not be applicable automatically to Iran. From a slightly different 
perspective, Thierry Gongora claims that, in the Middle Eastern case 
war-making and state-formation could even be negatively correlated as 
modern warfare makes developing nations turn to foreign rents 
(currency, military assistance,…), because these necessary rents can not 
be domestically extracted.214 Nonetheless, Gongora has to admit that of 
the entire Middle East Iran was the country that most relied on its own 
domestic resources to conduct to war against Iraq.215  
 
Not surprisingly, scholarship that explicitly and directly deals with 
Iranian state formation is rare. Homa Katouzian is probably the best 
illustration of the almost explicit negation of such a long-term 
progressive process in Iran. Katouzian’s main argument has been well 
reassumed as follows: “Modern studies of Iranian history and society have 
often been based on theories developed for the study of European society. This 
                                                                                                           
developmental potential?”, E-International Relations, 28 June 2008, www.e-ir.info; B. 
BADIE, Les deux Etats: Pouvoirs et société en Occident et en terre d'Islam, Paris, Fayard, 1986 
& B. BADIE, L'Etat importé, l'occidentalisation et l'ordre politique, Paris, Fayard, 1992 
212 G. OKRUHLIK, “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The 
Political Economy of Oil States”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, April 1999, pp. 295-
315 
213 G.LUCIANI, “Economic Foundations of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Arab 
World in Comparative Perspective”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.10, No.4, Fall 1988 
pp.457-475 (463) & R. SCHWARZ, l.c., p.21-26 
214 T. GONGORA, “War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East”, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.29, No.3, August 1997, pp.323-340 (331) 
215 T. GONGORA, l.c., p.334 
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has led to important anomalies which can be resolved by recognizing the 
fundamental differences in the development of the two types of society within 
the framework of a single social science. Agricultural property was owned by 
the state, parts of which it assigned or farmed out to individuals or groups as a 
privilege, but not a right. There was social stratification, but the social classes 
did not enjoy any rights independently from the state; hence there was no 
aristocracy, and the composition of the social classes changed rapidly through 
time. Therefore there was no law outside the will of the state, which stood 
above the society, despite a body of rules which were subject to rapid and 
unpredictable change. The state's legitimacy was not founded in law and the 
consent of the influential social classes, and the mere success of a rebellion was 
sufficient ground for its legitimacy. This explains the frequent crises of 
succession in Iranian history. Until modern times, revolts and revolutions 
were led against an 'unjust' arbitrary ruler to replace it with a just' one. The 
result was generalized chaos until a new arbitrary rule was established. 
Notwithstanding their many differences, the two revolutions in the twentieth 
century were massive revolts by the society against the state for lawful 
government. But, despite some temporary successes, the long experience of the 
society proved to be more powerful than the newly acquired political ideas and 
programmes.”216 In short Iranian exceptionalism would make indigenous 
state formation in a European sense impossible. 
 
If state formation is a rarity, “democracy” is a much more popular 
topic. Many authors see democratization in Iran in function of how the 
state can be “pushed back”, ignoring that without the establishment of 
                                                 
216 Abstract of H. KATOUZIAN, “Arbitrary Rule: A Comparative Theory of State, Politics 
and Society in Iran”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, May, 1997, pp. 
49-73; but consider as well H. KATOUZIAN, “Nationalist Trends in Iran, 1921-1926”, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4, November 1979, pp.533-551; H. 
KATOUZIAN, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 
1926-1979, New York, New York University Press, 1981; H. KATOUZIAN, “Problems of 
Political Development in Iran: Democracy, Dictatorship or Arbitrary Government?”, 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1-2, 1995, pp. 5-20 & H. 
KATOUZIAN, Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society, London, 
Routledge, 2007 
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some kind of modern state democracy is impossible to think of. In other 
words by considering “democracy” and “democratization” or “elites” 
and “elite factionalism” these authors make the same mistakes 
enumerated above. The lack of historical insight, that is historical 
insight in the state formation process, then has very considerable and 
negative consequences. Innumerable works for example analyze the 
Islamic Republic’s particular double state structure as a “logical” 
consequence of the velayat-e faqih doctrine of Shi’i political thought.  
 
There are a few notable exceptions to this general tendency. Gheissari 
and Nasr convincingly describe some kind of state formation process, 
including a search for territorial integrity and the provision of security 
at least until 1941. They then characterize the period between 1941 and 
1979, in essence the period of rule of the second Pahlavi shah as “the 
triumph of the state”.217 Rahnema and Nomani on the other hand 
illustrate how the Islamic Revolution continued a process of 
centralization undertaken decades before.218 Arjomand underlines that 
forms of European state formation, based on fiscal factors for French 
absolutism and for the development of city councils emerging from 
Steuerräthe for Prussia, have little relevance in analyzing early Iranian 
state formation.219 Yet, in his view another factor that allowed the 
“disengaging of state from dynastic, proprietary, and social interlinkages was 
the development of the idea of the state”. According to Arjomand, “the idea 
of the state” played a significant role in Iranian state formation by an 
impact on its political ethos.220  How tempting such an “idealist” 
explanation might seem, it  is important to note that in the Iranian case 
it would however take a revolution, 1906-1907, and a subsequent 
military coup to put this state formation on the right track. 221 The new 
regime quite unsurprisingly started from fiscal and military reforms. 
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The main opponents of this process turned out to be the numerous 
tribes, the clergy and, quite unsurprisingly considering the fiscal 
centralization, the merchant class.222 Mutatis mutandis the same social 
units that would oppose state formation and centralization until 1979.  
 
The breakdown of states is such a complicated matter that it could not 
possibly be treated extensively in the context of our study. All the more 
so since recent developments in scholarship seem to have exacerbated 
divergences. Jeff Goodwin once divided studies of revolution in three 
macro-approaches: modernization theories, Marxist theories and state-
centered theories.223  
 
The first macro-approach sees a connection between revolution and 
transitions towards modernity. Concerning Iran Abrahamian 
summarized such approaches of the breakdown of the royal regime in 
Iran: “Two very different interpretations have been offered to explain the long-
term causes of the Islamic revolution. One interpretation – accepted by the 
supporters of the Pahlevi regime – claims that the revolution occurred because 
the shah modernized too much and too quickly for his traditional-minded and 
backward-looking people. The other – favored by opponents of the regime – 
argues that the revolution occurred because the shah did not modernize fast 
enough and thoroughly enough to overcome his initial handicap of being a 
CIA-installed monarch in an age of nationalism, neutralism and 
republicanism.”224 His personal theory appears to be somewhere in 
between these two extremes, asserting that it was the economic 
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modernization and development accompanied by a lack of political 
modernization and development that caused the revolution.225  
Marxists on the other hand obviously stress the transition from one 
mode of production to another. In developing countries Marxist 
analysis of revolution has often been linked to global capitalism and 
imperialism. Classes and class structure in peripheral countries would 
present specific characteristics explaining the emergence of (socialist) 
revolutions. For Iran the Marxist scholar Jazani developed a similar 
analysis based on peripheral dependency.226 A similar paradigm has 
led other authors like Bayat and Kazemi to compare the Iranian 
revolution to Latin American upheavals.227 On state formation there is 
an obvious vicinity between these theories and Wallerstein’s world 
system analysis. 
 
Yet even within more inclusive state-centered approaches, 
controversies are many. Indeed while some scholars, like Wintrobe and 
Skocpol claim that weaknesses of the state lies at the origin of its 
breakdown and revolution,228 others pretend that reform strengthening 
and modernizing the state leads to revolution.229 According to Pincus 
for example the old state or Ancien Régime always ceases to exist before 
the revolution, yet not because of some kind of weakness or 
disintegration, but because of centralization, accelerated growth and 
economic development with state intervention, updating of the armed 
forces and the development of means of political oppression and 
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control.230 Among the empirical confirmations of his theory Pincus 
mentions the Iranian revolution. In his vision the repressive elements of 
the Iranian state before the revolution were strengthening rather than 
weakening. The chapter on pre-revolutionary concentrations of power 
illustrates that such a vision lacks empirical foundation. Finer’s 
mentioning of the fiscal (cash-flow) crisis before the French revolution 
seems a more valuable explanation of the Iranian revolution, 
considering the consequences of the fall on oil prices in the 1975-1977 
period.231 Skocpol had to admit that her theory of revolution as 
developed in States and Social Revolutions, which relied heavily on 
international factors weakening the state domestically and offering 
possibilities for revolutions to “come”, showed its limits in respect to 
the Iranian revolution, since the Iranian military crumbled without any 
defeat in war and the revolution did not merely come, it was clearly 
made.232 History of the developing world had already shown that by 
what Hobsbawm calls “ undermining the old structures of its economies 
and the balance of its societies, and by destroying the viability of its established 
political regimes and institutions”, a revolution became highly probable.233 
As this study illustrates the Shah undeniably did all of this. 
 
The Iranian revolution is not the object of my study. If any causal 
mechanisms of revolutions are addressed in this study, it is in a larger 
historical perspective. Considering the risk of a dissimilarity bias it 
seemed unthinkable to analyze the Islamic Republic as a consequence 
of the Islamic Revolution. Indeed why would the contemporary Iranian 
state have to start in 1979 when for the analysis of contemporary 
Western European polities scholars have went back as far as 990 ? The 
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approach of this study has clearly to be categorized as state-centered. 
Underlining both economic contradictions (between coexistent modes 
of productions) as political ones that saw powerful elites and their 
concentrations of power excluded from participation to the political 
arena, I cover the first two of Tilly’s categorization of state formation 
theories.234 At the same time however I recognize international factors 
and more concretely the Iran-Iraq war between 1980-1988 as a 
fundamental step in Iranian state formation. If my study acknowledges 
the importance of economic change, it does not consider that there is an 
immediate direct relationship between economic contradictions and the 
political ones. In a review of Barrington Moore’s classical work on state 
formation235, Theda Skocpol regretted the fact that Moore stayed within 
the Marxist framework which denied the independent role of state 
elites and organizations.236 Poulantzas, even though he was probably 
closer to Marxism than Moore, partially overcame this criticism by 
proposing a theory of autonomous state action.237 By using not only 
social classes, but also other concentrations of private power, that are 
not necessarily or exclusively economic, like the clergy, our approach 
lays the foundations for a similar look at post-revolutionary Iran. 
 
It is tempting to adopt a definition of “the State” and subsequently 
compare the formation of the Iranian state to the characteristics of the 
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modern state present in such a definition. This would be a grave 
mistake. Proceeding in such a manner would pull us right back into the 
meanders of teleology with the ultimate scope of an ideal-type of the 
State as ultimate goal of the development.  
 
Mostly states are defined in terms of their functions, something 
exemplified by Engels and Lenin for the Marxist side and Dahl for the 
Liberal side.238 The Weberian-Tilly approach does something very 
similar when it defines the state as an entity claiming the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force (Weber) or controlling the principal 
means of coercion within a given territory (Tilly).239 Alfred Stepan 
specified the Weberian definition by characterizing the State as the 
“continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that 
attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public 
authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within 
civil society as well.”240  
 
If it is to be asserted that the Islamic Revolution and afterwards the 
Islamic Republic continued and accelerated the process of state 
formation, we have to concentrate on what states do. Tilly asserts: “the 
agents of states characteristically carry on four different activities: 1. War 
making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the 
territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of 
force; 2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those 
territories; 3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their 
clients; 4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three 
activities – 
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war making, state making, and protection” 241 This “functionalist” approach 
requires us to take into consideration what Michael Mann has 
described as the infrastructural power of the state. Indeed, to be more 
effective in performing these functions, the state needs to develop its 
infrastructural power. Hence state formation and the development and 
enhancement of its infrastructural power are inseparable.  
 
If we wish to understand the contemporary Iranian regime an approach 
based on theories of state formation, understood in the sense of the 
increasing capacity of the state to fulfill the described constitutive tasks, 
seems hence the way forward. Such an approach will allow us on the 
one hand to avoid simplistic answers to the Aristotelian questions, and 
on the other hand will permit to steer clear of some weaknesses of 
transitological literature. 
 
The chapters on concentrations of power outside the state offer a view 
of Iranian society that is based not so much on class as a unit of analysis 
as on concentrations of power. As is explained more in detail when 
addressing the clergy as a social actor, such power can then be socio-
economic, have socio-economic roots, but contrary to what supposes a 
pure class-analysis, it can not be limited to such. 
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3. Directions of Iranian state formation 
before the Islamic revolution 
 
3.1. The Beginning 
 
Scholars from different disciplines and with different interests going 
from anthropological studies over social and religious history to 
sociology have already offered major and extremely valuable empirical 
data on state formation in Iran. What need to be done here is offer a 
historical framework of the main characteristics of the evolution of the 
state in Iran before the Islamic revolution. Indeed to assert that the 
Islamic revolution continued a process started about a century earlier, 
the existence and nature of such process has to be proven. This chapter 
intends to do so. 
 
Arguably state formation in Iran started in the Safavid era, yet the 
beginnings of modern state formation can be situated during the Qajar 
era. The analysis of state and society under Qajar rule is not an easy 
task Speaking of “the Qajar pact” Vanessa Martin argues that “Qajar 
government depended not only on the use of force for control of its subjects, 
but just as much, or rather more, on a consensus understood in deed rather 
than word. Such a consensus was itself shaped from a complex system of 
checks and balances.”242 She goes on to add that “segments of society (..) are 
found to have been demanding of their rights.”243 Speaking of a pact 
between society and the state or the Qajar administration made up of 
“bargaining” and “protesting” is not a very specific characterization of 
the Qajar state.  
 
Alamdari tries to systemize in a more general way the relationship 
between state and society in Qajar Iran. Referring to the thesis of Karl 
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Wittfogel on Oriental Despotism,244 Alamdari starts from the idea that in 
Iran no such thing as “feudalism” developed.245 Wittfogel’s famous 
thesis, based on an elaboration of Marx’ Asiatic Mode of Production, 
underlines the role of irrigation works in Asiatic (Indian and Chinese) 
state formation. Wittfogel’s argument is that these irrigation works, too 
important to be carried out by local powers, required stable and 
elaborate state bureaucratic structures. These structures were then in 
Wittfogel’s vision responsible for the employment of the population at 
large, which would require not only a developed bureaucracy, literate 
bureaucrats and hence an educational system, but also a higher degree 
of infrastructural state power. By controlling an essential part of the 
agricultural and life resources, water, the state was in the position to 
dominate any other possible societal competitors to its power. 
Considering certain similarities between irrigation systems in Iran, 
India and China, notably the qanat system, this theory would, in 
Alamdari’s vision, explain the formation of a strong and stable state in 
Iran.  
 
Alamdari develops and adds complexities to Wittfogel’s argument, but 
he basically agrees with Wittfogel that the domination of despotism 
was due to the centralized government control of water resources 
which led the countryside to be divided in self-sufficient villages, with 
little inter-village relations, under the leadership of a leader appointed 
by the King. In Alamdari’s view the lack of unity between and within 
the villages allowed the continuation of despotism.246 One will notice 
the similarity between Alamdari’s argument and Katouzian’s negation 
of the existence of social classes and notably aristocracy in Persia.247 
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Unfortunately since Wittfogel’s book was probably as much an act of 
accusation against communist regimes as it was a historical analysis of 
Asiatic countries, the theory also has its limits. In that way for example 
it tends to overestimate the power of states. A practical example is 
offered by the legendary account of Sir John Malcolm on Persian 
politics of the time. Although he asserts that “the Monarch of Persia has 
been pronounced one of the most absolute in the world; and it has been shown 
that there is reason to believe his condition has been the same from the most 
early ages.”248, he also has to admit that in the appointing of city chief 
magistrates: “though nominated by the king, must as necessarily be selected 
from the most respectable natives of the cit (..) Though these officers are not 
formally elected, we may assert that the voice of the people always points them 
out.”249 The voice of the people has to be understood as “the members of 
the corporation of any city or town in England” or still “the merchants, 
tradesmen, mechanics, and labourers, have each a head, or rather a 
representative (Wasta-asanaf) (..) This person is chosen by the community to 
which he belongs, and is appointed by the king.”250  Hence, by looking at the 
formal power structure Alamdari and Wittfogel more than slightly 
overestimate the sovereign’s power.  
 
This nuance illustrates the importance of the distinction between 
despotic power of the state or the king on the one hand, and 
infrastructural power on the other. The former is to be coined as “the 
range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, 
institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.” The concept of 
infrastructural power implies “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate 
civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the 
realm.”251 Mann identifies some “logistical techniques” that help the state 
to penetrate social life: “a division of labour between the state’s main 
activities which it coordinated centrally”; literacy; coinage and “rapidity of 
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 110 
communication of messages and of transport of people and resources, through 
improved roads, ships, telegraphy etc.”.252  
 
Thus, if the despotic power of the Qajar kings was probably as absolute 
as it gets, their infrastructural power was far more limited. Malcolm 
underlines three groups in particular that obstructed and opposed the 
development of the infrastructural power of the Persian monarchy: 
merchants, clergy and tribes.253 These limitations  weighing on the 
power of the state in Qajar Iran were observed in at least three domains 
of which the development is considered characteristic of state 
development and formation: fiscal matters, the armed forces, and 
bureaucracy.  
 
The system of tax collection was relatively decentralized. It were 
indeed the local authorities, rather than the central government that 
collected taxes.254 Willem Floor states: “Because the bulk of the central 
government’s expenditures were financed through local government transfers, 
the financial and military basis of the center would remain weak as long as the 
government’s hold on the provinces remained precarious.”255 The nominal 
ownership of grounds by the Shah should hence not be 
overemphasized, since between actual control and nominal ownership 
existed a considerable gap.256 It was not rare to hear even governors of 
provinces complain they lacked the power to levy taxes from local 
magnates.257 Revolts of groups most hit by tax collection also frequently 
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forced the state to retreat. Action through protest and occupations, 
sometimes with religious connotations was often effective.258 
 
During the Qajar era, what determined the development of the state 
was the extension of its fiscal administration, much more than any 
centralization by war. Tax districts were administrative districts and 
administrative districts were tax districts. The first Minister of Finance 
was appointed under Fath’ Ali Shah, who ruled from 1797 to 1834. 
Fath’ Ali Shah forced to “run an empire instead of just an army”, needed a 
bureaucracy to maximize the governments incomes.259 Not surprisingly 
the Shah increasingly needed coercion to extract tribute. It was only in 
the second half of the 19th century however that Amir Kabir, prime 
minister of Nasser al-Din Shah and one of the more famous prime 
ministers of the time260, was able to increase government revenues by 
establishing custom rights and confiscating properties of those that 
failed to pay taxes.261 The Qajars did increasingly try to levy taxes that 
influenced directly on the lives of important socio-economic groups, 
like merchants262, yet by the end of the 19th century tax collection had 
become an increasingly complicated task for the Qajar dynasty, 
although the situation was not completely a direct consequence of 
Qajar policy,263 the Qajar’s failure to further develop the state had 
become clear by this time. 
 
If the development of tax administration went hand-in-hand with the 
development of bureaucracy, such a bureaucracy was nowhere similar 
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to Weber’s “rational bureaucracy”. It was much more a form of 
patrimonial administration structured around the Shah’s family.264 
Nasser al-Din Shah tried to implement some reforms that could have 
increased the infrastructural element of state power. He reformed, or 
tried to do so, education (establishing military colleges), the 
administration (establishing Ministries) and tried to keep the clergy out 
of politics.265 To understand to continuity of the Pahlavi policies with 
these policies it is important to underline that the first systematic 
attempt to create a national educational structure was the foundation of 
the Council of National Schools in 1889.266  
 
However, at the same time one of the major parts of the Safavid ruling 
structure, an administration developed to influence and invade the 
realm of religion,267 collapsed in the Qajar period. “though the ‘ulama 
continued to have a close relationship with the state, (..) the major religious 
figures appear separate from the state in the early years of the Qajar period.”268 
The clergy enjoyed a rather comfortable position, with financial 
resources derived from its own taxes and foundations, which were, 
according to Vanessa Martin, by the end of the century worth 
approximately half of state income. Furthermore the clerics enjoyed 
“virtual immunity from prosecution by the state”.269 Keddie underlines that 
the strength of the clergy was also due to the fact that its main centers 
of power lie in Iraq, that is outside the reach of imperial Persia.270 On 
this level the infrastructural power of the state declined in comparison 
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to the situation during the Safavid dynasty.271 Moreover the last Qajar 
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Iranian Armed Forces and their constitution at the time is very 
intimately linked to different imperialist countries. Qa’em Haqani 
mentions how also the French and the German contributed to the 
army’s development and dependency.279 To these forces dominated by 
foreign powers, Abrahamian adds a centralized cavalry of 80,000 men 
which was however organized along lines of tribal loyalties. 
Simplifyingly one could say that one tribe constituted more or less a 
division and the commander of such a division was the tribe’s leader.280  
 
While hence the Qajar dynasty was failing rather desolately in 
reforming and restructuring the state in order to adapt it to new 
realities, something not unlike a civil society decided to take over. 
Shaul Bakhash describes the situation as follows: “The last years of the 
reign of Naser ad-Din Shah witnessed a serious deterioration in the already 
indifferent standards of Qajar administration. (..) The finances of the State, 
never very strong, began to break down. The hold of the government over the 
provinces weakened; and the tendency (..), towards a fragmentation of power, 
reasserted itself.”281 Intellectuals and merchants formed their own 
societies and newspapers, separated from the regime, hence decreasing 
further the power of the state.282 In such a situation the Qajar Shah 
turned more and more towards the British to guarantee his power. Too 
weak to impose his will on society, not nearly strong enough to resist 
European imperialism, the Qajars started to make virtue out of 
necessity and allied ever more with British colonialism.283  
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3.2. The Constitutional Revolution  
 
The Constitutional Revolution of 1906284 has hence to be considered in a 
very clear environmental setting: relative disintegration of the royal 
state as a consequence of a failure to modernize, centralize the state and 
adapt it to the necessities of the time. It were thus the contradictions 
between the necessities of innovation on one side and the failed 
attempts to do so on the other that led to the first Iranian revolution of 
1906. More concretely it were the regime’s necessities to raise extra 
funds, through increased and enforced custom tariffs organized by 
Belgian officials and loans which indebted Iran to the Russians,  
without being able to show accountability for these or being able to use 
sufficient coercion that provoked revolt.285 The forces behind this 
revolution would predictably be those concentrations of power that 
had not only been disgruntled by the (attempted) reforms, but also had 
sufficient capacity to organize resistance. At the same time, as is the 
case with every proper social revolution, these forces were joined by a 
hybrid coalition.  
 
A first influential group joined the movement not so much out of socio-
economic considerations as out of a genuine intellectual conviction that 
Iran had to modernize following the European model. The intellectual 
fascination for European culture and political systems, also animated 
the court. The Shah himself used to spend his summers in Europe. This 
“Westernphilia” resulted in the introduction of the 1831 Belgian 
constitution during the Constitutional revolution. To those fascinated 
by the West Mangol Bayat adds “religious dissidents”, that, often 
linked to minority religious networks as the Baha’i or Azali Babis,  
pushed for secularization.286 
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No need to adhere to the continuity-thesis287 which sees the role of the 
clergy in Iranian society and politics as the wire through Iran’s 
twentieth century history, to admit the clergy did play “a highly 
significant role in the events which culminated in the Constitutional 
Revolution”.288 An argument could be made that the clergy was far from 
united. The action of three high-ranking clerics Tabataba’i, Behbehani 
and Sheikh Fazlallah could exemplify this. The first opposed the Shah 
more for ideological reasons, asking for “proper laws”, while the 
second was especially sensitive to the demands and grievances of the 
merchants.289 However the Spring 1905 alliance proved this disunity of 
lesser importance. Sheikh Fazlallah, representing perhaps a third of the 
clergy, and appeared more in support of the system and condemned 
unrest, while affirming his support for monarchy.290 Notwithstanding 
this nuance, the alliance between modernists and the oppositional part 
of the clergy, in essence the majority, which probably found its origins 
in the Tobacco revolt of 1891-1892 would prove a powerful actor in the 
1905-1906 revolutionary process.291 All the more so since the clergy had 
become progressively a spokesman and a reliable partner for some 
interests that saw no other options to make their voices heard.292 The 
power of the clergy was undeniably reinforced by the role their 
preaches played as “substitutes for mass media”.293 
 
If the Constitutional Revolution is rightly considered a “nationalist” 
revolution, it would be a grave error to consider it a revolution “made” 
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by nationalist forces. This is best be illustrated with a reference to the 
nature of the participation of the bazaar and Iranian merchants in the 
revolution. A powerful concentration of power, they apparently joined 
the movement because of the fiscal policies and foreign concessions of 
Nasser al-Din Shah and his successor Muzaffar al-Din Shah between 
(1848 and 1907).294 Nationalist motivations might have inspired the 
merchants. Truth be said, history had at that time already proven that 
their nationalism ended at the precise point their interests started. 
These interests were much more linked to modernization than to any 
moral or ideological principle. The Reuter concession the Shah had 
offered to an “imperialist” businessman and which had stirred revolt of 
the clergy and parts of the court exemplified this.295 Lord Curzon 
described the concession as the: “most complete and extraordinary 
surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands 
that has probably ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished, in history. 
Exclusive of the clauses referring to railroads and tramways, which conferred 
an absolute monopoly (..) of seventy years, the concession also handed over (..) 
the exclusive working for the same period of all Persian mines, except these of 
gold, silver, and precious stones; the monopoly of the government forests; all 
uncultivated land embraced under that designation; the exclusive construction 
of canals, kanats, and irrigation works of every description; the first refusal of a 
national bank and of all future enterprises connected with the introduction of 
roads, telegraphs, mills, factories, workshops, and public works of every 
description,…”296 Although this concession was manifestly a way of 
outselling the country to foreign industrialists, the merchants did not 
oppose it. The reason for their acceptance were multiple, but easily 
imaginable. The agreement attracted foreign investment and promised 
to realize infrastructural work that were urgently needed for the 
facilitation of their trade activities but for which they themselves lacked 
sufficient capital.297 Moreover the agreement explicitly ruled out 
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national industrialization, which could have proved a threat to the 
merchants, who preferred to continue dominating the economy as 
“middleman”, rather than seeing an important national industrial class 
emerge. They eventually joined the movement when the continuing 
trade concessions to foreigners started undermining their position. The 
unrest in the bazaar was sponsored heavily by the merchants, 
obviously, but also, subsequently, by the clergy. 298 
 
The events of 1906 to 1911 including a civil war, a royal coup and the 
reestablishment of the Constitution left Iran with a rather modern 
constitution and an equally modern institution as Parliament. Although 
a guaranteed quorum of tribal representation was refused299, electoral 
laws nevertheless guaranteed guilds representation as the Constitution 
did clerical influence in politics.300 This constituted an attempt to 
incorporate the “external” concentrations of power into the new order 
and as such could have constituted a centralizing measure. The 
infrastructural power of the state also seemed on the rise with the 
growth of municipal, departmental and provincial councils with 
impressive executive and judicial powers.301 
 
All this is not to say that centralization was truly achieved. During the 
entire period tribes, like the Bakhtiari or regionalist movements in 
Azerbaijan would continue to challenge central authority in Tehran.302 
During the second Constitutional period, in essence when the 1908 
royalist coup was undone in 1909, by joining forces with the 
revolutionaries Bakhtiari tribes succeeded in taking over key 
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government positions.303 Another attempted comeback by the Shah in 
1911 was impeded by both military defeat and Anglo-Russian 
diplomacy.304 
 
When modernist intellectual Ahmad Kasravi305, who had played an 
important role in politics both during and after the revolution, travels 
on behalf of the post-revolutionary government to the South-Western 
Iranian province of Khuzestan, he notices how a local sheikh and his 
sons (in close collaboration with the British) had practically taken 
control of the province, where Iranian sovereignty appears nothing 
more than nominal.306 The First World War aggravated the situation 
and had devastating consequences on Iran. The country became the 
arena where Russian and British interests first coalesced and then 
clashed. After the Russian revolution, the Soviet Union has the 
intention to abandon much of the foreign activities of the former tsarist 
empire, yet very soon Soviet involvement starts again in order to 
counter British activities. On the one hand Soviet influence relies on the 
links with the Cossacks, but political activities of the Soviet Union are 
probably exemplified by the change of name of the Justice Party 
(Edalat) in Hezb-e Komunist-e Iran (Iranian Communist Party, ICP).  
 
It is not uninteresting to consider briefly the history of this and other 
parties in Northern Iran. With Southern Iran under direct of indirect 
British (military and economic) influence307, Soviet influence in the 
North gives some idea of how one of the basic characteristics of Iranian 
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state formation had remained unsolved after the Constitutional 
revolution: control over the national territory. 
 
The first Congress of the CPI decided in June 1920 to adopt the name of 
CPI. At the start of the First World War the party had been founded in 
Baku as a radical party under the name of “Edalat”. It was clearly a 
workers’ party that enjoyed high degrees of popularity among the, 
mostly Iranian, workers in Baku. The party declared itself a proletarian 
party, struggling for freedom and the well-being of mankind in a 
classless society. It quickly started to organize party cells and sections 
in Iran. Although party reports mention many arrests of party members 
on Iranian soil, the party has notable success in Northern Iran, not 
coincidentally especially around Tabriz, the Azeri region of Iran. From 
Tabriz the militant Sadeqzade calls upon Soviet troops: “We await the 
arrival of Bolshevik forces to rise up, to capture offices of the government and 
organize them according to the instructions and plans [worked out] by you, 
comrades.” 308 
 
The foundation of the CPI was a consequence of different factors. One 
of these was the grouping of Edalat with the Committee of Peasants of 
the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the Hemmat, tocsin of 
Oriental communism, which had oriented many Muslim workers in the 
direction of Communism309, into the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. 
Two other events also need played a role: the arrival of Soviet troops in 
Anzali on 18 May 1920 and the declaration of the Republic, often called 
the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic of Gilan, by Mirza Kuchek Khan of 
the regionalist Jangali movement. 
 
The Jangali movement (from the Persian word jangal, forest) was made 
up especially of peasants and petty bourgeoisie (doctors, journalists, 
merchants, clerics, small landowners and so on), which made the 
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movement a very heterogeneous one.310 Many of them had joined the 
Ettehad-e Eslam movement (Islamic Unity)311, others as Ehsan Allah 
Khan, had first participated in the activities of the Komitéh Mujaza’t312 a 
“punishment committee” assassinating pro-British politicians in 
Tehran. 
 
The Jangali movement was no communist movement and Mirza 
Kuchek Khan, inspired by pragmatism, became a friend of the Soviet 
Union merely to further his regionalist goals. Aware of the 
proclamation of the Gilan Republic, the Soviets incited the PCI to form 
a front with the Jangalis. The front will not hold, since Mirza Kuchek 
Khan and the Soviet Union can not accept the CPI’s proletarian 
rhetoric, defended especially by Avetis Sultanzadé,313 considered 
premature at a phase in which the revolution still needs some of the 
middle-classes.314 Sultanzade315, later condemned by Stalin, defended a 
“pure Communist movement” 316, while Lenin at the time stated that 
the existence of a pre-capitalist reality in developing countries and the 
practical inexistence of an industrial proletariat in those countries, 
rendered such a purely proletarian movement impossible.317  
 
These different visions on tactics undermined unity even within the 
CPI. After a PCI coup that puts the entire leadership of the Jangali 
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movement under communist control, factionalism immobilizes the new 
Republic. Sultanzade is replaced by Haydar Khan Amogli at the head 
of the CPI. Eshan Allah Khan even launches an adventurous  “March 
on Tehran”. Progressively the Soviets start to understand that the 
Republic of Gilan has little future and when their negotiations with 
Reza Khan, linked to their Cossack brigades, seem to offer satisfying 
results, Soviet troops withdraw from Gilan and the “independent” 
Soviet republic collapses. Although it continues its activities after the 
fall of the Gilan Republic the CPI will quickly lose influence due to 
Soviet support to Reza Khan. Indeed, As Michael Zirisnky notices: 
“Soviet policy favored the development of an Iranian buffer against British 
expansion northward. Moscow supported the development of Reza’s 
dictatorship after February 1921. Relations between the Kremlin and the 
Cossack barracks were often so close during the early 1920s that at times 
British officials were convinced Reza Khan was Moscow’s man. Soviet 
relations with Reza possibly reached their peak in 1926, shortly after his 
coronation when Moscow and Tehran exchanged ambassadors, giving the 
Soviet emissary personal access to the new king and precedence over the 
British minister.”318 Notwithstanding these impressions, reality was very 
different.  
 
3.3. The Pahlavi Dynasty: First Act 
 
Reza Khan’s coup was if not directly organized at least supported and 
facilitated by the British. After the end of the First World War Major 
General Sir Edmund Ironside reorganized the Iranian army in order to 
allow the British to withdraw their troops, as the Soviets had promised 
to do, while leaving behind a pro-British military corpse.319 In Reza 
Khan Ironside found the military leader he thought able to impose law 
and order and oppose Soviet influence, by any means necessary.320 The 
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idea of a model of law and order and one strong national army and 
leader was relatively new, even in British politics. Until then the British 
had accepted the de facto division of the country between them and the 
Russians. But the 1917 Revolution had changed that, the struggle for 
Persia was no longer a mere struggle between two imperialist interests, 
rather it had become one of political nature. Hence the idea of a strong 
uniform national army launched by more nationalist Iranians during 
the First World War was no longer looked down upon by the British. 321 
Yet the preparation of such an Army, notwithstanding the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from the North, would not prove an easy task. The 
developing national army was  brought to the center of the Iranian state 
by Reza Khan’s 1921 coup.  Even though “by late January 1922 (..) Reza 
Khan had issued decrees eliminating the terms ‘Gendarmes’ and ‘Cossacks’: 
the two forces would henceforth be members of a single armed force. The 
[South Persian Rifles] had already been disbanded in late December,”322 more 
than its completion the coup marked the beginning of the unification of 
armed forces and the country.   
 
The defense budget increased fivefold between 1926 and 1941.323 The 
necessary capital for these operations came from Britain. The British 
minister Sir Percy Loraine had convinced London to finance Reza 
Khan’s activities through the Imperial Bank of Persia.324 Reza Shah 
successfully capitalized on the situation by trying to find some kind of 
equilibrium between the British, who considered Iran as their privilege, 
on the one hand and France, the United States and, to a lesser extent, 
the Soviet Union who all wished to obtain some degree of influence in 
the emerging state.325 It is incontestable that this “choice” or rather the 
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possibility to balance between different foreign influences enabled 
Iranian state formation, much more so than a direct colony could have 
pretended. 
 
The task of developing a modern and unified army came in parallel 
with the urgent need for the establishment of control over the 
peripheral regions of Iran. Gilan would become only the first test, and 
arguably the easiest one, since infighting had already destroyed the 
independent Republic from the inside by the time Reza Khan’s troops 
arrived.326 A more serious test proved the Kurdish uprising in the 
Autumn of 1921. The Kurdish leader Simko327 inflicted heavy casualties 
on troops of the Army and Gendarmerie alike. But also in Khorasan 
and regions of the South the Army was confronted with strong regional 
uprisings. The tribal uprisings were perhaps the most challenging. 
Since as in the Qajar army, tribal divisions also continued to form “the 
most significant fighting element” of Reza Khan’s armed forces.328 
Moreover the military might of certain tribes, like of the Bakhtiyari, 
was coupled with prestige and practical fighting experience, as they 
had participated in the struggle against the Qajar shah after the latter’s 
anti-constitutional coup of 1908.329 Reza Khan’s centralized armed 
forces on the contrary were often badly equipped and lacking 
motivation.330  
 
Reza Khan had hence to move with extreme caution and he often 
preferred political maneuvering to actual armed confrontation. The 
Qashqai tribes331 were disarmed progressively by bringing important 
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tribal leaders to Tehran, “ostensibly as Majlis deputies, but in reality 
prisoners”332  Reza Khan also allied with the Bakhtiyari against other 
tribes, which permitted him subsequent victories over the Kurds, the 
Qashqai nomadic tribes in the province of Fars, and Sheikh Khazal in 
Khuzestan. Combined with attempts to bring Baluchistan under 
national control these victories show the interaction between the 
development of the nation and the development of the new armed 
forces in the years immediately following the coup.333  
 
The Bakhtiyari were dealt with after the so-called Shalil incident, in the 
mid-1920’s, where allegedly Bakhtiyari troops killed over 100 
soldiers.334 This allowed Reza Khan to undermine the prestige the tribe 
had built up among Iranians, that had not forgotten their participation 
to the Constitutional movement, present the tribe as “anti-national” 
and inflict a heavy military defeat on them. The tribe’s friendly 
relations with the British in the South obviously contributed to Reza 
Khan’s case to win over Iranian public opinion. Military defeat also 
sparked internal strives within the tribe. While tribe elders had been co-
opted by Reza Khan, one of them became even Minister of War335, the 
younger tribe leaders saw their chance and started contesting not only 
Reza Khan but also the alliance their elders had forged with central 
authority in Tehran. Moreover these younger khans were confronted to 
an ever declining realm for their tribe: the Ministry of Justice took their 
right of dispensing justice away, the military conscription threatened 
their military might and the Pahlavi dress code even cut into their 
private traditions. All these factors contributed to the 1929 Bakhtiyari 
rebellion. Its failure signed the end of the autonomous Bakhtiyari 
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power center and from 1932 the state started with the sedentarization 
of the tribe.336 
 
By 1925, Reza Khan had completed the territorial unification of Iran 
and had become the unquestioned leader of the unified military. The 
time was now ripe for the next step, his coronation as King. Reza 
Khan’s transformation into Reza Shah was approved by Parliament 
between October 1925, when it deposed the last Qajar, Ahmad Shah, 
and December 1925, when Reza Khan became the first Pahlavi Shah. It 
appeared the consecration of his power, yet was rather a sign of the 
contrary and the illustration of a major failure. Reza Khan had 
throughout his ascendancy to power tried to rally supporters of a 
republican state order, yet his idea had successfully been opposed by 
the clergy and, more importantly, by large sections of the army who 
threatened revolt and started plotting.337 By proclaiming himself Shah 
Reza Khan solved the loyalty problem. 338  Social forces no longer had to 
choose between him and republicanism on one side and the Qajars and 
monarchy on the other. They could now opt for both monarchy and the 
new man in power.  
 
The most important reform of the Army came with the Conscription 
Law. Generalizing military conscription obviously increased state 
power. It was no coincidence that both tribes and clergy opposed it. 
The former feared a decrease in their potential of military mobilization, 
the latter did not look favorably on the idea of seeing all young people 
pass two years in a secular institution. Even the landlords looked 
unfavorably upon the idea of losing their cheap labor to a national and 
public institution.339 Yet the unification of the army and the 
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establishment of its role at the center of the new Pahlavi state, formed 
only part of the state formation process under Reza Khan. Keddie 
nicely summarizes: “To exist as an independent nation, Iran needed a civil 
service, army, and efficient tax system. The middle classes grew after the war 
(…) wanted new outlets for their talents and capital. The revival of foreign 
trade meant a growth of Iranian merchant capital.”340  
 
Although many “totalitarian” measures, like imposing a Pahlavi cap or 
a particular uniform for public officials, were to amplify the impression 
of state influence and nation-building341, Reza Shah’s bureaucracy 
developed around two main pillars. First the establishment and 
development of Ministries like Foreign Affairs, Justice, Post and 
Telegraph, Agriculture, Trade, Roads and Industry, the Interior and 
Finance, paralleled by the adoption of French inspired Codes of Law as 
the Criminal Code of 1926 and the Civil Code of 1928342.343 This 
structure was used to increase the infrastructural power of the state at 
many levels, which was to form the second pillar. I will focus here on 
reforms concerning education and the economy , although admittedly a 
similar argument could be made for the Judiciary where Reza Shah 
ultimately wanted to guarantee state domination and control by 
removing the clergy from the entire system.344 Therefore clerical 
influence was first (1929) limited to marriage and divorce cases and 
then saw sharia courts abolished altogether.345  
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Under Reza Shah so-called étatism or state involvement in economic 
affairs constantly increased. After decades of stagnation346, Reza Shah 
understood that a “big push” was needed to get the economy going. He 
proceeded by “abolishing capitulations and commercial treaties unfavorable 
to Iran, repealing or revising the concessions, and concentrating his efforts on 
the development of transport and industry, the reform of fiscal and financial 
institutions, and the control of foreign trade.”347 Such a development had 
obviously to see an increase of tax programs. Reza Shah even tried to 
tax opium, widely consumed domestically and ranking second in value 
of Iranian exports.348  
 
The infrastructural results were rather impressive. While at the 
beginning of his reign Iran only had 2,400 km of roads, this amounted 
to 24,000 km at the end of his reign.349 The most impressive 
achievement was arguably the Trans-Iranian Railway totaling 1,394 km 
and connecting the north and the south of the country, by linking 
Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf city Bandar 
Shahpur. Similar projects towards the northwest (Tabriz) and the 
northeast (Mahshad) were started but unfinished in 1941.350 These 
railroads did not only favor trade as such, but also, and perhaps 
foremost, state control over peripheral areas. 
 
One of the main characteristics of the increase in infrastructural power 
of the state is the increase in literacy and state education programs. 
There is little sense in speculating whether Reza Shah “truly” wanted to 
modernize his country through the development of education, or 
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whether he merely wanted to increase state control over the population 
by increasing his means of communication for the sake of propaganda. 
Even so it is undeniable that in my framework the second point is the 
most interesting. As mentioned before, under the Qajar period the 
clergy had obtained quite some power from its quasi monopoly on the 
transmission of information in its preaches, which forced political 
forces to woo the clerical corporation if they wanted their opinions to 
be spread. Hence to increase state power and diminish the influence of 
sub-groups and autonomous concentrations of power, the development 
of state education system, and consequently mass media, became 
inevitable.351 To improve literacy in rural areas the literacy committees 
corps were formed and by 1937 90,000 adults and which rose to 160,000 
adults in 1940 had participated in these.352 Since the academic year 
1936-37 1,500 classes for adults had been established all over the 
country and due to great success 97 classes were added to these.353 Yet 
the bulk of the educational reforms lay elsewhere. Reza Shah first 
developed so-called vocational schools, directly linked to the 
Ministries, like the Tehran school of law which would form one of the 
basis of the University of Tehran.354 This University also challenged 
religious education by instituting a Faculty of Theology, but the 
development of public education soon went much further.355  
 
Over the period 1922 to 1935, the number of elementary schools 
evolved from 440 to 1336, while the number of students and teachers in 
the same period went from respectively 43,025 and 440 to 170,077 and 
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6,805.356 The number of girls’ schools increased from 41 in 1910 over 190 
in 1920 to 870 in 1933.357 Girls came to make up 35,000 of 150,000 pupils 
in elementary and secondary education in 1930.358 The development of 
public state education also signified a relative decline in the number of 
students frequenting traditional (maktab) and religious (tullab) 
educational institutes who had both been dominated by the clergy. 
David Menashri calculates that in the period  going from1929-1930 to 
1940-1941359 public elementary and secondary schools went from 
127,546 to 314,173, that is about 2.5 times the initial number. Maktabs 
also increased but only 1.4 times, while Tullab schools decreased 
impressively from the number of 5532 to 1341, which meant a decrease 
fourfold decrease.360 Although figures differ somewhat and exact 
numbers are hard or impossible to obtain. Statistics also served a 
propaganda objective. Nonetheless, a considerable increase in public 
education was just as undeniable as was the relative decrease of 
education outside the public system. However even if the educational 
expenses of the state rose from 100,000 dollar in 1925 to 12 or 13 million 
dollar in 1940, still less than 10% of the population that received 
elementary education.361 
 
All these reforms were accompanied by a conscious and explicit effort 
of nation-building. Not only did the Shah change the name of the 
country from Persia to Iran, he also installed programs of 
“Iranification”, inciting shops to use Persian rather than foreign signs, 
starting a committee that had to purify Persian language from Arabic 
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influences (farhangestan, an organization that continues its activities 
under the Islamic Republic) and the celebration of the so-called “pure” 
Persian, a concept very close to the Nazi-ideology.362 
 
The positive results of his reforms should not obscure their more 
negative aspects. First of all bureaucracy resembled ever less a rational 
bureaucracy. The best example is possibly offered by Arthur 
Millspaugh’s experience, whose efforts made the army reforms possible 
in the first place.363 The Brit had been asked by Reza Shah to reorganize 
and rationalize the finances and expenses of the Ministry of War. 
Millspaugh failed: the Shah considered “his own personal account and the 
army account as being a joint one” and hence spent whatever he wished 
whenever he wished on whatever he wished.364 That officers still owed 
their promotion more to nepotism than to meritocracy, was for the 
expansion of state power not a problem in se but showed the limits of 
Reza Shah’s modernization politics. 
 
Increasing state influence had alienated the merchants from the King’s 
case. If they had looked favorably on more state protection after WWI, 
they now strongly resented the monopoly the state had established 
over foreign trade and important sectors of domestic trade.365 The 
clergy, which had been a target of both the educational reforms, the 
secularization process and some state control established over part of 
their traditional vaqf lands,366 had been forced to accept a more liberal 
dress code for women, and was a part from the protestations of 
ayatollah Hassan Mudarris in the Majles367, as good as silenced, was 
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obviously not going to enter the arena in defense of the Shah. One 
undeniable step forward in enhancing state power during the reign of 
Reza Shah had however been the “nationalization” of the clergy. This 
did not mean the incorporation of the clergy in the state, but the “de-
internationalizing” the clergy. In the Qajar period one of the strong 
points of the clerical institution that had permitted it to escape state 
control had been its power base in Iraq. The period of Reza Shah saw 
an important part of it leaving Iraq for Qom. There were still two sides 
to this medal. On the one side there was the fact that the state did now 
have a more national competitor which could be dealt with on a 
national scale. On the other side however the clergy could use this 
“nationalization” to develop even further its national power base and 
become a more powerful competitor to the State.368 
 
Politically Reza Shah at first ruled through a triumvirate of a Minister 
of Court from the landowner class, Teymourtatche, a Minister of 
Finance, Prince Firuz of the Qajar nobility and a technocratic Minister 
of Justice, Davar, that together represented some kind of social base369. 
Yet at the very last during the thirties they had all been alienated from 
power by drastic means. Adding to this his huge personal enrichment 
which had made him the country’s large landowner,370 had left the 
Shah with himself and the Army. Yet when even the Army realized 
that Reza Shah’s position had become untenable, the question merely 
became how and when Reza Shah “the Great” would be deposed.371 
The foreign invasion of Iran due to its relatively sympathetic attitude to 
Nazi Germany during World War II effectively answered this question.  
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3.4. The Pahlavi Dynasty: Second Act  
 
The quick defeat of an army specialized only or foremost in internal 
policing and the establishing of law and order signified the collapse of 
much of the successes obtained in those years. The collapse was 
especially visible on the level of state control over peripheral areas: 
regionalist tendencies rose once again. Especially the Turks and the 
Kurds. Until 1953, Mohammed Reza’s reign, which officially started in 
1941, when foreign powers put him in place of his father, proved to be 
more of a struggle for than an exercise of power. Pahlavi-sponsored 
journalists defended an argument very similar to what the Islamic 
republic would defend later on the same topic: “The Turks and Kurds of 
Iran are not distinct nations, they are ‘Iranians’” and “the ‘puppet’ 
governments in Kurdistan and Azarbaijan were a small band of communists 
and godless ‘rascals’”.372 There does indeed seem to have been some 
Soviet influence on the Kurdish national movement that even 
developed a Kurdish hymn to Stalin.373 At the same time some other 
groups like the Qashqai clearly had pro-Nazi inclinations. Their 
strength was such that Mohammed Reza and the British army decided 
to use them against the pro-Soviet forces rather than continuing a 
desperate struggle with them.374  
 
The clergy as well quickly reaffirmed its role in Iranian society and 
politics, a sign that Reza Shah’s claimed successes against this social 
group had been little more than apparent. Ayatollah Kashani would 
come to incarnate this reemergence of the clergy and its eruption in the 
political arena. Kashani would play a major role in the 1953 events 
surrounding nationalist premier Mossadeq. Contrary to ayatollah 
Burujerdi, who defended a more quietist approach, Kashani stated that 
religion and politics were inseparable and that the clergy must 
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intervene in politics to “attend to the affairs of Muslims.”375 The 
Mossadeq-period, which has been documented exhaustively elsewhere, 
did if anything illustrate the weakness of the Iranian state in the period 
1941-1953.376 The pro-Moscow  communist Tudeh-party played a major 
role, especially through its infiltration of the army and its strong trade 
union in the oil sector, the CCFTU. The clergy with ayatollah Kashani 
weighed on politics and even on the appointments of ministers.377 
 
If Kashani is, and not without reason, presented today as a nationalist 
cleric, it is probably more correct to consider him a defender of clerical 
interests, who tried above all to avoid the reemergence of the kind of 
dictatorship that undermined the clergy’s power and authority in the 
preceding decades. Indeed, when Mossadeq tried to reinforce state 
power, and more specifically the power of the executive, in the midst of 
allegations of Republicanism, Kashani turned against him.378 Although 
for example the quietist ayatollah Burujerdi never openly sided with 
the Shah, it is undeniable that after the CIA inspired coup which led to 
the reaffirmation of Mohammed Reza and the strengthening of 
monarchy, a modus vivendi between the royal regime and the clergy was 
found all the easier since much of the clergy withdrew to mosques and 
religious colleges.379 The acceptance by the government of certain 
educational reforms (of which a greater role for Islam in public 
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education) and the relative increase in the number of religious students 
showed how the balance of power was shifting away from the central 
state. The increase in the population of religious students had been 
visible since the collapse of the military regime of Reza Shah. Indeed 
between 1941-1942 and 1946-1947 the number of tullab students 
increased from 784 to 3057 a multiplication by 3,75. In early 1956 it was 
estimated to have reached 5,000  which came significantly close to the 
number of tullab students of just before the Reza Shah reforms.380  
 
If on a general level the need to strengthen and develop Iranian central 
bureaucracy and its control over particular power concentrations made 
a durable alliance unlikely, two factors made it explode rather quickly. 
The first related to US President Kennedy’s insistence to the Shah on 
the fact that military repression alone would not guarantee stability 
and that a more modern capitalist state had to be developed.381 The 
second factor was the lesson the Shah himself had drawn from the 
Mossadeq period in which he risked to lose his thrown almost as 
rapidly as he had obtained it. Both the activist clergy nationalist middle 
classes had challenged his position without him being able to defend it. 
The lesson was well understood. The Christian Science Monitor observed: 
“If the Shah can identify himself with successful reform, radical changes in the 
present social and political system of his country would not automatically 
mean the establishment of a republic.”382 The Shah had become aware that 
a new order and new elites were needed, not so much because “the 
traditional power groups had consistently impeded modernization and 
circumscribed power to the center”383 but because his own position would 
be untenable if such a new order were not to be installed. Not 
surprisingly his father’s policies were continued and reinforced: nation-
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building and three components of state-building by reinforcing the 
army, developing education and furthering the state’s power and 
influence on the country side and autonomous groups. 
 
The project of nation-building passed through the glorification not only 
of monarchy, with its supposedly eternal symbols, but also of the 
celebration of a mythical nation knowing “injustice, lies, avarice and 
egotism to be the signs of evil and darkness” and promoting “justice, truth, 
and humanitarianism.”384 The mainly symbolic 1946 victory of the Iranian 
army against separatists in Iranian Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan 
showed Mohammed Reza how reliant he would be on this military 
structure. 385 The new Shah was however confronted with a major 
challenge from within the armed forces: the Sazeman-é Makhvi Afsaran-é 
Hezb-é Tudeh (the Secret Organization of Officers of the Tudeh Party).386 
The communist Tudeh party had indeed succeeded in developing 
within the army an organization of officers that could be used against 
the shah. Whatever the limits this network might have had387, it still 
was a potential threat to the regime.388 The Shah expressed his feelings 
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later in this way: “even the commander of the most trusted battalion of my 
Imperial Guard was a hard-core Communist.”389 Moreover, the network’s 
rapid, albeit partial, resurrection after the 1979 revolution, showed all 
its potential. The examples of a communist party infiltrating with such 
a success the armed forces are few in history. It remains an enigma why 
the secret organization has had such limited operational effects, but its 
very existence already permits to question the coherence of the military 
institution. 
 
The attitude of the military during the 1953 events illustrates this even 
better. As history records, the CIA’s intervention, of which the famous 
operation Ajax was only the start, convinced general Zahedi to 
overthrow Mossadeq and bring the Shah back from his temporary 
“exile” in Rome when it became clear that the initial hopes of the US to 
take over the British role in Iran would not materialize.390 Although 
historians still disagree on the factual history of the time, two lines of 
thought can be distinguished.  
 
The first one, proposed by Gasiorowski et Azimi,391 asserts that the role 
of the Tudeh (and its military organization) during these events has 
been at best insignificant and at worst extremely negative. These 
authors state that the attempted coup of 16 August 1953 failed because 
of the deployment of pro-Mossadeq sections of the army. The CIA 
would then during two days have organized pseudo-Tudeh 
demonstrations, which would have been attended by genuine but 
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misled Tudeh militants. These demonstrations were designed to offer 
an image of chaos and disorder in the streets, which would justify a 
return to “law and order”. This return to order, implying above all a 
return to the barracks of pro-Mossadeq factions of the army and a 
mobilization of the anti-Mossadeq bazaaris, then opened the way to the 
putschist factions of the military. Indeed, these factions were no longer 
confronted with pro-Mossadeq troops, which had returned to the 
barracks, but only with demonstrators, the majority of which, 
according to this viewpoint, was organized by the CIA, and hence anti-
Mossadeq. This thesis, denying any significant and autonomous role to 
the Tudeh military organization, does nonetheless acknowledge at least 
two factions in the military.  
 
A second line of thought, which differs quite importantly from the first, 
has been offered by Abrahamian and, to a lesser extent, Behrooz.392 
They underline the action of the Tudeh prior to and during the events 
of the 16 August 1953, describing it in a rather positive way. According 
to these authors, the military organization of the Tudeh would have 
contributed in an important way to the failure of the first coup attempt. 
The organization would indeed have warned Mossadeq of the coup 
preparations by offering him the information they had collected within 
the army. Behrooz more or less agrees with the first thesis on the fake 
or pseudo-Tudeh demonstrations of the 17th and 18th , but stresses that 
interviews of the time show that none of the Tudeh militants present at 
the time noticed any of these “fake Tudehis”. 393 This obviously doesn’t 
prove that the latter did not exist, but it might indicate that the first 
thesis exaggerates their importance. Since the Tudeh demonstrations 
continued to increase in size, Mossadeq, fearing the Tudeh’s slogans of 
a “democratic republic” which recalled Eastern European republics394, 
would then have used the armed forces against these demonstrations. 
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By arresting these demonstrators Mossadeq actually destroyed part of 
his support, since, notwithstanding past contradictions, his National 
Front and the Tudeh were still fundamentally on the same side. By 
using the armed forces against the Tudeh, Mossadeq disorientated the 
party, which proved no longer able to offer him any real support at the 
time of the second coup some hours later. This thesis, without denying 
the pro-Mossadeq factions of the army, hence stresses two other 
factions of the army: the Tudeh-faction and the “reactionary” faction.  
 
The second thesis probably offers a more accurate image, since the first 
one fails to clarify, among other things, why the Tudeh military 
organization, with its considerable importance, would not have acted at 
all against the coup. The second line of thought is also a lot closer to the 
memoirs of Tudeh militants of the time. In his memoirs Amou’i, one of 
these officers describes to some detail how the Tudeh used this 
network in order to protect Mossedegh 395 
 
Aware of the weaknesses caused by this situation the Shah tried to 
increase his influence on the army in every way possible. One example 
is the unconstitutional custom of appointing his own nominees to head 
the War Ministry396 The Shah took the 1953 warning very serious and 
he made sure his reign would see an essential transformation of the 
Iranian military. Two major transformations can be distinguished. 
 
In the first place, Mohammed Reza erected the SAVAK (Security and 
Intelligence Organization of the Country), which would become an all-
powerful repression and intelligence apparatus, specialized in tracking 
and assassinating political opponents. Although not a military 
organization pur sang SAVAK took care of political opponents in the 
military as well. It offered the Shah an extra tool to influence on the 
                                                 
395 M.A. AMOU-I, Dord-é Zamane, Tehran, Anzam Entesharat, 1377; Consider as well F.M. 
JAVANSHIR, Tajrobe 28 Mordad, republished by Navideno, 1385, pp.82-84 and the 
memoirs of future party secretary N. KIANOURI, Hezb-e Tudeh Iran va Doktor-é 
Mossadegh, Tehran, republished by http://chawoshan.mihanblog.com , 1359 
396 E. ABRAHAMIAN, “The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905-53” in H. AFSHAR, Iran: A 
Revolution in Turmoil”, London, McMillan, 1985, pp.121-148 (127) 
 140 
internal functioning of the army, that had revealed itself vulnerable to 
outside (communist) infiltration. While the Shah used the SAVAK to 
limit the armed forces’ power, he also gave generals important political 
roles, to assure the military’s allegiance.397 At the same time however he 
merged, or tried to do so, in his person both governmental and military 
policies. In an interview then general Fereydoun Djam describes the 
interaction between these three actors: “there were two independent chains 
of command (…) the armed forces were separated from government policies 
which were in case dictated by the Shah. Therefore the Shah alone was the 
coordinator of both military and government policies.”398   
 
The second major military “innovation” of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi 
was the “Americanization” of the armed forces. Grateful to the US to 
whom he owed his return to power and aware of its indispensableness 
to his reign, he sponsored the Americanization of the Iranian armed 
forces. He hence made Iran a typical example of what Tilly describes as 
a characteristic of the armed forces of most non-European: “states that 
have come into being recently through decolonization or through reallocations 
of territory by dominant states have acquired their military organization from 
outside”.399 A part from the massive arms sales and other forms of 
technological military collaboration, one of the main signs of this 
Americanization was found in the presence of American advisors and 
technical personnel in Iran. According to an investigation of the 
American Senate in 1980, American military personnel and their 
relatives amounted to around 50.000 and 60.000 people. Moreover, the 
Iranian army structure was highly dependent on these foreign 
counselors since it lacked know-how, experience and skills to maintain 
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and use the American military equipment purchased in such massive 
amounts by their king.400 
 
With the 1953 coup and the establishment of SAVAK the Shah had 
succeeded in bringing the army more or less back under his control and 
make the military once more the central part of Pahlavi reign. On 
education as well Mohammed Reza decided to follow in his father’s 
footsteps. A campaign of public and secular education was launched 
towards the countryside, which the clergy immediately grasped as 
being directed against its interests. 401 The powerful revolt of the clergy, 
which would become famous as the 15th Khordad Movement and lead 
to the exile of Khomeini demonstrated hence as much the clergy’s 
understanding of the direction of the new policy as it illustrated the 
corps’ reestablished power. Reza Khan had been able to avoid such a 
large revolt by undermining the clergy’s power base and countering it 
with a strong army and a developing bureaucracy.402 Mohammad Reza 
was not. The Literacy committees that had existed under his father 
were reestablished as a Literacy Corps in which at the end of 1977 over 
166,949 men and 33,642 women had served. The new Shah also 
extended the campaign to rural areas, and while in 1962/1963 only 7930 
schools could be found in 7,000 villages, at the end of his reign 30,000 
villages were reached by 33,500 schools. Nonetheless by 1974 due to a 
strong growth of population the number of illiterates increased by 2 
million people.403  
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If quantitatively the Shah’s reforms showed impressive results404, 
qualitatively they were less impressive, and proportionately ever less 
students that graduated from high school got access to universities. 
This was partially a consequence of the lack of quality of high school 
graduates, or better, of the education they had received, but equally of 
the lack of university infrastructure. The Vocational Schools 
Mohammed Reza had founded, once again inspired by the work of his 
father in this domain, lagged behind both quantitatively as 
qualitatively. Designed to form agricultural and technological experts 
the colleges received mostly low-grade elementary school graduates 
and rather than 28,000 students as foreseen by the development 
program (1963/1964 to 1968/1969) they had only 16,000 inscriptions; 
while regular schools surpassed the program’s expectations by 
enrolling 658,000 students rather than 400,000. 405 
 
But military and educational reforms to tighten the state’s grip on 
society and solidify his position were not enough. The Shah became 
ever more wary of possible opponents and profoundly disliked the 
feeble opposition he sometimes had to endure from the big landlords 
on the one hand, which were no doubt nostalgic of the days of the 
weaker more feudal-like Qajar dynasty and the left, or what was left of 
it, demanding a land reform on the other. Moreover the development 
of industry406, highly accentuated, needed a different economic order in 
the countryside. Rather than being a “personal policy choice”, land 
reform was hence imposed on the Shah. Both internal as external 
pressures, like the land reform underway in Iraq after the 1958 
revolution, had made it inevitable.407  
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The agricultural development initiated with the White Revolution of 
1962. Some Western observers, admiring the high level of economic 
growth in the period 1962-1972, described the White Revolution as 
removing of loosening “many obstacles impeding Iran’s development”.408 
Other, more attentive, observers as Bani Sadr noticed how all measures 
regarded growth almost without productive investment.409 The fact that 
the Shah’s development programs strongly based on foreign 
importations did not allow an autonomous national bourgeoisie to 
blossom. At first choked by the chains of “feudalism”, it were now the 
royal “development” policies that blocked their ascension. The bazaar 
for example had the habit of using its own capital and choosing its own 
suppliers, which contrasted rather strongly with the new habits of 
becoming “exclusive” representatives dependent on foreign firms. 
Politically as well the national bourgeoisie saw its ascension blocked by 
the system’s standstill, a situation that compared very unfavorably 
with Mossadeq’s policies.410 
 
On the countryside the White Revolution reforms were the beginning 
of a process that may well have been one of the more fundamental 
causes of the monarchy’s downfall. Katouzian identifies how the 
Iranian countryside, probably not without resemblance to what Marx 
describes as the Asiatic mode of production,411 was characterized by the 
domination of villages by intermediaries of landlords (generally absent 
because living in the city).412 Exact numbers are difficult to obtain, yet 
according to estimations before the reform 56% of all lands and 
somewhere between 34-43% of all villages were owned by large 
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proprietors (although bigari, imposed labor was also common).413 
Others mention that 54% of the land was cultivated by sharecroppers 
totally dependent on the landlords, 50% of which were considered 
absentees.414 This class of landowners could be split up in different 
categories: members of the court, traditional landlords and merchants. 
Because of their contacts with the urban reality and the 
interdependence between bazaar and agricultural producers in the 
countryside, this class often mixed with commercial and state 
bourgeoisie.415  
 
In accordance with his plans of developing a classical capitalist state, be 
it in combination with an authoritarian political environment, the Shah 
tried to introduce capitalist production relations in the countryside as 
well. The White Revolution had three phases. Theoretically the first 
phase was directed against landlords possessing more than one village 
and nomads. The second phase was intended to hit land ownership of 
the clergy (waqf) and the third phase was supposed to force landlords, 
that had until then more or less successfully avoided excessive 
obedience to the Shah’s program, to sell some land to the peasants 
working on it at a price fixed by the state.416 Other accounts see the pro-
peasant bias of the first phase reversed in the second phase, which 
largely guaranteed property rights of the owners, that could retain 
more land and were even permitted to buy tenants out. 417 
 
The Shah’s scope was double, destroy the electoral support of the 
landlords and undermine the popularity of those forces demanding a 
                                                 
413 W.B. FISHER (ed.), The Land of Iran, The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol.1, Cambridge, 
Cambridge UP, 1968, p.687 
414 R. GRAHAM, The Illusion of Power,  London, Croom Helm, 1978, p.40 
415 F. HALLIDAY, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, New York, Penguin Books, 1979, 
p.106 and T. SKOCPOL, “Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution” in T. 
SKOCPOL, Social Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1994, 
pp.240-258 (245-246) 
416 F. NAHAVANDI, Aux Sources de la Révolution iranienne, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1988, 
pp.98-100 
417 M.J. AMID, Agriculture, Poverty and Reform in Iran, London, Routledge, 1990, pp.86-87 
 145 
land reform.418 His land reform consisted among other things in the 
development of agricultural holdings or corporations.419 These were, 
contrary to what was the case for landlords who could retain “just” one 
village, not limited in size.420 Moreover a redistribution of lands was 
initiated in which land was given to small peasants, officially with the 
scope of permitting them to develop their own private agricultural 
activities.421 In reality, as Abrahamian remarks, for every peasant that 
got a piece of land big enough to be able to start an independent 
farming activity, three peasants received a totally useless amount of 
land.422 Farazmand gives an overview of the situation after the land 
reform in which the new distribution of land is illustrated 
quantitatively.423 Knowing that something between 7-10 hectares was 
considered the “useful minimum”424; 320 peasants were allowed 
between 300 and 25,000 hectares; 9,000 of which the majority absentees 
100 to 300 hectares; 37,000 peasant 51 to 100 hectares; 100,000 11 to 50 
hectares; while 1,200,000 were left with 3 to 10 hectares and 1,000,000 
with ½ to 3 hectares of which about 80% with less than 1 hectare. 
Finally about 1,400,000 were left landless. They would become the new 
landless wage laborers in what the Shah intended to be agricultural 
capitalist production relations. Statistics of the International Labor 
Office mention how among the big landowners 350 families had farms 
of over 300 hectares; 1,000 families possessed farms between 200 and 
300 hectares; 4,000 families possessed between 100 and 200 hectares.425 
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When adding to it the 40,000 smaller landlords owning between 50 and 
100 hectares of land, it can be said that a little more than 45,000 families 
owned as much as twenty percent of Iran’s cultivated land.426 Although 
with these numbers it does not come as a enormous surprise that big 
landlords were able to retain the best lands with the best 
infrastructure,427 and considering that even in urban Iran right up to the 
time of the revolution pre-capitalist crafts coexisted side by side with 
industrial enterprises,428 capitalist production relations were in some 
way installed.429 Notwithstanding certain continuities, the reform 
offered a new kind of stratification to the countryside, of which a 
higher degree of centralization, with 1,300 commercial enterprises, and 
state involvement was one of the characteristics.430  
 
As Fred Halliday mentions in a Leninist sense commodity relations 
were installed just as a separation of land and labor, the growth of a 
home market with the exchanges of commodities and the development 
of a capitalist class structure. 431 By giving less than the viable minimum 
to many peasants the state hoped to strengthen this process and 
“encourage” the peasants to participate as wage laborers in state run 
farming firms while still taking advantage of the propaganda effect 
linked to a land reform.  This propaganda effect was all the more clear 
when the clergy, losing some of its lands, tried to revolt against the 
reforms. The small peasants, who would in the end benefit the least 
from the reform, did not support the clerical rebellion, because they 
considered they could only benefit from the coming reforms.432 
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Yet the land reform also had other, maybe less intended consequences. 
First of all many of the landlords, even when they reconverted 
successfully to other more modern capitalist activities, kept a profound 
resentment towards the Shah. As Firouzeh Nahavandi correctly 
underlines, the White Revolution alienated the Shah from one of the 
only classes he could reasonably expect support from for his absolutist 
way of rule.433 Moreover, the agricultural reform impoverished many 
peasants. The newly formed “rural bourgeoisie”, in essence those 
benefiting from the reform, became ever less numerous, an inevitable 
evaluation considering the nature of the land reform. Some more 
fortunate peasants that decided to emigrate to the cities to invest in 
urban real estate, but for many others it was a deteriorating economic 
situation that forces them to leave the countryside. Wanting to try their 
luck in the cities, they often became members of the so-called lumpen or 
subproletariat (mostazafan). Although due to the land reform, the 
relative share of independent farmers increased from 5 to 76% of the 
rural population,434 the part of Iranians employed in agriculture 
decreased with 23% between 1956 and 1976,.435 Between 1966 and 1976 
the urban population increased with about 6% annually. In the same 
decade around 2,111,000 persons emigrated to urbanized 
environments, hence 35% of the total increase in urban population 
came from immigration.436 If these numbers partially show the extent of 
urbanization, the social consequences of this migration are more 
difficult to measure. It remains indisputable that if Tehran in 1979 was 
a city profoundly divided between the rich north and the poor slums of 
the south, immigration had more than a marginal role in it. A member 
of the upper classes at that time asserts that since living in the north 
was not very different from living in any European city, the houses, 
offices, clothes, schools, restaurants and overall the behavior of the 
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population were perfect copies of their European equivalents, they 
never felt the necessity to visit the south of the city.437 The few 
exchanges between both parts of the city went through the workers 
living in the south but working in the north of the city. 438 Rural 
migration that added a subproletariat to the existent working class in 
the cities only accentuated this social segregation. 
 
Although the activity and class consciousness of these immigrants 
differed depending on the generation of migration, it is probably not 
too much of a generalization to describe them as the “urban poor” or 
even, considering their exclusion from the benefits of development and 
participation in institutions, as “marginal”.439 In the end  these 
immigrants, in their diversity, would prove a fruitful “fishpond” for 
the clergy and bazaaris during and especially after the revolution. 
Khosrokhavar states that “ the ever increasingly fascist vision of the 
Hezbollah is to consider in relation with the adhesion of the urban plebs to the 
post-revolutionary order. (…) It mobilizes this plebs assuring it a central place 
in street parades (…), Friday prayers, (…) and by supporting it financially 
with the distribution of prebends by revolutionary organizations.” 440 In this 
manner different organizations and « Islamic » foundations bought an 
efficient support for Khomeini. Hard not to see the parallel with the 10 
December Society of Louis Bonaparte.441 Although officially a society of 
beneficence it had no other function than buying support for 
Bonaparte. It remains ironic that those poor peasants that initially 
seemed to support the Shah’s White Revolution ended up as urban sub-
proletariat giving a decisive support to the establishment of Khomeini’s 
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power. At the same time the old concentrations of private power in the 
hands of the landlords were left almost unchanged. Indeed as a public 
servant of the time asserts, the Shah’s objective had never been to 
expropriate the class of landowners, but rather to integrate them in the 
state structure.442 As time would show, the only thing that the Shah had 
really succeeded in, had been turning one of the oldest concentrations 
of private power against his regime. In pre-revolutionary times French 
revolutionaries had had to seduce the aristocracy, in Iran the Shah’s 
policies drove part of this class, even reconverted, in their arms.443 
 
However, and this is extremely important to underline, the changes 
made in the socio-economic composition of the countryside were not 
reflected by equal changes in the development of the state’s 
bureaucracy and legitimacy, since the structural changes were 
“primarily derived from the personal power and authority of the monarch” 
and “designed to strengthen his power.”444  
 
If one would have to indicate one rationale of the Shah’s policies on the 
political level, it might be the tendency to centralize power ever more 
in his own hands. The dissolution of the two royalist parties and their 
replacement by an even more loyal party Rastakhiz in 1975 symbolize 
in an unambiguous way this political absolutism. This party intended 
to invade what had been the exclusive grounds of the traditional 
classes and more importantly the bazaar and the clergy, by forcing 
some of them to join the party and opening its own Chambres of Guilds 
and branches of the bazaar, while dissolving century-old autonomous 
guilds.445 It were not only the Shah’s socially progressive reforms that 
hurt the clergy, but also his insistence on what one newspaper called 
“nationalizing religion”: imposing public accountability to religious 
endowments and foundations, limiting the publication of religious 
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books to those institutions approved of by the state and increasing state 
influence on religious colleges.446 The developments in rural Iran 
intended to increase the role of the State, be it on the economic level by 
the corporations, be it on the social level, with the development of 
public education. If some kind of socio-economic development was 
indisputably achieved, the political area remained very exclusive. 
While the State’s importance grew, important actors as the clergy or 
even the bazaar were increasingly excluded from the political arena, 
while seeing there traditional “chasse gardée” come under government 
scrutiny. 
 
3.5. Net Results in State Formation 
 
Inspired by Lenin’s Development of Capitalism in Russia, Nicos 
Poulantzas asserted in his Political Power and Social Classes that no social 
formation presents itself ever in pure form. It always consists of 
different and intertwined “pure” modes of production.447 There is 
probably no better example of this statement than the second Pahlavi 
king’s rule. The best illustration of it is offered by the origins and 
causes of the Shah’s White Revolution.  
 
Notwithstanding the emergence of industry, accompanied the 
development of trade unions and workers’ revolts, until the mid-
twentieth century  some kind of feudalism was the dominant economic 
and social system of society in rural Iran.448 After the 1953  agitation 
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around nationalist prime minister Mossadeq, the US started inciting the 
Shah, with Israel the best guarantee for US regional interests, to 
develop a traditional capitalist state, deemed more stable than outright 
despotic rule.449  
 
What were then after two Pahlavi-kings and more than a century since 
“modernization” began within the boundaries of the country, the 
results on the field of state formation? Some of these results, notably on 
education, tribal policies and the economy have already been cited. Yet 
what has to be evaluated is how the state performed, or better how the 
Shah performed, in subduing those other concentrations of private 
power that had challenged the state’s role since the Qajar period. Two 
of those concentrations in particular had proven able to undermine the 
process of state formation and the extension of infrastructural state 
power: the bazaar and the clergy. Sabouri identifies above all three 
actors of the Islamic revolution. First the intellectuals, bureaucrats and 
lettered, then the clergy and finally the bazaar.450 Although this 
classification is indubitably a bit reductive, it justifies the attention that 
will go to clergy and bazaar under this section.  
 
In order to assess how much competition to the state these 
concentrations of private power really formed, I will envisage the 
clergy’s degree of institutionalization. In short I will assess if the clergy 
is more than just a social group, if it truly had the capacity of acting as a 
challenger to the state. For the bazaar the institutional question, 
although not superfluous, seems of lesser importance, attention should 
primarily go to its nature and considerations of its socio-political 
character. Can it be considered an actor whose actions exceed the 
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domain of business and economics? Is it in other words justified to 
consider it an actor opposing state formation and centralization?  
 
3.5.1. Concentrations of Private Power 
3.5.1.1. The Bazaar 
 
Analyzing the pre-revolutionary class structure of Iran and the 
consequences the Shah’s reforms had on it, a distinction between 
modern middle classes and traditional middle classes is often made.451 
The socio-economic reforms of the Shah did undeniably create some 
kind of new or modern middle class, many of which received education 
in the US, very often employed as technocrats. Exemplary is indeed the 
growth of state bureaucracy. Although bureaucratization had already 
started under the first Pahlavi Shah,452 its continuation caused the  
Ministry of Economy to triple and the Ministry of Education to double 
in size between 1956-1963.453 Although the distinction between modern 
and traditional middle classes is certainly not meaningless, it should 
not be exaggerated. In Mossadeq’s National Front were active members 
of both traditional, with the Tehran Association of Bazaar Trade and 
Craft Guilds454, and more modern middle classes or technocrats, with 
for example the Iran Party.455 However, since it were especially the 
traditional middle classes and above all those present in the bazaar that 
most successfully mobilized their support and shaped the post-
revolutionary state, the bazaar merits some attention. 
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Orientalist accounts of Iran and Islamic countries in general are often 
characterized by a strange sense of fascination towards it.456 The clergy 
as well is often and generally not without reason linked to the bazaar. 
But how to qualify the bazaar? What is the nature of this seemingly 
separated social space? Is it an independent sector of the economy or 
on the contrary a highly interdependent one? Most Orientalist 
approaches appear unable or unwilling to answer these questions. In 
his admirable study of the bazaar of Sefrou (Morocco) Clifford Geertz 
understandably regrets the lack of scholarship that treats the bazaar as 
a separate cultural formation, as a social institution and as an economic 
(proto-?)form.457 Geertz underlines that the bazaar is a lot more than 
just a place where people meet to cheat, he describes it as a particular 
and separate system of social relations and a special kind of economy 
centered around the consumption of goods and services.  
 
It lies beyond the scope of this analysis to offer a profound analysis of 
the Iranian bazaar, only a brief assessment of its main characteristics 
can be presented here. As will be seen, the clergy-bazaar alliance was a 
plain encounter of well-understood interests, rather than an ideological 
or automatic choice.458 Or what Nacify has called: “a symbiotic 
relationship”.459 Classical Marxist analyses would insist on the class 
nature of the bazaar. This generally leads to some kind of analysis of 
the bazaar as a (petty-)bourgeoisie or national bourgeoisie with a 
incoherent and unstable attitude towards the compradore bourgeoisie or 
the big bourgeoisie.  Such an, admittedly simplistic, scheme could then 
account for the hesitating and ambiguous nature so characteristic of the 
bazaar’s attitude towards the ruling classes throughout the twentieth 
century.  
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However when trying to increase the complexity of the analysis the 
primary question should be if anything like a bazaar exists. Or better, if 
it can be considered as a separate entity. In other words, is what Geertz 
states sufficient to include the bazaar as a separate social and unified 
entity or, why not, institution? In other words, did the bazaar 
constitute, at least at the socio-economic level, a credible opponent to 
the state?  
 
The use of the concept “bazaaris” as one category or social group is 
indeed not that self-evident. The frequently used concept seems to 
erase immediately all kinds of socio-economic differences existent 
within the bazaar. Moreover, a distinction would probably have to be 
made between the urban bazaars of the great cities (Mahshad, Tehran, 
Isfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz) and those in rural areas, or even among 
different bazaars in the same city.  
 
Nacify offers us a clear and sufficiently simplified categorization,460 
which allows us on the one hand to distinguish quite finely between 
different groups within the bazaar and, on the other, because of its 
explicit rebuttal of Marxism, to consider the bazaar from a Weberian 
point of view (Schichte). 461 Nacify mentions the “big” traders (tujaar-e 
bozorg), the middlemen between these and the retail salesmen (bonakdar 
and dallal), bankers (sarraf, those that offer credit to the bazaaris), 
producers and manufacturers (karkhanehdar and kargahdar) and finally 
the small retail salesmen (kaseb or taji-e kuchek) and in the same category 
street vendors (pilehvar). Artisans (pishevar) and “people of the square 
or place” (meydani, often but not necessarily fruit or vegetable sellers). 
Prestige and power of these differs greatly, but such are not necessarily 
linked to economic capital. It seems obvious that a big trader’s prestige 
and influence will be superior to that of a street vendor. However, so-
called middlemen, lacking any significant economic capital, frequently 
enjoy more respect than others with a bigger share of economic and 
material possessions. 
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This categorization underlines the, at least theoretical, possibility of 
class struggle in the bazaar. If the guilds of the craftsmen, artisans and 
shopkeepers can be considered to represent the bazaar’s middle 
classes,462 workers, small salesmen, pilehvar, pishevar and the strange 
combination between meydani’s and luti’s could have very different 
interests from those of the bazaar’s middle classes and theoretically 
revolt. 463 This however often remain merely theoretical, since even 
though factions have existed among bazaaris, an important conflict, 
dividing the bazaar along class lines has yet to emerge. It seems that 
rather on the contrary the masses of the bazaar have generally been 
mobilized by the big traders. 
 
The seemingly total absence of infighting along class lines brings us to 
the core argument concerning political action of the bazaar: its 
remarkable cohesion. What is to be explained in other words is that 
organic feeling of unity, the “Wir-Gefühl”.464 What seems to be missing 
among the bazaari proletariat or subproletariat of the bazaar is class 
consciousness. Can this corporatist solidarity among different members 
of the bazaar be explained by mere geographical closeness? Or by some 
kind of class or communitarian solidarity?465 A more prolific approach 
might be to consider the reasons of collective political action of the 
bazaar. 
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What have been the reasons for the bazaar to revolt? As was illustrated 
above most times the bazaar acted as a corporation defending its 
collective rights and position in the Iranian economy. “Reza Shah 
established a modern code of commerce and a series of laws  regulating 
lending, credit, and taxes in his efforts to laicize the Bazar. These measures, as 
well as those taken later by Mohammad Reza Shah were applied only partially 
to the Bazari system, while the Bazar did what it could to elude the state legal 
system.”466 Bazaari interests did not always parallel clerical interests. 
When the clergy turns against Mossadeq a large part of the bazaar 
remains loyal to him.467 No miracle in this because Mossadeq as the 
incarnation of national bourgeoisie incarnated certain policies the 
bazaar favored. More concretely the bazaar had been displeased by the 
massive imports of foreign products of which they controlled much less 
distribution and prices. Only force made them reopen their shops after 
the coup of 19 august 1953. During the Mossadeq trial, in November of 
the same year, the Tehran bazaar closed down once more. The Shah’s 
answer was unforgiving: 300 bazaaris were arrested, 218 sent into exile 
and parts of the bazaar’s roofs were destroyed by the notorious general 
Zahedi. This piece of collective action of the bazaar, although one 
should not be blind for internal contradictions in any of its actions, 
illustrates very concretely how the bazaar acts as a professional 
corporation in its own (economic) interest. As Rotblat’s long-term study 
demonstrates, the maintaining of its dominant position in the Iranian 
economy and the very survival of the bazaar are in this sense a 
transcending interest which allows to unify the bazaar.468 
 
Assessing the bazaar as a corporation allows us to evaluate the 
omnipresent religious sentiment in a different way. Mottadeh notes 
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how “there were also ways in which religion lived in the bazaar independently 
from the mosque as an endogenous expression of bazaar life.”469 The 
autonomous religious rites that take place in the bazaar seem to 
reinforce the idea that the bazaar is the house of popular religion. To 
link the merchants ethics to an Islamic ideology would probably be a 
step to far, but it is interesting to mention that it always has been in the 
interest of a merchant to appear pious because this obviously increased 
potential clients’ trust.470 Nonetheless the function of religion in the 
bazaar has undoubtedly always been wider and especially been 
focused on increasing the “Wir-Gefühl”. Increasing the bazaar’s 
cohesion by using religion, brings us very close to what Durkheim says 
when analyzing these rites : “ They are as necessary for the well functioning 
of our moral life as aliments for our physical life, because it is through them 
that the group asserts and maintains itself.”471 Khomeini himself stated in 
an address to the clergy on the occasion of the holy (Arab) month of 
Muharram that typical Shi’i mourning ceremonies achieve nothing but 
unifying the people and allowing to mobilize it.472 
 
However one should not overestimate the influence of religion. 
Abrahamian notes that the 1977 slogans of the middle-classes did not 
have any “Islamic” or “religious” content, but were entirely based on 
(economic) freedom.473 When he admitted at the end of his reign that he 
had acted directly against the bazaar, describing them as a lot of 
obsolete fanatics474, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi undoubtedly revealed one 
of the main causes for revolt of the bazaar. The Shah’s campaigns 
against “profiteering” hit the bazaar double. First of all they had been 
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hit themselves by the inflation, secondly the Shah, by launching the 
slogan “no inflation without inflators” held the bazaaris personally 
responsible for the inflation.475 Parsa describes the important 
consequences the campaign to fix prices launched between 1975 and 
1977 had for the bazaaris. During the first days 7,750 of them were 
arrested, as were some landlords. Between 1975 and 1977 109,800 and 
200,000 shopkeepers had been under investigation for the violation of 
fixed prices. These politics made the bazaaris appear as criminal 
thieves, awaiting only the next occasion to rip of customers. 476 A bazaar 
merchant declared to the New York Times that the bazaar would be 
flattened if the Shah was to get his way.477 
 
The individualization of responsibility for economic problems served a 
double objective. The intention was to deresponsibilize the government 
while at the same time offering a scapegoat to the population. Since the 
attempts of the bazaaris to negotiate with the government remained 
without success, a solution by struggle seemed ever more attractive. It 
lies beyond the scope of this study to analyze in depth the Why Men 
Rebel,478 yet two elements of the bazaar’s evolution to revolt have to be 
mentioned. First of all there was the fact that the bazaar, due to the 
regime’s reforms was losing part of its mobilizing power and 
traditional networks. Its quantitative importance in regard to the urban 
workforce had decreased from 16,09% in 1966 to 13,13% in 1976. 479 An 
admittedly small yet undeniable quantitative decrease. Secondly and 
more inmportantly, its mobilizing force diminished because the 
modernization policies of the royal regime (and especially the 
construction of huge shopping malls outside the bazaar specialized in 
luxury goods) had led many more fortuned bazaaris to leave the 
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bazaar, which increased the potential for conflict between the less 
fortuned (suffering the decreasing importance of the bazaar) and the 
high classes of the bazaar (taking advantage of the new possibilities 
offered by the reforms). The Shah himself stated: “I could not stop 
building supermarkets. I wanted a modern country. Moving against the 
bazaars was typical of the political and social risks I had to take.”480 The royal 
reforms were, unwillingly, preparing and promoting class conflict 
within the bazaar. The growing conflict between both groups 
materialized in shops being burnt down if they remained open during 
a strike. The very existence of the bazaar came under siege. In this 
context of a decrease in organizational capacity and potential 
autonomous action and the quasi-disappearance of the National Front, 
the religious way out appeared to be the only way left to mobilize and 
express concerns of an almost purely economic nature. All the more so 
since other, communist or Marxist, movements did not seem 
appropriate for the defense of the bazaar’s interests. No wonder hence 
that the bazaar started acting in close alliance with the clergy. Ashraf 
and Banuazizi show how 64% of  2.483 demonstrations during the 
revolution and half of the massive strikes between October and 
November 1978 were organized by the mosque-bazaar alliance.481 
 
Nevertheless even among religious bazaaris divergences existed and 
flourished. If after the revolution, ayatollah Shariatmadari received the 
(financial) support of the upper classes of the bazaar, Khomeini was 
favored by the lower classes. When in 1981 certain sections of the 
bazaar chose president Bani Sadr’s side, others defended staunchly 
Khomeini’s positions. 482 An example of these contradictions was 
offered in the same year when some shops in the bazaar closed down 
as a reaction to Bani Sadr’s anti-bazaar remarks, while other remained 
open at his request. The chaotic and potentially explosive situation that 
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resulted from it was probably one of the reasons that led Khomeini to 
get rid of Bani Sadr and launch a purge of the bazaar to free it from 
contra-revolutionary elements, in essence those that had supported the 
former president. The appearance of some kind of class cleavage in the 
bazaar, which sometimes took the upper hand on the corporatist 
tendencies within it, became clear in the support of lower class bazaaris 
for Khomeini’s nationalization of foreign trade, which could hardly be 
considered a measure benefiting the bazaar. 483 One of the elements that 
was supposed to cement the corporatist social relations within the 
bazaar (religious fervor) will now allow the bazaar’s lower classes to 
access state power, be it in a dominated position. This objective 
possibility of social promotion will permit some of them to turn their 
backs on the ancient dominating forces of the bazaar. Yet as a whole the 
bazaar will react in a rather unified manner during the revolution. 
Mohammed Reza had tried to undermine the bazaar’s power by 
incorporating some of them in a new economic framework, yet it had 
turned against him. His failure or unwillingness to incorporate the 
bazaaris in his political structure was what distinguished him 
fundamentally from the Islamic Republic’s regime. 
 
3.5.1.2. The Iranian Shi’i clergy 
 
In state formation it is not just about traditional elites, in essence those 
social groups that have historically been seen as concentrations of 
private, not state-dominated, power, but also about  “institutions” that 
wield private power. In the first part of this chapter it has been 
underlined how the clergy has often been a social force and a political 
actor, if not always unified, because the foundations of its power lay 
beyond the reach of Iranian secular political authorities. 
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Where the clergy would certainly be a “social unit” for Elias, 
Poulantzas would qualify it as a social category or force.484 Contrary to 
a class, a social category is not defined on the economic level. Rather, a 
social category is any distinct social grouping that could be defined as 
such by virtue of having certain (non-economic) characteristics in 
common. For example, university students, intellectuals, and the clergy 
can be considered social categories. The question then rises how to 
evaluate the cohesion of such a social category. And especially to see to 
what degree the clergy was a credible competitor to the state.  
 
In the sixties Samuel Huntington offered a definition and four criteria 
(adaptability, coherence, autonomy and complexity) of successful 
institutionalization.485 The problems with Huntington’s typology are 
many,486 applying it to pre-revolutionary “institutions” only increases 
these. It is indeed of little use to verify if the clergy has been able  to 
“adapt” in a Huntingtonian sense of the concept, nor does it seem 
useful to do so since its lasting for centuries now has sufficiently 
proven such adaptability. Yet although some interesting new 
definitions of “institutions” have emerged, Huntington’s criteria have 
not been replaced or improved since. Applying these criteria and 
“measuring” the degree of institutionalization of the clergy will offer us 
an idea of how independent, autonomous and credible this social unit 
was in its opposition to the development of the state’s power. 
 
Some other criteria than those proposed by Huntington have to be 
taken into account as well. Namely hierarchic structure, which is not 
without link with Huntington’s complexity, and independence, which 
will be linked to Huntington’s autonomy. All these will be useful to 
consider to what degree the clergy can be considered a cohesive entity 
wielding socio-economic and socio-political power on a national level, 
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rather than just a grouping of uncoordinated and divided clergymen 
spread over the country. In essence the better the clergy passes 
Huntington’s test of institutionalization, the more our argument that it 
was the clergy on the whole as a social entity that opposed state 
formation from the Qajars until the Pahlavis gains in credibility. 
 
3.5.1.2.1. Hierarchic?  
 
The first characteristic to be verified concerns the hierarchic, and thus 
in a way the bureaucratic, nature of the clergy. It is commonly known 
that Islam does not have a structured clergy as for example the Roman 
Catholic Church does, yet twelver Shi’ism forms an exception to this 
general rule. The twelver Shi’i conception of worldly rule is based, not 
only on the vanguard role of the Imams but also on the occulted Imam. 
The twelfth Shi’i Imam (so-called Mahdi487 and single legitimate ruler) 
being occulted and expected to return only at the end of times, the 
question has always been who will fill the gap in the meanwhile. The 
Safavid dynasty succeeded in “replacing” the occulted Imam with an 
institutionalized and hierarchical clergy apparatus. This process 
undoubtedly started during the reign of Ismail I (1488-1524). The 
Lebanese Karaki, accepting the title of “Just Sultan” or even “Just 
Imam” for the Safavid king was all to happy to pronounce himself 
general deputy of this ruler. Afterwards Shah Abbas I, famous among 
other things for his urban development programs in the city of Isfahan, 
then capital of the empire, also developed an infrastructure allowing 
the clergy to further strengthen their positions.488 
 
Amir-Moezzi rightly mentions how this process “took place in a specific 
direction: its aim was to drag Imamism into the political arena, apply it to the 
collective level and crystallize it as an ideology”.489 The development of a 
Shi’i clergy was hence an inherently political choice, with little or no 
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connection to religious necessities. The Shi’i clergy quickly became a 
rather powerful actor in Iranian society and would remain so for 
centuries. However and notwithstanding the strong hierarchy, 
indicated by degrees as tullab (student), mujtahed, hojjat ol-eslam, 
ayatollah, ayatollah-ozma, marja-e taqlid, all these levels are highly 
interdependent. Momen states: “ The local mullas are the main means of 
spreading public recognition of a mujtahid’s piety and learning since the 
common people are not considered able to discern such things (…). Thus the 
great mujtahids need the local mullas for recognition and the income that that 
ultimately entails. Local mullas need the great mujtahids since they tend to 
bask in the reflected glory of the mujtahid they follow.”490   
 
The highest level reachable for a Shi’i cleric is unquestionably marja-e 
taqlid (source of imitation). In a way marja’iyya is the top of the 
pyramid. Because of its politicization some predict the end of marja’iyya 
as “an institution” and consequently in one way or another the 
disappearance of a clear hierarchy within the Shi’i clergy.491 This point 
of view considers Shi’i hierarchy from a mere religious point of view. 
Nonetheless the flexibility and adaptability of this institution should 
not be underestimated. Centuries ago the relative newcomer Karaki 
declared himself something like a marja, without the approval of many 
of his seniors. In contemporary Middle Eastern history, a well-known 
example is Mohamed Al-Shirazi, whose father Mirza Hasan Shirazi, 
had been active in the Tobacco rebellion, but who himself was 
dispraised by the central Shi’i center of Najaf, yet nevertheless 
pronounced himself marja at 34 years of age. He would try to legitimize 
this claim at least as much in the political as in the religious field.492 The 
best known example is obviously Khomeini, whose acceptance as a 
marja by the Shi’i world was at least as much inspired by his political 
activities as by his religious authority.  
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A big part of the “clergy” consists of “non-professionals”. Men and 
women with limited religious training, who “perform a variety of 
religious functions ranging from services officially sanctioned by the clerical 
hierarchy to activities which, if popular, are frowned upon or even condemned 
by Shi’i scholars.”493 One can not but notice the similarity between this 
structure and functioning and the structure and functioning of a 
political party or maybe even a state’s administrative apparatus. For 
our purpose it suffices however to underline the similarity with the 
local functioning of any political party and especially a communist 
party. Local militants or party officials were essential to for example 
Stalinism since they formed its backbone, its information and 
propaganda structure. For these local party militants or soldiers, Marx, 
Lenin or Stalin were then useful to refer to as a model of authority and 
glory.  
 
In scholarly literature, Moaddel identifies two main theses for the 
understanding of clerical politics: an ideological explanatory thesis and 
a modernization-based theory.494 The first thesis pretends that twelver 
Shi’ism as a religion and an ideology leads the path of the clerics when 
these become politically active. The modernization-based explanation 
of the clergy’s political action considers the clergy’s political action in 
the light of modernization efforts of the secular state and clerical 
resistance to it.  
 
It is especially the second approach that is of some interest to us. 
Independently of its usefulness for the analysis of the political 
positioning of the clergy, its statement that the strength of the clergy 
and that of the state have always been inversely correlated is extremely 
interesting. Not so much because of the statement in itself, as because 
of the interesting supposition it uses. In such a vision the state and the 
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clergy are seen as competitors for power. And such has undeniably 
been the case. 
 
3.5.1.2.2. Autonomy-Independence 
 
The autonomy and independence of the clergy has to be considered on 
the one hand as autonomy-independence from the state and on the 
other hand as autonomy-independence from its main political ally, the 
bazaar. 
 
When Huntington mentions autonomy, he defines it as the extent to 
which organizations and procedures exist independently of other 
groups and behaviors.495 Autonomy, in a bureaucratic sense, can be 
understood as the power of autonomous policy-making, where 
bureaucracies become “politically differentiated from the actors who seek to 
control them”.496 For our model some additional features which justify a 
shift from the concept of “autonomy” to some kind of “independence” 
are at least as important. Financial and organizational independence 
from the state on the one hand, and from another social grouping the 
Iranian clergy is traditionally very entwined with (the bazaar) on the 
other hand, being the ones that interest us most in this framework.497 
The financial independence of Shi’i clergy is traditionally due to three 
kinds of revenues. Khom (an income tax of one fifth), zakat (religious 
alimony for the poor) and gifts received from believers that wish to 
support a particular cleric.498  The causes of organizational 
independence are harder to grasp, but the autonomous system of 
education the clergy has developed did indisputably play a role in it. 
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Long before the establishment of any system of public education in Iran 
the clergy disposed of a very well developed education system that 
provided anything from elementary education (maktab) in the villages 
to higher (religious) education in more religiously important cities 
(madrasa with levels from moqaddamat, as-sutuh to dars al-kharij)499  
 
To understand the special role and function the clergy had and has in 
Iranian or other Muslim societies, it is not enough to refer to the 
hierarchy (or “hierocracy”), nor does it suffice to mention the 
development of a (parallel if not unique) system of education. One of 
the most important assets of this social category has been and remains 
the mosque. While, especially until 1924, state and public functionaries 
only occasionally passed in the countryside, the clergy was 
permanently present. Papoli-Yazdi notes how: “the rapport de force 
favorable to the clergy can in a large measure be explained by the fact that, 
because of its presence and the work of its members, it possesses the equivalent 
of an administration, which is greater in number, more efficient, more 
motivated, better embedded on the entire territory and hence having an 
unsurpassed network of information, than the government’s 
administration.”500 It is seldom exaggerated to speak of a true control of 
public space by the clergy.501 
 
The omnipresence of the mosque in most Muslim countries has put it 
often at the very centre of societal and political activities. Yet, although 
not automatically belonging to it , the almost natural domination of 
these mosques by the clergy in combination with the mosque’s 
omnipresence make it a formidable asset for this social category. As a 
disillusioned communist militant told me pointing at a mosque: “You 
don’t need a political party when you have these.” The role of these 
mosques in the Islamic revolution and especially in the divulgation of 
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Islamic revolutionary thought, like the speeches of Khomeini, was 
fundamental.502  Especially from the publication of an anti-Khomeini 
article on 7 January 1978 to the victory of the revolution, the mosque 
played a central role in revolutionary mobilization by sermons, 
pamphleteering and the distribution of recorded speeches on tape.503 
No wonder that after the Islamic revolution the new government 
promoted the proliferation of mosques.504  
 
Independence also partially explains the oppositional role Shi’i clerics 
have played so often.505 This independence does however have two 
separate, contradictory yet complementary consequences: greater 
independence (separation state-clergy) combined with greater political 
influence (involvement of part of clergy in politics). Most of Keddie’s 
work has been based on some kind of continuity assumption. Her 
analysis of the Iranian revolution506 interpreted this revolution as a 
« logic » consequence of Iranian history which for centuries saw the 
clergy protagonist in politics. Molajani is right to call this an orientalist 
approach, all the more so since it minimizes the role of other 
autonomous social groups in the revolution.507  A discussion on the 
relative importance of the clergy in Iranian history does not endanger 
my basic assumption, namely that the Iranian clergy can be considered 
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an institution in the sense of my model. Rather on the contrary, up till 
now I have demonstrated how history seems to have contributed to the 
institutionalization of a clerical establishment able to function as a 
parallel institution after the revolution. It is hence important to notice 
that, whatever the causes and reasons for it might be, in Iran the clergy 
had, even before the revolution, become an independent entity or, to 
use the words of Yann Richard, an autonomous social category.508 Inspired 
by Weber, Arjomand indicates it as a “hierocracy”.509 A neologism that 
does perfectly illustrate not only the nature of the clerical Shi’i 
hierarchy but also its usefulness in the structure of our model. 
 
Although it recognizes the essential role the clergy has played in 
Iranian history510, the continuity thesis, which sees the Iranian 
revolution as a logical consequence of the well-built alliance between 
the bazaar on the one hand and the clergy on the other, seems at the 
same time to undermine the idea of the clergy as an autonomous 
institution. The lack of autonomy appears even more plausible since of 
the above mentioned financial revenues of the clergy an important 
share, of khoms notably, is obtained through the bazaar. Something 
Khomeini himself admitted gladly.511 Even though some authors, as 
Parsa512, assert that the bazaar and the clergy have sometimes acted in 
opposition to one another, this can hardly obscure the fundamental 
alliance that has characterized the relationship between both groups. If 
one wishes to limit the analysis to contemporary Iranian history, the 
Tobacco protest of 1891-1892 was probably the first modern example of 
collective political action of these two groups.513 Even when we take a 
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closer look at the Mossadeq era, it is undeniable that for most of the 
period ayatollah Kashani, one of the most influent clerical 
representatives of that time, coordinated his action closely with the 
bazaar. His Society of Muslim Warriors, together with the Feda’iyan-e 
Eslam and, to a lesser extent, the Toiler Party of Maleki and Baqai, were 
even considered the political expression of the bazaar.514 At the same 
time it is accurate to state that different interests coexisted in this 
alliance. Kashani turned away from Mossadeq especially because of the 
socio-cultural reforms the latter wished to implement, parts of the 
bazaar on the other hand, although ultimately disgruntled by the coup 
d’état, feared that Mossadeq’s socio-economic reforms would lead to 
some kind of “communist Iran”. Other parts, of which Bazargan is 
probably a good example, although fervidly opposed to the communist 
Tudeh party chose to remain loyal to Mossadeq, inciting him to take a 
stauncher stand against the communists.  
 
The continuity thesis is thus not immune to criticism. The close alliance 
between both groups should indeed not hide the fact that both groups 
continue to pursue their own interests. In the beginning of the sixties, 
Khomeini and with him an important part of the clergy mobilized 
against the modernizing reforms of the shah out of disquiet caused by 
decreasing clerical power. The action of the clergy demonstrated and 
not for the first time that it had proper and material interests. The 
secularizing educational reforms of the Shah for example were 
perceived as posing a threat to the social role of the clergy and its 
control on the people’s education. 515  Moreover, by taking over the 
educational system from the clergy, the state was also, indirectly 
threatening the financial power system of the clergy. Many of the 
personal ties that would convince a believer to pay his religious taxes to 
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